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Showing posts with label injunction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label injunction. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Court grants injunction to Enbridge over interference with maintenance digs

Back in March, 2017, Enbridge Pipelines Inc. ("Enbridge") was in court seeking injunctions against two individuals to prohibit them from interfering with maintenance work being conducted on Lines 10 and 11, two adjacent oil pipelines near Hamilton, Ontario.  Enbridge asserted that the individuals had been regularly interfering with its work crews since January, 2017, including the tearing down of snow fences and gates and verbally demanding that work be shut down.  Enbridge also alleged that, after two weeks of obstruction, the individuals placed rabbit traps to obstruct access to the dig sites and then asserted treaty hunting rights.

In their defence, the individuals involved in the case alleged that they are Haudenosaunee citizens with the ability to exercise rights upon Haudenosaunee traditional treaty territory.  They served Notices of Constitutional Question stating their intention to question the constitutional validity of the following: 1) the Trespass to Property Act as it may apply to a Haudenosaunee person undertaking harvesting activity pursuant to treaty rights; 2) any interim or interlocutory injunction which would directly or indirectly impair, infringe and/or interfere with the exercise of treaty rights where the Crown has not discharged its obligations to uphold the Honour of the Crown (duty to consult and accommodate); and, 3) the granting of any easement (i.e. Enbridge's pipeline easements) where treaty rights would be impaired, infringed and/or interfered with where the Crown has not discharged its obligation to uphold the Honour of the Crown (duty to consult and accommodate).

Justice Broad of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice reviewed the constitutional arguments and concluded that, "the question of whether the Crown has made efforts to comply with its duty to consult and accommodate is not relevant to the exercise of the court's decision to deny an injunction sought by a private party such as Enbridge with an interest in land on discretionary grounds."  Also, Justice Broad noted, "The defendants have been unable to point to any cases where a precondition involving the exhaustion of efforts to consult and find negotiated or legislated resolutions has been recognized or applied where an injunction is sought at the instance of a private property owner where aboriginal treaty rights are claimed or exercised."

Having disposed of the constitutional issues, Justice Broad reviewed Enbridge's request for injunctive relief on the basis of the standard three-part test for injunctions:

1)      the plaintiff must establish a serious question to be tried;
2)      the plaintiff must show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and
3)      the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. This involves a consideration of which party will suffer greater harm if the injunction is granted or refused.
Justice Broad ruled in favour of Enbridge on all three parts of the test.  With respect to the defendants' treaty right claims, he concluded: "The defendants' claim to relevant interests or rights may be advanced by appropriate parties or groups having the requisite standing through lawful avenues.  The defendants' resort to unlawful self-help should not, however, be countenanced ...".

Read the decision at: Enbridge Pipelines Inc. v. Williams et al.

Tuesday, July 7, 2015

No harm, no foul in gravel extraction lease case - Sask Court declines to terminate lease

In a Saskatchewan case decided last fall, the Court of Queen's Bench ruled that the tenant under a gravel extraction lease was not subject to termination of the lease for having missed a deadline to provide proof of insurance coverage.  A common term in commercial leases is that the tenant or lessee must maintain liability insurance in a specified amount and must provide proof of insurance on a periodic basis, often annually.

The contract in question in this case demanded that the lessee have insurance in place and that it provide proof of the insurance on or before December 30 of each year of the contract, failing which the contract would terminate.  In 2012, although the lessee had put the necessary insurance in place prior to December 30, 2012, an oversight resulted in a failure to provide proof of the insurance to the lessors until January 2, 2013.  On December 30, 2012, the lessors instructed their solicitors to send a letter purporting to terminate the contract, and they refused to accept the proof of insurance when delivered to their home on January 2.

The lessors argued to the Court that there was a clear breach of the contract - proof of insurance was due by a certain deadline and that deadline was missed.  The lessee argued that a breach of the contract required two joint failures - both a failure to have the insurance in place and a failure to deliver the proof of insurance.  In its reasoning, the Court assumed (for the purposes of argument) that there was a breach and then turned to consider whether it should grant relief from penalty and forfeiture under the contract pursuant to its equitable power under Section 13 of The Queen's Bench Act: "The court may grant relief against penalties and forfeitures and, in granting that relief, may impose any terms with respect to costs, expenses, damages, compensation and any other issues that the court considers appropriate."

The Court found in favour of the lessee on all three prongs of the test for granting relief: 1) the conduct of the lessee was a mere oversight - there was no suggestion of bad faith, but only "clerical ineptitude"; 2) the breach caused no harm - the insurance was in place; and, 3) the lessee would lose its significant investment in the property while the lessors would suffer no damage (other than to have to continue with their contract with the lessee).  On those bases, the Court granted summary judgment to the lessee and issued a permanent injunction against the lessors preventing them from terminating the gravel extraction lease by reason of the 2012 late delivery of proof of insurance.

Read the decision at: Elchuk v Gulansky.

Friday, September 19, 2014

It looks like Enbridge is back in Court today looking to extend its injunction against Line 9 protesters

I have recently written about Enbridge Pipelines Inc.'s efforts to obtain injunctions against Line 9 protesters (click here).  It looks as if Enbridge is back in Court in London today in what is likely a motion for an extension of the injunction already obtained against protesters a few weeks ago.  If you're interested in observing the motion proceeding, the court docket says it will be heard by Madam Justice Gorman at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 14 on the 7th Floor of the London Courthouse at 80 Dundas Street.

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Court grants injunction to Enbridge, but is concerned about the right of protesters to be heard

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently granted a temporary injunction prohibiting unauthorized persons from entering or occupying an Enbridge Pipelines Inc. valve installation site in Innerkip, Ontario, near Woodstock.  On August 5, 2014, 25 or so individuals had entered the Enbridge work site, occupied it and then refused to leave.  Enbridge brought an ex parte motion for orders requiring the protesters to leave.

The valve installation work is being required by the National Energy Board (NEB) as part of the Line 9 oil pipeline reversal project, and Enbridge alleged that the work is time-sensitive - there is no time to waste in getting the protesters off the site.  Enbridge's evidence provided: "A project of this magnitude involves the organization and deployment of extensive resources and expertise.  The timing and execution of the project cannot be dictated by persons who do not understand or respect Enbridge's safety and operational protocols.  Enbridge cannot proceed with the required and time-sensitive Valve Installation with Trespassers on the site."

In reviewing the motion (in which the only party present was Enbridge), Justice E.M. Morgan commented:

While property rights and economic interests are important in the Canadian legal system, so are rights of expression. I agree that the time, place, and manner of expression can be tempered by competing rights, see Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada, 1991 CanLII 119 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 139, and that generally “[p]ersons are free to engage in political protest of that public nature, but the law does not permit them to do so by engaging in civil disobedience through trespassing on the private property of others…” Canadian National Railway v Chippewa of Sarnia First Nation, 2012 ONSC 7348 (CanLII), 2012 ONSC 7348, at para 23. Nevertheless, there must be some reason other than the unilateral claim to property rights to deprive otherwise non-violent protesters the right to be heard.
 
Here there is an economic imperative to the timing of the motion, but there is no safety imperative that created the short timeline and that made notice of the Application impossible. The valve installation has a safety motivation as evidenced in the National Energy Board report, but that is a long term concern due to the upcoming changes in the oil flow, not an immediate one.

Justice Morgan questioned Enbridge about why it had not given notice of its motion to the protesters, given that there was not safety imperative involved.  Enbridge explained that it is faced with adversaries that are difficult to identify - a "shifting group of individuals".  In the end, Enbridge was granted its injunction to permit the expulsion of the protesters, but for a duration of only 10 days.  After 10 days, Enbridge would have to return to the Court either in London or in Woodstock (not in Toronto, where the original motion was heard) to extend the injuction on at least 3 days' notice to the protesters.

With respect to the right to be heard, Justice Morgan stated: "It is important that the protesters’ right to be heard be a realistic one, and that notice of a new hearing date either be disseminated before the protesters disband or be announced in a way that is likely to come to their attention. It is not the purpose of an ex parte injunction to stall the proceedings so that the Applicant’s opponents fade away without being heard in court."

Read the decision at: Enbridge Pipelines Inc. v. Jane Doe.

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

Court orders berm removed, says landowner "appears to like to act first and seek required permission later"

The Regional Municipality of York (the "Region") went to court for an injunction requiring the removal of a berm that was installed by a local landowner.  The Region alleged that the berm, which was constructed in August, 2012 and measured approximately 3.5 metres high by 157 metres long, caused pooling in the ditches along neighbouring roads.  The berm cut off the flow of an intermittent watercourse that ran over the subject property from a culvert running beneath one of the roads into a wetland.

In 2012, the landowner applied retroactively to the local conservation authority for a permit to construct the berm.  The permit was not granted and the conservation authority issued a Notice of Violation with respect to the "unauthorized development, interference or alteration in or on a wetland setback".  The prosecution of that violation was the subject of a separate court proceeding.

The defendant landowner contended that there never was a watercourse on his property and denied that the berm was within a provincially significant wetland (PSW) or within the 120 metre PSW setback.  Also, the defendant claimed that the culvert from which the water was to flow was not operational before July, 2012 - he installed the berm only to deal with the new water flow created by work done on the culvert by the Region.  The Region denied this, saying that work done in July, 2012 was only to remove some sediment build up; the culvert had been in place for 35 years.

The Court rejected the evidence of the landowner and granted the injunction requested by the Region.  The Court found the landowner's evidence to be "unreliable": "I accept that his motives for building the berm may not be as altruistic as he wishes this court to see them.  As such, where [the landowner's] evidence and that of the Region conflict, I prefer the evidence of the Region."  The Court's decision also reads: "I find that [the landowner's] argument that the berm is not within the setback area to be disingenuous in the face of the evidence presented.  It appears that he does not like to be told what to do when it comes to his property.  He applied for permission to construct the berm only after he had already constructed it. ... [He] appears to like to act first and seek required permission later."

The injunction was granted based on the test applicable to the power to grant an injunction under the Municipal Act, 2001 where a by-law has been violated.  However, the Court would also have granted an injunction in this case on the basis of the berm constituting a public nuisance. 

Reading the Court's decision, one cannot help but conclude that this was the case of a rogue landowner cutting off an established watercourse to a wetland.  However, situations like these are not always so simple.  It is often the case that a wetland is created artificially through development of neighbouring properties - a road is installed or a residential subdivision is created with the result that drainage patterns are changed and a previously dry area becomes intermittently or permanently wet.  Local conservation authorities will take charge of the new wetland and prevent the affected landowner from remedying the drainage problem.

Landowners should be vigilant when it comes to drainage problems and the potential creation of wetlands on their properties.  It's one thing to want to create a new wetland - it is an entirely different thing to have the conservation authority tell you that you must have a wetland.  Drainage problems should be addressed sooner rather than later.

Read the decision at: Regional Municipality of York v. DiBlasi.

Saturday, September 7, 2013

Judge: "Shared water does not necessarily make good neighbours ..."

Justice DiTomaso's remark seems pretty obvious - shared boundaries and shared resources are quite often the subject matter of litigation.  In this case, the Plaintiff organic farmer purchased a farm from a retired dental surgeon in 1998.  In 2007, she learned from a neighbour not only that the neighbour's water was contaminated with e-coli bacteria, but also that the neighbour's water was sourced from the Plaintiff's farm.  The judge noted: "This was surprising and disturbing news to her."
 
As a result of the discovery, the Plaintiff sued the retired surgeon for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.  She also sought a declaration against her neighbour that the neighbour has no prescriptive easement to use the waterline that originates on the Plaintiff's property and services the neighbour's property.  The neighbour counterclaimed for a declaration that she does have a prescriptive easement and for an injunction preventing the Plaintiff from doing anything that would interfere with the quantity or quality of the water running through the (alleged) easement.
 
At trial, a number of factual findings were made, including:
  • neither the dental surgeon nor anyone on his behalf disclosed the shared waterline to the Plaintiff at any time prior to the purchase of the farm in 1998
  • another farmer who had looked at purchasing the property was not told about the waterline either, and testified that had he known of it, he would not have purchased the property
  • the Plaintiff received absolutely no notice of the shared waterline from the vendor prior to closing, and the first notice she had was from the neighbour in 2007
  • surveys of the farm did not show the shared waterline, and would not have assisted a prospective purchaser or realtor in understanding that there was a shared water system
  • the assertion by the vendor's real estate agent that notice of the waterline was not included in the property listing because there was no room for it was "incredible"
  • the waterline to the neighbour's property was in use since October, 1967
  • the evidence of the dental surgeon was that he consented to the use of the waterline from the time he purchased the farm property in 1975
The Court dismissed the claim by the neighbour for a prescriptive easement on the basis that use of the water line had been by consent (during the period relevant to determine the easement - in this case, 1967 to 2000, when the land was converted to Land Titles) and on the basis that the use was not "open and notorious".  The waterline was not visible and could not be discovered by the Plaintiff except from disclosure by another party. 
 
The neighbour's claim for an injunction was also dismissed.  There was no evidence of irreparable harm to the neighbour if the injunction was not granted - she could drill her own well for water. 
 
Justice DiTomaso then ruled that the waterline was a latent defect in the property and that the vendor, the retired dental surgeon, "misrepresented the nature of the property for sale by failing to notify or inform [the Plaintiff] that the water supply from the Farm supplied properties and residences to the north by way of the waterline."  The judge did not find that the misrepresentation was fraudulent (i.e. intended to mislead), but did find it was negligent and gave rise to liability.  The Plaintiff was awarded $25,500 in damages plus interest.
 
Read the decision at: Hanisch v. McKean.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Injunction granted against importation of fill for "farm practices"

A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice begins with the following question: "Is it normal farming practice to alter the topography of lands by the depositing of large quantities of fill?".  A couple had purchased a 108-acre property on the Oak Ridges Moraine through a holding company and submitted to the local municipality a fill permit application to deposit 300,000 cubic metres of fill on the property (approximately 30,000 dump truck loads).  The municipality eventually brought a motion for injunctive relief to stop the unauthorized deposit of fill on the property.

According to the owners, the purpose of the fill was for the purposes of enhancing their ability to farm the property.  This was the position they took in response to the municipality's injunction application. Yet, in an affidavit sworn by the wife in support of an earlier application by the owners to quash a municipal by-law, it was stated that, "we were interested in purchasing the property for the purposes of using it as a "fill site" for clean fill".  The Court noted that in none of the owners' materials in the first application was there mention of any intention to use the property for farming.

In November, 2010, the municipality became aware that the owners were depositing more fill onto the property than was permitted by the applicable by-law.  The municipality issued a compliance order, but the deposits of fill continued.  The Court found that the owners did not comply with any of the orders issued by the municipality.  It also ruled that:
Based on the evidence that was placed before this court I am not satisfied that the depositing of the quantity of fill that has been observed, and specifically the intent of the respondents to ultimately deposit upwards of 30,000 truckloads of fill, in any way remotely resembles a normal farming operation.
The owners had argued that their operation was protected by the normal farm practices legislation.

The Court issued a permanent injunction against the owners restraining them from performing any further site alterations on their property and specifically restraining them from depositing any further fill or altering the grade of the property other than as permitted by a building permit, an agreement with the municipality and the site by-law.

Read the decision at: Township of Uxbridge v. Corbar Holdings Inc. et al.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Rural landowner ordered not to use outdoor wood furnace during summer

A Judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has found that interference of one property owner's use of an outdoor wood furnace with his neighbours' enjoyment and use of their properties warrants an order that the furnace may not be used between April 1 and October 15.  The Township of Ramara sought a permanent injunction restraining any use of the wood furnace, but the Court declined to order an all-out ban.  At issue was whether the operation of the furnace "unreasonably interferes with the normal enjoyment of human life and property" for the neighbours.

Read the decision at: Ramara (Township) v Mullen.

Friday, April 27, 2012

Is clearing of trees a normal farm practice?

The Supreme Court of British Columbia is going to be dealing with the question of whether a farmer can be restrained from clearing trees on his property in spite of normal farm practices legislation.  A B.C. farmer purchased a Nanaimo property in 2006.  In December, 2005, the Regional District of Nanaimo had registered against title to the property a restrictive covenant that prohibits the removal of any vegetation from a 30 metre wide strip along the boundary of the property with an adjacent road.  After the farmer began to clear trees, Nanaimo sued under the restrictive covenant, and also applied for a pre-trial injunction to prohibit any further clearing.

The Supreme Court granted the injunction as requested.  In the course of deciding the injunction application, the Court examined the defences put forward in the action by the farmer.  The main defence appears to be that the farmer has not breached the covenant since it is invalid by reason of non-compliance with the Agricultural Land Commission Act, s. 22(2) and the Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) Act, s. 2(1).  The farmer claims that his clearing activities were farm operations.

We will have to wait and see what the Supreme Court makes of this argument and what implications its decision may have on similar situations in the future.

Read the decision at: Regional District of Nanaimo v. Buck.

Monday, March 26, 2012

NB Court tells landowners to allow access to power line right-of-way

NB Power and Bell Aliant brought an application before the New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench asking the Court to interpret a Right of Way Agreement after a family in Fredricton denied access to their property for utility work.  Beginning in May 2011, various employees of the two utility companies attempted to access a right of way on the property.  The utilities said they have a right to enter the property, and to remove trees and brush within a distance of five feet of their lines.  They said they have these rights under the Agreement and under s.84 of the Electricity Act.

In response to the application, the Fredricton family suggested that a trial was necessary to determine the issues, saying that there were "materials issues in dispute".  However, the Court disagreed.  It found that the language of the Right of Way Agreement is unambiguous and grants the rights of access being denied by the property owner and her son.  Also, the Court found that the rights in the Electricity Act are even broader.

The Court concluded that it could decide the case as an application and ruled in favour of the utilities.  It granted an injunction restraining the respondents from preventing access to their property.

Read the decision at: NB Power et al. v. Kinsella.

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

Sask. Wind Farm can seek damages over failed injunction against development

The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench has ruled that the Red Lily Wind Farm may pursue a claim for damages against David McKinnon based on his undertaking as to damages given when he obtained a injunction against the wind project.  McKinnon commenced a putative class action, claiming that the wind turbine farm caused adverse effects on human health.  He sought and obtained an ex parte injunction (i.e. without Red Lily being present), one of the conditions of which being the undertaking to pay damages if it turned out the injuction was unnecssary.  When the injunction was lifted, Red Lily decided to pursue McKinnon for damages.

The parties asked the Court to determine whether Red Lily is entitled to enforce the undertaking, which read:
The Plaintiff, David McKinnon, hereby undertakes to abide by any Order as to damages which this Court may make by reason of the granting of an interlocutory injunction at the request of the Plaintiff if it shall appear that the Defendants have sustained damages for which the Plaintiff ought to pay.
The Court of Queen's Bench found that the case law "unequivocally establishes a strong presumption that an undertaking will be enforced, a presumption which can only be rebutted by compelling facts amounting to special circumstances."  The Court noted that McKinnon filed no sworn material and failed to establish the existence of any special circumstances.  Therefore, Red Lily is entitled to enforce the undertaking.  The Court then set out the procedural steps to be followed to determine the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded to Red Lily.

Read the decision at: McKinnon v Red Lily Wind Energy Corp.

Saturday, July 2, 2011

Ontario Court orders landowners to stop blocking drainage ditch on their property

Justice Quigley of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has ordered Steven and Joan Morrow to stop blocking the flow of water through a drainage ditch on their property in Lanark County.  The County applied to the Court for the injunctive relief after neighbours complained of flooding caused by the damming of a local drainage ditch. 

The County took the position in the case that it was a proper party (even though it was not one of the neighbouring landowners) because the blockage of the ditch created a public nuisance.  Quigley J. agreed.  He found that the attempt to distinguish between a private and public drainage ditch was irrelevant in the circumstances and that the actions of the landowners in blocking the flow of water (with result of flooding of neighbouring lands) "would be actionable even if there were no ditch". 

The Court granted a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the obstruction of or interference with the ditch, and made an order allowing the County to enter the property to remove the obstruction and to grade the ditch.  There was also an order for payment of $1,000 in damages contingent on the costs of the County's work.

Read the decision at: Lanark v. Morrow.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

B.C. Court resolves nasty neighbour dispute over Sunshine Coast vista

A recent Supreme Court of British Columbia action arose out of a dispute between adjacent landowners in a rural area outside of Comox, B.C.  The dispute culminated in the defendant, Susan Field, erecting a wall of earth topped by a row of large concrete blocks, along a southern portion of the boundary between their properties.  The plaintiffs, Robert and Kathryn Silcox, said that this contravened an agreement they had reached with the defendant in April 2006.  Under that agreement, the plaintiffs had acquiesced in the defendant’s purchase of a road allowance which abutted their properties at the north end.  In return, they said, the defendant had agreed to do a number of things, including preserving their view – what they call their “viewscape” – over the southern end of the defendant’s land, out over the Straits of Georgia.  That view has been blocked by the wall.

The plaintiffs therefore sought an injunction compelling the defendant to remove the concrete blocks, vegetation, and fill installed by her after April 29, 2006, and restraining the defendant permanently from interfering with the view as it existed on that date.

In the end, the Court did not grant the injunction.  This decision is worth a read to see what events led the judge to determine that Ms. Field was entitled to keep the wall in place:
... in my view, removal of the wall would deprive the defendant of what measure of peace and security it has provided her. In my judgment, the plaintiffs’ behaviour subsequent to April 2006, in particular the malicious and high-handed damage to the defendant’s plants, which must be viewed in the context of their generally confrontational approach to defendant, and their numerous demands and objections, should entitle the defendant to leave to wall in place and relieve her of any obligations which could arise in law or in equity respecting preservation of the plaintiffs’ view. In my judgment, leaving the wall as-is would lead to a more equitable result than forcing its removal.

Read the decision at: Silcox v. Field.

Saturday, December 11, 2010

B.C. woman found in contempt of court for distributing raw milk for human consumption

Alice Jongerden was ordered by the Supreme Court of British Columbia to stop packaging and distributing raw milk for human consumption. The Fraser Health Authority, which obtained that injunction, alleged that Ms. Jongerden disobeyed the order and asked that she be found in contempt of court.  The Fraser Health Authority said that after the injunction was issued in March, 2010, Ms. Jongerden continued to distribute raw milk in the same manner and to the same recipients as before. Ms. Jongerden admitted she continued to distribute raw milk, but said she complied with the court order by labelling the product “not for human consumption”.

Ms. Jongerden operates a dairy farm, carrying on business under the name of “Home on the Range”. She disagrees with the public policy prohibiting the distribution of raw milk and believes consumers should have the right to choose it.  On July 9, 2009, she was ordered by the Public Health Inspector to “cease and desist the distribution of raw milk for human consumption”.  When that order was apparently not complied with, the Fraser Health Authority sought and obtained an interim injunction from the Court.

On a review of the circumstances, the Court concluded that Ms. Jongerden wilfully disobeyed the terms of the Order by continuing to distribute and make available raw milk to the same individuals to whom she previously provided it for human consumption.  Therefore, Ms. Jongerden was found to be in contempt of the Court Order.  However, the Fraser Health Authority had not yet asked that any specific penalty be imposed for Ms. Jongerden’s contempt of court.  The Court understood that Ms. Jongerden had, as a result of the interim order of Saunders J., ceased all production and distribution of raw milk products. As long as that would remain the case, the Court found that Ms. Jongerden would have purged her contempt and that there should be no need for the matter to proceed to consideration of a penalty.

Read the decision at: Fraser Health Authority v. Jongerden.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Red Lily Wind Farm - Court Decision denying injunction

In a previous post, I wrote about a Saskatchewan landowner who may face a costs order as a result of a failed application for an injunction to prevent the Red Lily Wind Farm project from moving forward.  The decision denying the injunction is now available to read at: McKinnon v. Martin no. 122 (Rural Municipality). 

The Court rejected outright the evidence of the expert witness put forward by those seeking the injunction:
If Dr. Nissenbaum could be considered an expert to provide opinion evidence on the issue surrounding the granting of the injunction, there are two further reasons to reject his evidence. The first is that he has assumed the role of advocate. A review of his affidavit No. 2 especially shows that he does not take an objective approach to the issues at hand. He passionately believes in the harmful health effects of wind turbines from his own survey on the Mars Hill project and has made that the basis for his foray into an area that he has little real knowledge of. It is clear from the content and tone of his second affidavit that he has no objectivity in respect of the issues. Secondly, in addition to the leaps of logic that were contained in para. 17 of both affidavits, he makes bold, unsupported statements on issues critical to the injunction.
Having rejected the evidence of the plaintiff's expert in favour of the project proponent's expert, the Court found that the test for an injunction had not been satisfied. 

Friday, September 17, 2010

Wind Farm may seek $450,000 costs from landowner over ex parte injunction

On August 25, the Court of Queen's Bench in Saskatoon granted an interim injunction stopping further construction on the Red Lily Wind Farm.  David McKinnon, a landowner within the Red Lily project area, applied for the injunction on an ex parte basis (i.e. without the presence of the other parties, including the wind farm owner and the local municipalities).  A week later, on September 1, the Court overturned the injunction after hearing from all parties. 

In order to obtain the injunction, McKinnon had to undertake to pay damages if the injunction was found to be unnecessary and damages were caused.  Red Lily Wind Farm claims that the cost of the construction delay was $74,000 per day for 6 days, totalling nearly $450,000.  The company says it is considering seeking to recover the damages from McKinnon.

Read the story at: world-spectator.com.

Saturday, August 28, 2010

B.C. Court rules Ghost Town Resort must allow mining exploration

Kitsault, British Columbia, is located near the head of Alice Arm in the northwest corner of British Columbia, about 140 kilometres north of Prince Rupert. It is the site of a former molybdenum mine, known as the Kitsault Mine. Open pit mining began at this site in 1968. Mining operations were suspended in August 1972 due to low molybdenum prices, resumed in April 1981 and were suspended again in November 1982 due to low molybdenum prices.

In 1980, a townsite (“Kitsault Townsite”) was constructed to provide accommodation for those who worked at the Kitsault Mine. The Kitsault Townsite was comprised of approximately 100 houses, seven apartment buildings, a hospital, a school, stores, restaurants, a theatre, a library, a pub, recreation centres and other buildings and utilities to support a population of over 1,200 people.

When the Kitsault Mine shut down in 1982, all of the residents of the town left, leaving it a modern-day ghost town. However, unlike other ghost towns in British Columbia, Kitsault was not left to deteriorate and fall to ruin. The owners of the Kitsault Mine continued to provide heat for the buildings to prevent mould and mildew setting in and hired full-time caretakers to maintain and protect the buildings and maintain the lawns, grounds and roadways.

In 2005, the defendant, Kitsault Resort Ltd. (“Kitsault Resort”) purchased Kitsault Townsite from Aluminerie Lauralco, Inc. (“ALI”), the company that then owned both the mineral properties comprising the former Kitsault Mine and the lands and improvements comprising Kitsault Townsite. At the time it sold Kitsault Townsite, ALI was engaged in the remediation, reclamation and decommissioning of the Kitsault Mine as required by law.

Prior to conveying Kitsault Townsite to Kitsault Resort, and in accordance with the agreement of purchase and sale, ALI granted to itself and to Climax Canada Ltd. (“Climax”) a statutory right of way (the “Right of Way”) across the Kitsault Townsite.  In 2008, ALI sold its mineral tenures and other lands located at Kitsault, including the Right of Way, (collectively referred to as the “Kitsault Property) to Avanti Kitsault Mine Ltd. (“AKM”), a subsidiary of Avanti Mining Inc. (“Avanti”).  Avanti and AKM are currently carrying out exploration activities to support an application to reactivate the Kitsault Mine. AKM, as the registered owner of the Right of Way, claims the right to use the Right of Way, now and in the future for its exploration activities and for its mining activities in the event it re-opens the Kitsault Mine. Kitsault Resort has refused to permit Avanti to cross over Kitsault Resort pursuant to the Right of Way.

AKM and Kitsault Resort went to court to determine the scope and validity of the Right-of-way.  Kitsault Resort argued that, even if the Right-of-way remained in place, it was limited to remediation and decommissioning activities.  The Resort argued that mining activities were not permitted.  The court found that there were three issues to be resolved in the proceeding:
(a) On the proper construction of the Right of Way, are the rights granted by it limited to activities for the remediation, reclamation and decommissioning activities required at the Kitsault Mine only, or do they include the right to use the Right of Way for the purpose of exploration and mining activities? A further matter for consideration under this issue is whether the rights granted by the Right of Way are limited to activities carried out at the actual Kitsault Mine site, or whether they apply to any lands, improvements or works intended to be used in conjunction with the mine site, including the surrounding mineral deposits?

(b) If the rights are not limited to remediation, reclamation and decommissioning, should the Right of Way be rectified to so limit its scope?

(c) Is the defendant entitled to cancellation or modification of the Right of Way under s. 35 of the Property Law Act?
The court found in favour of AKM on all issues and made a declaration that AKM is entited to use the Right-of-way for exploration activities.  The court also found that AKM was entitled to an injunction preventing the Resort from obstructing use of the Right-of-way to carry out mining activities.

Read the decision at: Avanti Mining Inc. v. Kitsault Resort Ltd.