Repair and Maintenance of Easements – Whose Responsibility?

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled on a case where the duties surrounding easements and who has the obligation to maintain an easement were at issue.  An easement is a legal right to use another person’s land for a specified purpose and must have four characteristics to be effective. There must be a dominant and a servient tenement – the “dominant” land is benefitted by the “servient” land over which the easement applies; the easement must “accommodate” the dominant tenement in that it is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of that land; the owners of the dominant and servient tenements must be different persons (you can’t have an easement over your own land); and a right over land cannot amount to an easement unless it is capable of forming the subject-matter of a grant (for instance, the right can’t be vague or uncertain). Case law has established that where an easement is created by express grant, the nature and extent of the easement should be determined based on the language of the instrument that created it, taking into account the circumstances at the time the easement is created.

In the recent court decision, the “dominant” owner was found to have no positive obligation to repair and maintain a drain located on the “servient” owner’s land. The servient land was located adjacent to the Highway 401 corridor.  In 1959, the owner of the servient land, part of a farm, had granted the Province an easement for the installation of a drainage system.  The drain was properly installed but, as the years went by, the drain deteriorated and caused the farm property to retain water.  The servient owner experienced crop loss and had to undertake significant repairs to the drain at a cost of roughly $60,000.  The servient owner sued the Province (and later the Municipality that took over the easement) to recover his losses.  After the Plaintiff passed away, his estate carried on the action and asked the Court to grant summary judgment (a decision made by the court without a full trial) against the Municipality.

After repairing the drainage system, the Plaintiff had contacted the Province and the Municipality to inform them of the problems in hopes of having the repair costs covered. The Municipality informed the Plaintiff that it only had the right to maintain the drain and not an obligation to do so.  Hearing this news caused the Plaintiff to write a letter to the Mayor of the Municipality setting out the background behind the drainage easement.  The Municipality did not respond to the letter or take responsibility for the repair costs, which led to the Plaintiff commencing his action.

The Plaintiff’s claims included requests for a declaration that the Municipality is liable for the continuing maintenance of the drain, reimbursement of the costs to repair and replace the drain,  and damages for the loss of crops. The Court considered several issues in deciding the claim, including the applicable test for summary judgment, the nature of the easement, whether the Municipality had a positive obligation to repair the drain, and whether the Municipality was liable to the Plaintiff for the cost of the drain repair and/or the crop loss and in what amount(s).

In considering what the nature of the easement was, the Court determined that both the original easement (originally granted to the Province) and the transferred easement (as transferred from the Province to the Municipality) are valid in law.  The Highway 401 corridor was considered to be the dominant tenement and the Plaintiff’s property was the servient tenement; the original easement and the transferred easement accommodated the drainage of the highway (reasonably necessary for the use of the highway); the owners of the dominant and servient tenements were different persons; and, the right to build and maintain a tile drain on a strip of the property was a right capable of forming the subject matter of a grant.  Having concluded that the easements are valid, the Court then addressed the Plaintiff’s claim that the Municipality had a positive duty to repair and maintain the drain and cover the costs incurred.  The Court ruled against the Plaintiff based on its interpretation of the easement.

The Court referenced the legal principles established by the Supreme Court of Canada in a 2014 decision that stated evidence should be examined by considering the mutual and objective intention of the parties.  When it comes to easements, the words of the grant must be interpreted in an ordinary and grammatical meaning that aligns with the circumstances of the parties involved at the time the easement was created.  The Court found in this case that the original easement was silent with regard to any obligation to repair.  While in some cases, the party enjoying the use of the easement will be liable for repairs, that was not the case in this scenario.

Absent express language in the grant of the easement, the “dominant owner” (the person benefitting from the easement) does not have an obligation pursuant to the grant of easement to keep the easement in proper condition. However, that doesn’t necessarily leave the “servient” owner (whose land is subject to the easement) without a remedy. Where the dominant owner acts negligently or commits a nuisance, they can still be held liable for repair costs and damages.  In this case, the Plaintiff’s estate was permitted to continue with a claim for damages based on the law of nuisance.

Read the decision at:  2024 ONSC 2811 (CanLII).

Utility Easements and Swimming Pools – A Costly Combination

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

In conducting a title search on a property, it is not uncommon to discover one or more registrations for easements for public and even private utility services.  A municipality may have an easement for a sewer line through a property or an easement for access to maintain a sewer in an adjacent property.  Oil and gas companies have easements for pipelines.  Electricity distributors have easements for electricity transmission and distribution lines.  Telephone companies have easements for telephone lines.  A neighbour may have an easement for a private water line.  In all of these cases, there will be some restriction on the use that may be made of the land encumbered by the easement.  The “servient” owner of the affected land, whether by the terms of a contract or through the Common Law, is generally prohibited from substantially interfering with the rights of the “dominant” owner for whose benefit the easement exists.

Some minor utility easements will have little effect on property use, such as those running parallel to a road allowance where building is already prohibited by setback requirements in a zoning by-law.  Other utility easements can have a major impact on land use.  For instance, the easement for a large diameter high-pressure natural gas pipeline or for an overhead electricity transmission line can effectively sterilize a property.  Within urban centres, such easements may be condemned to serve as “green space”.  In agricultural areas, these easements can often continue to be used for cultivation and other agricultural purposes but not for any other non-agricultural development.

In standard forms of Agreement of Purchase and Sale for land, buyers agree that they will take title to the property subject to minor easements for utility or telephone services or easements for public utility lines that do not have a material effect on the use of property.  While the seller is generally obligated to provide clear title to the property, those easements are an exception.  In some cases, a buyer will know about easements affecting a property before signing the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.  In other cases, easements will only be disclosed after the deal is signed when a title search is conducted.  Sometimes the discovery of an easement can scuttle the closing of a transaction.

In a case decided in 2016, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ordered that sellers return a $50,000 deposit to a buyer in a failed transaction involving a $1,685,000 home.  The Agreement of Purchase and Sale included the exceptions to clear title mentioned above, but the buyer refused to close the transaction after discovering that there was an easement for a TransCanada Pipelines natural gas pipeline running through the backyard directly beneath the property’s pool, cabana and patio.  There was an agreement registered on title that provided TransCanada with the right to remove the pool and cabana if necessary to deal with its pipeline.

There were actually two TransCanada easements registered on title to the property.  While the sellers had disclosed the existence of one of the easements (registered in 1959), which did not affect the pool, cabana and patio, they failed to disclose the second easement (registered in 1992), which did affect those components of the property.  The sellers had constructed the pool, cabana and patio in 2011 without TransCanada’s consent, and had subsequently entered into the agreement by which TransCanada could require removal of the pool and cabana in order to allow construction to be completed.

The Court ruled in the buyer’s favour, finding that he was entitled to rescind the agreement to purchase the property because of the undisclosed easement and agreement which could “affect, in a significant way, the [buyer’s] use and enjoyment of the property.”

The Court of Appeal for Ontario just released a decision in another utility easement/swimming pool case.  This time, homeowners constructed a swimming pool on a part of their property that was subject to a 1972 general municipal utility easement.  The terms of the easement reserved to the landowners the right to use the surface for any purpose which did not conflict with the Municipality’s rights.  The easement also specifically prohibited planting of trees and the erection of any building or structure.

The homeowners had purchased the property in 2012.  They knew about the utility easement, but believed it was abandoned or never used.  They were wrong.  The easement contained an electricity distribution line servicing a neighbouring property.  The homeowners built their pool in 2014 without a building permit, which resulted in prosecution under the Building Code Act.  In 2018, the easement rights holders (the Municipality and the local electricity distributor) applied to the Court for orders declaring that the pool encroached upon the easement and requiring the removal of the pool.

A judge of the Superior Court granted the application, ruling that the pool “actionably” encroached on the easement because it contravened the express prohibition in the terms of the easement.  Without that express prohibition, though, the judge would have found that the pool did not have to be removed because it did not meet the test for “substantial interference” with the easement; the pool could only “cause some unspecified or unknown, but probably quite minor, degree of inconvenience” to the rights holders in exercising their easement rights.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the construction of the pool was an actionable encroachment.  The words of the easement document were clear – do not under any circumstances plant a tree or build a structure within the easement lands. 

Whether you own a property or plan to buy one, don’t ignore easements.  And, no, that caution doesn’t just apply to properties with swimming pools.

Read the Court of Appeal's decision at: 2021 ONCA 1.

Subsequent agreement doesn't necessarily cancel out pre-existing prescriptive easement

"Good fences do not always make good neighbours." 

I wonder how many court decisions begin with that line or something like it - it seems like it must be a lot.  Madam Justice Gomery of the Ontario Superior Court opens her reasons with that line in a recent case involving a claim for a prescriptive easement in Ottawa.  Neighbours were in court disputing the space between their houses, each built sometime prior to 1928.  The houses are just over 14 feet apart, and a shared driveway runs between the houses.

Neighbour E had lived in the one house since 1980.  Neighbours P moved into the other house in 2003.  Notwithstanding that the driveway had been between the houses for the entire time Neighbours P had occupied their property, they went ahead in November, 2016 and built a fence down the middle of the driveway, just inside their own property line.  Of course, they were still able to use the driveway with the fence in place because they had sufficient space on their side.  On Neighbour E's side, a retaining wall was in place and the space between that wall and the fence was insufficient to allow him to use the driveway.

As noted above, the actual property line ran down the middle portion of the shared driveway.  Neighbour E brought an application for an order recognizing his right to use the full width of the (previously) shared driveway and requiring Neighbours P to remove their fence.  Neighbour E claimed that he had a prescriptive easement (one that arises through use over a period of time) over the driveway.  At issue was whether Neighbour E's enjoyment of the driveway (and that of his predecessors in title) had been with the permission of Neighbours P (and their predecessors in title).  In order for an easement to arise by prescription, the use of the land must be without the permission or objection of the owner of the land involved. 

To succeed in his claim, Neighbour E had to show that the owners of his property had used the shared driveway for a period of at least 20 years prior to 1996 (when the lands were converted into the Land Titles System, which no longer permits the creation of easements by prescription), with the knowledge of the neighbouring landowners, and without their objection or permission.  While Neighbour E had evidence showing such use prior to 1996, he had to deal with the fact that a previous owner had entered into an agreement in 1980 in which each neighbour (predecessors in title to the current owners) had given the other a right to use the shared driveway, and had agreed to share expenses, for a period of 21 years less a day.  Did this agreement mean that use of the driveway was with permission and could not, therefore, give rise to a prescriptive easement?  If an easement had been established prior to 1980, did the agreement cancel the easement out?

Justice Gomery found that the agreement did not erase the prescriptive easement that she found to have existed prior to the agreement made in 1980.  She reasoned that where parties neglect to record an easement on title, that does not defeat the claim for the easement where the Court finds that it exists.  Likewise, the failure by the parties to have recognized the pre-existing easement in the 1980 agreement did not extinguish the pre-existing prescriptive easement.  Justice Gomery ruled in favour of Neighbour E.

Read the decision at: E et al. v. P et al.

Court grants injunction to Enbridge over interference with maintenance digs

Back in March, 2017, Enbridge Pipelines Inc. ("Enbridge") was in court seeking injunctions against two individuals to prohibit them from interfering with maintenance work being conducted on Lines 10 and 11, two adjacent oil pipelines near Hamilton, Ontario.  Enbridge asserted that the individuals had been regularly interfering with its work crews since January, 2017, including the tearing down of snow fences and gates and verbally demanding that work be shut down.  Enbridge also alleged that, after two weeks of obstruction, the individuals placed rabbit traps to obstruct access to the dig sites and then asserted treaty hunting rights.

In their defence, the individuals involved in the case alleged that they are Haudenosaunee citizens with the ability to exercise rights upon Haudenosaunee traditional treaty territory.  They served Notices of Constitutional Question stating their intention to question the constitutional validity of the following: 1) the Trespass to Property Act as it may apply to a Haudenosaunee person undertaking harvesting activity pursuant to treaty rights; 2) any interim or interlocutory injunction which would directly or indirectly impair, infringe and/or interfere with the exercise of treaty rights where the Crown has not discharged its obligations to uphold the Honour of the Crown (duty to consult and accommodate); and, 3) the granting of any easement (i.e. Enbridge's pipeline easements) where treaty rights would be impaired, infringed and/or interfered with where the Crown has not discharged its obligation to uphold the Honour of the Crown (duty to consult and accommodate).

Justice Broad of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice reviewed the constitutional arguments and concluded that, "the question of whether the Crown has made efforts to comply with its duty to consult and accommodate is not relevant to the exercise of the court's decision to deny an injunction sought by a private party such as Enbridge with an interest in land on discretionary grounds."  Also, Justice Broad noted, "The defendants have been unable to point to any cases where a precondition involving the exhaustion of efforts to consult and find negotiated or legislated resolutions has been recognized or applied where an injunction is sought at the instance of a private property owner where aboriginal treaty rights are claimed or exercised."

Having disposed of the constitutional issues, Justice Broad reviewed Enbridge's request for injunctive relief on the basis of the standard three-part test for injunctions:

1)      the plaintiff must establish a serious question to be tried;

2)      the plaintiff must show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and

3)      the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. This involves a consideration of which party will suffer greater harm if the injunction is granted or refused.

Justice Broad ruled in favour of Enbridge on all three parts of the test.  With respect to the defendants' treaty right claims, he concluded: "The defendants' claim to relevant interests or rights may be advanced by appropriate parties or groups having the requisite standing through lawful avenues.  The defendants' resort to unlawful self-help should not, however, be countenanced ...".

Read the decision at: Enbridge Pipelines Inc. v. Williams et al.

Ontario Court of Appeal confirms test for grantor's easement of necessity remains "strict necessity", not "practical necessity"

In Ontario, an easement of necessity may arise where land that is sold is inaccessible except by passing over adjoining land retained by the seller (i.e. an implied grant by the seller of an easement that allows the purchaser to access the purchased lot).  The easement must "be necessary to use or access the property", and necessity is determined at the time of the grant (the situation at the time the property was sold).

It is also possible for the easement to arise in the opposite direction, where the grantor (the party selling the land) requires an access easement across the land being sold or transferred.  That was the situation reviewed recently by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Wise.  In a case where the grantor or seller seeks an easement over the land that he or she transferred, the test is one of "strict necessity".  The test to be met by a grantor seeking an easement is supposed to be more difficult than where a grantee seeks an easement because "grantors are not permitted to derogate from the terms of their grant of land.  If they want to reserve an easement, they should do so explicitly at the time they make the grant.  An easement of necessity will be found only if it was necessary in order for the grantor to be able to use his or her property at the time of the grant."

In the Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Wise case, the application judge in the Superior Court had found that a landlocked waterfront property had an easement of necessity over a neighbouring property in spite of the availability of water access.  The judge found that the water access was "impractical".  On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the basis that the water access, whether inconvenient or impractical, was available, and that the property in question was not rendered unusable.  The test to be applied was not "practical necessity" (as the judge at first instance had proposed), but remained one of "strict necessity".

Read the decision at: Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Wise.

TransCanada pipeline easement beneath swimming pool nixes property sale

The Plaintiffs in this case wanted to sell their residential property.  They listed the property for sale and the Defendant agreed to purchase it for $1,685,000.  The Agreement of Purchase and Sale was dated August 25, 2014 and the transaction was scheduled to close on November 28, 2014.  The property featured a pool, cabana and patio in the backyard.

After entering into the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, the Defendant discovered that a TransCanada Pipelines Limited ("TCPL") easement ran directly under the pool, cabana and patio.  An agreement provided that TCPL could remove the pool and cabana if necessary, and the agreement and the easement were the subjects of ongoing litigation between the Plaintiffs and TCPL.  The Agreement of Purchase and Sale between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant did not expressly reference the easement or the litigation.

The Defendant discovered the easement on November 6, 2014.  On November 7, 2014, the Defendant advised the Plaintiffs that he would not close the deal, and requested the return of the $50,000 purchase deposit.  The Plaintiffs refused to return the deposit and commenced an action against the Defendant for damages resulting from the failure to close the deal.  The Defendant counterclaimed for the return of the deposit.

As the Court explains in its decision on the claim and counterclaim, the Plaintiffs had constructed the pool, cabana and patio in 2011 without the consent of TCPL.  The TCPL easement dated from 1992, but the Plaintiffs were apparently unaware of it when excavations began (it was actually the second of two TCPL easements on the property).  TCPL permitted the Plaintiffs to encroach on the TCPL easement on certain conditions including:

(a)   The owners agree to sign a formal agreement prepared by TCPL which will be registered against the title of the land and will carry forward with future ownership;

(b)   In the event TCPL’s future operations, new installations, integrity or maintenance programs require the removal of the improvements (the pool and cabana) situated on its easement, the Owner agrees to remove the improvements immediately upon receipt of notice. The Owners and TCPL agree to equally share (50/50) the cost to remove the improvements;

(c)   The Owners covenant and agree that upon the Owner’s sale or disposition of the Lands, the Owners shall fully disclose the restrictive covenant to any prospective purchaser.

A letter containing those terms was registered on title to the property, but the Plaintiffs did not otherwise advise the Defendant of the letter or the subsequent litigation between TCPL and the Plaintiffs.

After the Defendant failed to close the transaction, the Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage and the property was sold under power of sale in May, 2015 for $1,730,000.  Although the sale price was higher than the price the Defendant would have paid, the Plaintiffs claimed they received $78,100 less in the power of sale because of the difference in the real estate commission charged (5% vs. 2.5%).

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the damages they claimed from the Defendant.  Instead, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim and granted judgment to the Defendant for the return of the $50,000 deposit.  The Court ruled that the Defendant was entitled to rescind the Agreement of Purchase and Sale because the (second) TCPL easement and associated encroachment agreement and litigation had not been disclosed to the Defendant in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.  As the Court noted:

The reference to a single easement in Schedule A of the APS did not provide the defendant with notice or disclosure of the 1992 easement or the June 2, 2011 letter agreement. Schedule A did not referentially incorporate the 1992 easement or make it part of the APS. This is especially true when the wording of Schedule A is compared to the wording of Schedule A in the earlier Purbas APS, which specifically referenced the TCPL litigation. Accordingly, the existence of the 1992 easement, the June 2, 2011 letter agreement, the unexecuted “Agreement To Install Swimming Pool and Cabana”, and the cloud of the litigation in relation to the plaintiffs’ refusal to execute the agreement, all meant that the plaintiffs did not comply with paragraph 10 of the APS which required the title to be free from all registered restrictions except as specifically provided in the agreement.

Read the decision at: Savo and Robichaud v Moursalien.

Lawsuits challenge railroad's authority to OK oil pipeline

Here is an interesting article from AP business writer, Josh Funk, about growing conflicts between railways and neighbouring landowners in the US over pipelines and pipelines royalties: Click here to read the article at PennEnergy.com.  Not all railways hold full ownership over the land beneath their tracks; so who has the authority to grant permission for a pipeline, and to whom is compensation payable?

Court declines to find that shared driveway right-of-way was abandoned

The drawing above shows three adjacent residential properties in Toronto (in blue, pink and yellow) along with a right-of-way that is shared by the three properties (in green).  The street adjacent to the three properties runs down the left side of the drawing; the right-of-way is a driveway that runs back behind the properties in an L-shape.

 

The owners of the blue lot wanted to use the driveway pursuant to the deeded right-of-way.  The owner of the yellow lot challenged this use on the basis that the blue lot owners had abandoned the right of way.  She claimed that she was entitled to park her car beside her house so as to block the laneway.  In fact, both the yellow lot owner and the pink lot owner (or their predecessors in title) had fenced off the right-of-way adjacent to their backyards.

 

The owners of the blue lot applied to the Superior Court of Justice for an order enforcing their rights to use the right-of-way.  In reviewing the application, the Court noted that the rights-of-way of the three lot owners were duly registered on title.  However, the registered owner of the right-of-way lands (the laneway) had passed away and none of his heirs were made parties to the application by the owners of the blue lot.  For that reason, Justice Myers stated, "I am reluctant to declare any rights in the laneway that may affect the owners' interests."

 

Justice Myers did comment that he would not find as a fact that the applicants (owners of the blue lot) or their predecessors in title abandoned their right-of-way over the laneway, but he did not think that he had the proper parties before him (including the owners of the laneway) to make a formal determination that the owners of the blue lot had not abandoned the right-of-way.  Justice Myers was prepared, however, to enforce the applicants' deeded right-of-way as against the other two residential lot owners (pink and yellow) in personam so that neither of those two owners would be permitted to block the laneway.  He specified that, "nothing herein is intended to bind the true owner(s) of the laneway and my order is expressly without prejudice to any and all rights of the true owner(s) to assert abandonment or any other causes of action or defence that he, she, it, or they may have against the [residential owners]."

Read the decision at: Currie v. Chatterton.

Gas supply easement binds any severed parcels

The Alberta Court of Appeal rejected an application for leave to appeal from a decision that found that a gas supply easement continued to apply after a lot was severed into three parts (creating two new lots).  The owners of the original parcel applied to the Alberta Utilities Commission for an order directing the Evergreen Gas Co-op to discharge its easement from the newly subdivided lots.  The Commission refused, and the owners sought leave to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the easement, which was a general easement that applied to the entire original property (rather than a limited easement or ROW over a particular portion of the property), would continue to apply to any subdivided parts of the property.  The Court rejected the argument by the owners that the imposition of the easement on the new parcels was nevertheless "improper" within the meaning of the Gas Distribution Act.  The Court also rejected the argument that the easement "agreement" (the easement was created when the owners agreed to receive gas service from the Co-op, the terms of the contract being statutorily set) was "unconscionable" - how could the contract be unconscionable when the owners had applied for gas service and the terms of the contract were imposed by statute?

Read the decision at: Andre v Evergreen Gas Co-op Ltd.

Lack of an "honest belief": BC Court orders neighbours to remove encroaching barn and shed

One neighbour (G) has a barn and a shed that protrude onto another neighbour's (N's) property.  The barn is used for stabling horses and the shed is used for storage and has an attached chicken coop.  The situation ended up in BC Supreme Court where N proposed two options: 1) shared use of the barn and the shed; or, failing that, 2) an order for removal of the encroaching structures within 6 months.  According to the Court, each neighbour accused the other of being unreasonable and uncompromising about the encroachments.

G sought an order that there is an easement permitting the encroachments.  Although G knew about the encroachment before purchasing the property, G suggested that reliance had been placed on the representations made by the previous owner of N's property when G dealt with the barn and shed (choosing to maintain and improve the buildings, rather than remove them).   The Court ruled that G would not obtain an easement, largely on the basis that G did not have an "honest belief" about having the easement in the first place:

G purchased their property knowing specifically that the barn and shed and surrounding land encroached on their neighbour’s property. They now seek to obtain by court order what they did not bargain for in the first place. In essence, the G position is that the simplest and easiest solution from their point of view is for the court to grant them an easement over the N property or to allow them to buy the encroaching area, for modest compensation.

The Court ordered that the barn and shed encroachments, including buildings and fencing, be removed from N's property within 9 months.  The Court declined to order that half of the cost of doing so be borne by N, finding no reason to do so. 

Read the decision at: Gueldner v. Nichele.

Is a 1960 reservation of the right to take hay still enforceable?

The Nova Scotia Supreme Court has recently heard the case of a farmer looking to exercise a right to take hay that was first created in 1960.  The Court explained:

This application involves the interpretation of a reservation of a hay/crop

right in favour of GC, his heirs and assigns” in a 1960 deed from

GC to the respondents’ predecessor in title ID. An area of some 2.7 acres of GC’s 150-acre farm lot in Antigonish County, was conveyed, along with a 100-year old farm house and barn (or its foundation), collectively “the S lot.” After describing the dimensions of the 2.7-acre lot, which runs through GC’s farm lot, the deed then provides the following:

RESERVING however to the said GC, his heirs and assigns the right and privilege to enter upon the said land from time to time for the purpose of removing hay or other crops or improving the land, ...

GC's nephew and successor in title has now come to the Court seeking an order confirming and declaring his right to enter the 2.7 acre parcel "for the purpose of removing hay or other crops or improving the land".

The Court determined that the right reserved to GC when he sold the 2.7 acre parcel was a "profit a prendre" - a right to take the produce or profit from the land.  The Court ruled that GC had reserved to himself and to his assigns (his successors in title) the right to remove hay form a portion of the 2.7 acres and that this reservation was not "repugnant" to the grant of title to the 2.7 acres (i.e. the sale of the land in 1960).

The responding parties (the current owners of the 2.7 acres) argued that the profit a prendre was extinguished years ago "because the purpose for which the condition was created has now expired".  The Court disagreed with this position.  It found that the owners of the GC lands have continued to take hay from the 2.7 acres since 1960 (whether for their own use or by lease to another farmer) and that:

If the profit appurtenant has been extinguished by the permanent alteration of the GC tenement, since it is no longer a cattle farm, then removal of the hay is still held as a right in gross, unaffected by such circumstances. It is a right exercisable by GC, the owner of it independently of his ownership of any land. The reservation is not rendered void or the profit extinguished due to alteration to the GC lot. 

However, the Court agreed with the respondents that the right to take hay on the whole 2.7 acres unreasonably limited their potential use of the property.  The Court made an order allowing the respondents to use the land within a certain tree line, which the Court determined "would not be an actionable infringement of the reservation rights".  The Court did grant the application and declared that the GC land owners hold a profit a prendre.

Read the decision at: Chisholm v. Snyder.

Court of Appeal rules dock at end of right-of-way can stay

The Court of Appeal has released its decision in a right-of-way case I argued before it on October 11.  The Court overturned a trial decision that prohibited the appellant landowners from using their right-of-way to a lake to access a dock they had constructed in the lake.  The local conservation authority had granted a permit for the dock, but the owners of the right-of-way opposed the presence and use of the dock. 

 

On behalf of the Court of Appeal, Justice Goudge ruled that the right-of-way in question was one of general use and that accessing the dock was not an overburdening use of the right-of-way.  Importantly, he stated that, "what the user does immediately after leaving the right of way cannot be said to affect the use made of the right of way at all.  Accessing the dock does not extend the right of way beyond the shoreline."

 

Read the decision at: Kendrick et al. v. Martin et al.

Trial ordered for pipeline right-of-way abandonment case

Calgary landowner Genstar Development Company applied to the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench remove a right of way held by Plains Midstream Canada ULC from title to its property.  Plains Midstream opposed proceeding on the basis of an application with written materials, arguing that a trial was necessary.

In the 1950's, Cremona Pipe Lines Ltd. constructed the Cremona Pipeline stretching 444 km between Calgary and Sundre.  Cremona had an Easement Agreement with one of Genstar's predecessors in title.  The Agreement provided that it would be binding on all future owners of the land and would remain in effect from May 19, 1956 and "for so long thereafter as [Cremona] may desire to exercise" its rights and privileges.

While the northernmost 314 km of the pipeline remains in operation, operation of the southernmost 130 km was suspended by Pembina Pipeline Corporation (a Genstar predecessor) in 1997; the pipeline under the lands owned by Genstar was removed from the ground.  In 2009, Plains Midstream purchased the line from Pembina, including the rights of way under all lands along the Cremona Pipeline.

In 2010 and subsequently, Genstar asked Plains Midstream to discharge the right of way on its lands.  Plains Midstream responded with an offer to re-route its right of way, but Genstar eventually commenced the court application. 

In reviewing the application materials, the Court concluded that a trial would be necessary in order to have all of the evidence required to answer the legal issues in play: "Given the complex and unsettled legal issues identified above, it is my view that any decision in this case should be founded on complete and nuanced findings of fact resulting from a trial, rather than on a paper record resulting from an originating application."

Read the decision at: Genstar Development Company v. Plains Midstream Canada ULC.

Update: Cottagers keep right-of-way over farm, but have duty to repair

I posted in early 2011 about a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal concerning a lane used by cottagers located on a neighbouring farm (see March 18, 2011).  The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a Superior Court Judge which ruled that certain cottage owners in Northumberland County had acquired a prescriptive easement over the laneway. The owner of the farm property does not use the lane and did not want to pay for upgrades to the lane. 

In a further ruling, Ontario Superior Court Justice Peter Lauwers has ruled that the cottagers (the owners of the "dominant tenement") "have the duty to repair Sunnybrae Lane that is imposed on them by the common law".  He also ruled that, "the duty is flexible and relates to the conditions on the ground as they appear from time to time."

In other words, the cottagers can use the lane, but it is their responsibility, and not the responsibility of the farm owner, to repair the lane when necessary.

Alberta Court of Appeal upholds landowner's right to terminate easement

In January of this year, I posted a blog about an interesting case in Alberta concerning the right of a landowner to terminate a utility easement agreement (Alberta Court Rules in Favour of Landowner).  The land in question had been owned originally by the CPR, which had a right to terminate the right of way of the utility.  The lands were transferred to the current owner, who then gave notice of termination to the utility.  The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench decided that the right to terminate could be assigned to the new landowner and that the right could be exercised.

In a recent decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal has agreed.  The Court of Appeal agreed that the agreements were not personal contracts, and were validly assigned to the new owner (Remington Development) including the right to terminate.  The Court rejected the utility's argument that the easements were actually only licenses that could not be assigned; it found that even if the agreements were licenses, they could be assigned. 

With the decision, the utility has no land rights to maintain its power transmission operation on the lands in question.  It will either have to obtain a further agreement from the landowner or attempt to expropriate the rights through the applicable regulatory process.

Read the decision at: Remington Development Corp. v. Enmax Power.

NB Court tells landowners to allow access to power line right-of-way

NB Power and Bell Aliant brought an application before the New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench asking the Court to interpret a Right of Way Agreement after a family in Fredricton denied access to their property for utility work.  Beginning in May 2011, various employees of the two utility companies attempted to access a right of way on the property.  The utilities said they have a right to enter the property, and to remove trees and brush within a distance of five feet of their lines.  They said they have these rights under the Agreement and under s.84 of the Electricity Act.

In response to the application, the Fredricton family suggested that a trial was necessary to determine the issues, saying that there were "materials issues in dispute".  However, the Court disagreed.  It found that the language of the Right of Way Agreement is unambiguous and grants the rights of access being denied by the property owner and her son.  Also, the Court found that the rights in the Electricity Act are even broader.

The Court concluded that it could decide the case as an application and ruled in favour of the utilities.  It granted an injunction restraining the respondents from preventing access to their property.

Read the decision at: NB Power et al. v. Kinsella.

Who owns abandoned pipelines?

A few years back, David Howell, Senior Right-of-Way Agent, International Right-of-Way Association, Houston, TX, wrote a frightening article about landowners and the ownership of abandoned pipelines.  Howell had received a call from a Texas landowner who was facing a $51,000 cost to remove 300 metres of abandoned oil pipeline from his property to allow for development.  The company has walked away from the line, but retained ownership and refused to allow Howell to hire his own contractor to remove the pipe at a cost of no more than $1,500.  Of course, the $1,500 quote was based on an assumption that the company had properly purged the line of contaminants, etc. 

Many landowners are worried about the day when they will become responsible for abandoned pipelines on their properties.  However, what happens when the pipeline company walks away (i.e. ceases operations and escapes any regulatory control), but retains ownership?

Read Howell's article at: Who owns abandoned pipelines?

Alberta Court rules in favour of landowner over crossing agreement

In 1948, CPR and Calgary Power Ltd. reached an agreement providing Calgary Power with the right to place three towers carrying power transmission wires on and over CPR property abutting the north side of 10th Avenue S.E. in the City of Calgary.  The agreement also provided that either party could terminate the agreement by giving three months' notice, and on termination Calgary Power would be obligated to remove the towers and wires and make good any damage caused to the property.  If the removal did not happen within one month of termination, CPR could undertake the work itself at the expense of Calgary Power or take ownership of the towers and wires.  Under the agreement, Calgary Power was to pay to CPR an annual rental of $40.00.

Flash forward to more recent times.  The power transmission facilities on the property have been expanded.  The original agreement and subsequent amending agreements have been assigned by Calgary Power to a company called Enmax.  CPR has sold its lands to a development company called Remington.  Remington wanted to develop the former CPR lands and advised Enmax of the plans.  Enmax told Remington that a 20 metre utility right-of-way would be required and that Remington would need to bear the cost of any changes, including the conversion of the overhead power lines to underground lines. 

Remington's response to Enmax was to provide a notice of termination under the existing agreements.  Enmax was directed to vacate the Remington lands (the former CPR lands) on or before June 30, 2005.   Despite that direction, Enmax has refused to remove the transmission towers and lines from the lands.  Remington says that its development will be severely compromised with the continued presence of high voltage transmission lines.  It believes such a continued presence will acutely influence potential purchasers or tenants in its intended mixed use residential/commercial development.

Remington applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for orders requiring Enmax to vacate the lands.  Enmax argued in response that the agreements between CPR and Calgary Power were personal contracts between a railway company and a utility company and could not be assigned to Remington without the consent of Enmax.  There were also questions raised about whether the agreements actually created true rights-of-way or whether the rights granted were simply a personal licence which could not be assigned or transferred.

The Court found that the agreements did create utility rights-of-way, which through legislation were not subject to all of the Common Law rules surrounding valid easements and rights-of-way.  Further, the Court ruled that if it was wrong about the nature of the agreements, and they did create mere licences, CPR still had the right to assign the agreements to Remington without the consent of Calgary Power or Enmax. 

For those reasons, the Court found that Remington was entitled under the agreements to terminate and require Enmax to remove its facilities.  Of course, that dealt only with the private relationship between the parties.  The transmission facilities are also subject to public regulation by the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC).  The Court directed Enmax to make an application to the AUC to remove the transmission lines, and ruled that the lines could not be removed or relocated in the absence of an order from the AUC.

This decision is reminiscent of an earlier Alberta Court decision involving a landowner named Randolph Hill.  He purchased land from a railway company and was assigned an agreement that gave him the right to require a pipeline company to remove its pipeline.  The Court agreed that he had that right, but then the company simply went to the National Energy Board and obtained a Right of Entry Order.  The ROE Order now permits the pipeline to remain in place and, further, allows the company to abandon the line in place. 

Hill will no doubt be seeking compensation for this expropriation of his rights under the agreement.  It will be interesting to see how much those rights are worth.  What would someone pay for an agreement that would allow them to free their lands from the encumbrance of a pipeline corridor?  That has to be worth a lot on the open market.  Remington may very well find itself in a similar position.  The AUC may decline to order the removal of the transmission lines, in which case Remington's rights under the CPR agreements will have effectively been expropriated.

Read the decision at: Remington Development Corporation v. Enmax Power Corporation.

Landowner awarded damages for neighbour's breach of drainage easement agreement

Madam Justice Quinlan of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice began her Reasons for Judgment in a recent drainage case in this way: "Issues between neighbours can sometimes be unpleasant.  A drainage easement over the plaintiff James Smith’s lands has resulted in acrimony and almost ten years of litigation."

Smith owns a property next to land owned by the Defendant in the case, 663556 Ontario Limited, which owns and operates a RONA store on its property.  Smith argued that an inadequately maintained drainage pipe installed by 663’s predecessor in title caused damage to his property in breach of the terms of a drainage easement agreement, including cracking to concrete block retaining walls.  In addition, water from RONA’S roof that continued to run off onto Smith’s property breached a court order and created a nuisance by diminishing Smith’s enjoyment of his property. 

In 1976, a former owner of Smith's property granted the owner of the RONA property an easement "for the purpose of laying down and constructing a drainage pipe to accommodate run-off water from the roof of the building."  Smith's land fronts on the Nottawasaga River.  Pursuant to the drainage easement, 663 agreed to “save, defend, keep harmless and fully indemnify the Grantor, her heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, and her and their lands and tenements, goods, chattels and effects, from and against all loss, costs, charges, damages and expenses which the Grantor, her heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, or any of them, may at any time or times hereafter bear, sustain, suffer or incur, by reason of the Grantee constructing the said drainage pipe over the lands of the Grantor”.

The drainage pipe in issue was in a poor state of repair.  Eventually, Smith went ahead and replaced the pipe at his own expense and sought to be compensated by 663.  Justice Quinlan applied the indemnity and save harmless provision in the drainage easement and ordered 663 to pay for the work carried out by Smith on the drainage pipe.  However, she did not order 663 to pay for damage to a retaining wall, having found that Smith failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the damage would not have been sustained "but for" the drain pipe issues.  Another claim related to driveway damage was dismissed.

Justice Quinlan also ruled that 663 had committed a nuisance by failing to rectify the drainage situation.  She found that a reasonable amount of damages was $3,000 per year for the seven years between 2004 and 2010, totalling $21,000. 

Read the decision at: Smith v. 663556 Ontario Limited.

Hearsay evidence not enough to establish prescriptive easement

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently ruled against a landowner seeking a prescriptive easement over property owned by the Township of Guelph/Eramosa for lack of evidence.  The applicant, 1718351 Ontario Inc., had owned its property for only 4 years.  The establishment of an easement by prescription (the passage of time) required evidence of use of the land in question for a period of no less than 20 years.  The applicant relied upon statutory declarations that had been registered on title by previous owners which purported to establish the use of the Township property by the previous owners of the applicant's lands.  The Township objected to the admission of this evidence on the basis that it is hearsay (out of court statements tendered for the truth of their contents - i.e. tendered to show that it is true that the previous owners made use of the Township property).

Hearsay evidence may be admissible in certain circumstances if it falls within a traditional exception to the hearsay rule or if it meets the tests of reliability and necessity (the "principled approach").  Mr. Justice Hourigan found that the proposed evidence did not fall within any established exception and did not meet either of the tests of reliability or necessity:

Turning first to the issue of necessity, there was nothing in the record before me indicating the current whereabouts of the individuals who executed the statutory declarations. Counsel asked me to assume that given their likely ages at the time of executing the documents that the declarants are deceased. However, there is no evidence before me to make such an assumption.  Nor was there any evidence of even the most cursory efforts to locate the declarants.  Moreover, there was no explanation proffered regarding why Ms Tomlinson could not have sworn an affidavit. I conclude, therefore, that the applicant has not established necessity.

The applicant has also not met its onus of establishing the reliability of the statements in issue. There is no explanation provided as to why the statutory declarations were completed in the first place, nor is there a description of the context in which they were made.  We do know that they were executed some years after the time when the owner of the Applicant Parcel and the Police Village of Rockwood could not reach an agreement on an easement. This timing makes their reliability more suspect given that they appear to have been made during an on-going negotiation between the parties. Similarly, the context in which the statement was made by Ms Tomlinson to Mr. Clarke is nowhere described.

Given the lack of supporting evidence, the application was dismissed.  Read the decision at: 1718351 Ontario v. Township of Guelph/Eramosa.