A Nova Scotia forestry company leased land to Rogers Communications for a cell tower. The original 1988 lease was renewed several times and provided that renewals would be "upon the same terms and conditions" as the original lease. In 2012, Rogers asked for the lessor's consent to a "co-location" agreement where Rogers would sub-lease space on the tower to a third party.
Although no agreement was reached and no consent was given, Rogers went ahead with the co-location arrangement. The lessor sought a declaration from the Court that the lease was terminated as a result of Rogers' failure to obtain consent. The lessor also sought damages.
In court, there was a dispute between the parties over whether the lease had been renewed in 2012 for a further five-year term. Rogers argued that it had given notice as required by the lease to renew under the same terms and conditions and, therefore, it was entitled to the renewal of the lease (which would be more or less automatic as long as Rogers exercised its option to renew). The lessor, on the other hand, contended that Rogers' proposed renewal amounted to a counter-offer (which it rejected). The proposed renewal lease included the co-location arrangement and additional rent as compensation for the addition of a sub-tenant to the tower. Rogers took the position that it was its right to include the additional provisions in the renewal.
The Court determined that the lease had not been renewed and ordered Rogers to vacate the lands within 8 months of an order to be issued setting out the terms of the decision. Also, the lessor was awarded any rent not paid during the period after the lease had terminated.
The Court then proceeded to consider the lessor's request for damages for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and trespass. The Court ruled that Rogers did not have the right under the lease contract to allow a third party to sub-let or co-locate - the lease provided rights to Rogers to erect, maintain and operate its tower, but it did not allow it to host a third party's services. Also, the Court noted that Rogers had sought consent from the lessor to allow the co-location. The lessor was awarded the sum of $3,000 in rent for each year in which the third party co-located on the tower.
Read the decision at: Atlantic Star Forestry Ltd. v. Rogers Communications Inc.
Tractor
Showing posts with label Nova Scotia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nova Scotia. Show all posts
Monday, July 27, 2015
Rogers Communications loses cell tower lease over move to sub-lease space to a third party
Friday, May 8, 2015
NS Court of Appeal overturns profit à prendre (right to take hay) decision
Back in February, 2014, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court upheld a neighbour's right to take hay or other crops off a portion of a 2.7 acre property that had been severed from the neighbour's farm in 1960 (see my post on that decision here). The case has gone to the Court of Appeal and the lower court's decision has been overturned.
The Court of Appeal introduced the case as follows:
Rarely does a claim of the property right known as profits à prendre, which has existed since ancient times, come before the courts. It arises here because a landowner conveyed part of his property subject to a reservation of a right in favour of himself, his heirs and assigns to enter on that property to remove hay. Throughout the next fifty years, the landowner, his successors in title and their assigns continuously exercised that right, entered the conveyed lot and cut hay.
However, as noted the Court, that finding (which was not made by the lower court judge) was not of assistance to the neighbour: "Since a profit is an interest in land, to be valid in law it must be conveyed by deed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. But none of the 1972 and 1998 deeds in the chain of title of the C lands from GC to the respondent conveyed the right to enter upon and remove hay from the D lot. The 1998 deed merely excluded that lot from the description of the C lands." In other words, there was nothing in the chain of title to link the original profit à prendre to the current owner of the neighbouring land.
It was also possible for the right to take hay to continue to exist as a part of the estate of the original landowner. However, there was no evidence of any disposition or transfer of the profit à prendre (an asset of sorts) by will or otherwise from the original grantor, GC, to the neighbour. The neighbour's claim failed.
Read the decision at: Snyder v. Chisholm.
The Court of Appeal introduced the case as follows:
Rarely does a claim of the property right known as profits à prendre, which has existed since ancient times, come before the courts. It arises here because a landowner conveyed part of his property subject to a reservation of a right in favour of himself, his heirs and assigns to enter on that property to remove hay. Throughout the next fifty years, the landowner, his successors in title and their assigns continuously exercised that right, entered the conveyed lot and cut hay.
The current owners of that lot defended an application seeking to confirm the right to cut hay on their property. They argued that the reservation was void or voidable. In her decision dated January 29, 2014, Justice Margaret J. Stewart granted an order for a declaration in the nature of a profit à prendre (2014 NSSC 36 (CanLII)). This is an appeal from her order which issued June 11, 2014.After reviewing in detail the law relating to profits à prendre, the Court of Appeal concluded that the original grant of a right to take hay was a "profit in gross", which is a "right without limit and separate from any land owned by the profit holder". Therefore, it was not necessary that the right to take hay benefit the neighbouring property specifically - it just had to benefit the original grantor and his successors.
However, as noted the Court, that finding (which was not made by the lower court judge) was not of assistance to the neighbour: "Since a profit is an interest in land, to be valid in law it must be conveyed by deed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. But none of the 1972 and 1998 deeds in the chain of title of the C lands from GC to the respondent conveyed the right to enter upon and remove hay from the D lot. The 1998 deed merely excluded that lot from the description of the C lands." In other words, there was nothing in the chain of title to link the original profit à prendre to the current owner of the neighbouring land.
It was also possible for the right to take hay to continue to exist as a part of the estate of the original landowner. However, there was no evidence of any disposition or transfer of the profit à prendre (an asset of sorts) by will or otherwise from the original grantor, GC, to the neighbour. The neighbour's claim failed.
Read the decision at: Snyder v. Chisholm.
Tuesday, August 26, 2014
NS Supreme Court throws out spray drift case after Farm Practices Board rules farm practice was normal
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has dismissed a spray drift claim brought by landowners against a neighbouring farmer and his farm business. The plaintiffs are organic farmers and alleged that, in 2007, the defendant farmer sprayed his lands with a herbicide that drifted onto their property causing various damage: significant health issues, crop damage, and miscarriages by four horses as a result of exposure to "overspray".
In response to the claim, which was founded in negligence, the defendants relied on the provisions of the Farm Practices Act. They stated that their farming activities were carried out in accordance with "normal farm practice" so that, under the legislation, they were protected from any civil action in "nuisance, negligence or otherwise, for any odour, noise, dust, vibration, light, smoke or other disturbance resulting from an agricultural operation." Following a motion by the defendants, the civil action was stayed pending a determination by the Farm Practices Board of whether the activities in question constituted "normal farm practice".
The plaintiffs then made an application to the Board and a hearing took place in June, 2012. In January, 2013, the Board ruled that the defendants had not acted in a manner inconsistent with "normal farm practice", and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. That Board decision was appealed unsuccessfully by the plaintiffs.
With all of that completed, the plaintiffs returned to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to have the stay lifted so that they could proceed with their action for damages. The defendants also asked for the stay to be lifted, but for the purpose of dismissing the claim. The Court had to deal with the ruling by the Board that the activities in question, in particular the spraying, were "normal farm practice". However, the Board decision was not automatically determinative of the civil action - the question for the Court was whether spray drift was "other disturbance" within the meaning of the Farm Practices Act.
If spray drift fell outside "other disturbance", then there would be no protection against a civil claim afforded by the Act. Justice Murphy concluded on this point: "Absent contrary authority, I remain of the view that the activities the plaintiffs allege occurred, herbicidal overspray or drift and contaminated run-off from ditching, are "other disturbances" resulting from an agricultural operation as contemplated by section 10(1)(a) of the Act." Therefore, the claims made by the plaintiffs were barred by the normal farm practices legislation and dismissed as such.
Read the decision at: Nauss v. Waalderbos.
In response to the claim, which was founded in negligence, the defendants relied on the provisions of the Farm Practices Act. They stated that their farming activities were carried out in accordance with "normal farm practice" so that, under the legislation, they were protected from any civil action in "nuisance, negligence or otherwise, for any odour, noise, dust, vibration, light, smoke or other disturbance resulting from an agricultural operation." Following a motion by the defendants, the civil action was stayed pending a determination by the Farm Practices Board of whether the activities in question constituted "normal farm practice".
The plaintiffs then made an application to the Board and a hearing took place in June, 2012. In January, 2013, the Board ruled that the defendants had not acted in a manner inconsistent with "normal farm practice", and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. That Board decision was appealed unsuccessfully by the plaintiffs.
With all of that completed, the plaintiffs returned to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to have the stay lifted so that they could proceed with their action for damages. The defendants also asked for the stay to be lifted, but for the purpose of dismissing the claim. The Court had to deal with the ruling by the Board that the activities in question, in particular the spraying, were "normal farm practice". However, the Board decision was not automatically determinative of the civil action - the question for the Court was whether spray drift was "other disturbance" within the meaning of the Farm Practices Act.
If spray drift fell outside "other disturbance", then there would be no protection against a civil claim afforded by the Act. Justice Murphy concluded on this point: "Absent contrary authority, I remain of the view that the activities the plaintiffs allege occurred, herbicidal overspray or drift and contaminated run-off from ditching, are "other disturbances" resulting from an agricultural operation as contemplated by section 10(1)(a) of the Act." Therefore, the claims made by the plaintiffs were barred by the normal farm practices legislation and dismissed as such.
Read the decision at: Nauss v. Waalderbos.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Cottage neighbours, boundary lines, chainsaws and adverse possession
This Nova Scotia cottage boundary line case started in 2007 when neighbours on one side started cutting down trees to install an access road: "the tranquility of the setting was shattered by the sound of chainsaws". A surveyor for neighbour D had run a line that purported to represent the boundary with the lands owned by neighbour M, and the trees were being felled by neighbour D on the basis of that survey. In the end, the Court ruled in favour of the boundary line claimed by neighbour M, putting an end to the sound of the chainsaws.
The M property had been deeded to the M family in 1966 by the D family. Although three of the four boundaries of the 100 acre M property were certain, one was not. A complication in setting the fourth boundary line arose because the description of that fourth boundary, the one in question between the M property and the D property, included reference to a property owned by KD. This was a problem because, in actual fact, KD didn't own any land in that area (although he was known in the community to own it). Therefore, the boundary of KD's property could not be used to define the uncertain boundary line.
That said, the location of what had been presumed to be the property of KD was to considered in setting the proper location of the line. The Court noted that one proposed line was not to be accepted because, "it is based on the false premise that the description of the northern boundary of the M lands as the property of KD was meaningless." That description had meaning, even if it was based on an error.
In the end, the Court accepted the M-proposed line as the correct one on the whole of the evidence. The Court did not accept that the description of the M property as being 100 acres "more or less" could be used to locate the fourth boundary line, since the sale of the M property was not a "sale by acreage". The phrase in the deed stating that the land contains 100 acres "more or less" was a "falsa demonstratio" (from the latin legal maxim - falsa demonstratio non nocet cum de corpore constat - "a false demonstrative particular or reference does not prejudice what was clear before").
In the alternative, the Ds claimed to have acquired the land in question (including the proposed access road location) through adverse possession. The Court found that the main evidence in support of this claim was exaggerated, and that there were not acts that were sufficiently "exclusive, continuous and notorious" to supplant the ownership of the M family.
Read the decision at: Webster v. Duncanson.
The M property had been deeded to the M family in 1966 by the D family. Although three of the four boundaries of the 100 acre M property were certain, one was not. A complication in setting the fourth boundary line arose because the description of that fourth boundary, the one in question between the M property and the D property, included reference to a property owned by KD. This was a problem because, in actual fact, KD didn't own any land in that area (although he was known in the community to own it). Therefore, the boundary of KD's property could not be used to define the uncertain boundary line.
That said, the location of what had been presumed to be the property of KD was to considered in setting the proper location of the line. The Court noted that one proposed line was not to be accepted because, "it is based on the false premise that the description of the northern boundary of the M lands as the property of KD was meaningless." That description had meaning, even if it was based on an error.
In the end, the Court accepted the M-proposed line as the correct one on the whole of the evidence. The Court did not accept that the description of the M property as being 100 acres "more or less" could be used to locate the fourth boundary line, since the sale of the M property was not a "sale by acreage". The phrase in the deed stating that the land contains 100 acres "more or less" was a "falsa demonstratio" (from the latin legal maxim - falsa demonstratio non nocet cum de corpore constat - "a false demonstrative particular or reference does not prejudice what was clear before").
In the alternative, the Ds claimed to have acquired the land in question (including the proposed access road location) through adverse possession. The Court found that the main evidence in support of this claim was exaggerated, and that there were not acts that were sufficiently "exclusive, continuous and notorious" to supplant the ownership of the M family.
Read the decision at: Webster v. Duncanson.
Tuesday, March 18, 2014
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal denies costs to landowner on failed expropriation challenge
A landowner in Nova Scotia challenged the validity of the expropriation of his land. The challenge was unsuccessful and the landowner was ordered by the NS Supreme Court to pay costs of the challenge to the expropriating authority. The Court disagreed with the landowner that the costs should be decided under the Expropriation Act as costs related to asserting a claim for compensation (in which case there is no provision for the landowner to pay the expropriating authority costs, and it may be that the landowner would be entitled to costs when compensation is decided). The landowner appealed the decision on costs to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal ruled that there is a distinction between compensation proceedings under expropriation legislation and court proceedings to challenge the validity of the expropriation itself. Having determined that the Supreme Court judge was not wrong to have applied the normal costs rules under the Civil Procedure Rules, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision.
Read the decision at: Higgins v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General).
The Court of Appeal ruled that there is a distinction between compensation proceedings under expropriation legislation and court proceedings to challenge the validity of the expropriation itself. Having determined that the Supreme Court judge was not wrong to have applied the normal costs rules under the Civil Procedure Rules, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision.
Read the decision at: Higgins v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General).
Wednesday, February 26, 2014
Is a 1960 reservation of the right to take hay still enforceable?
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court has recently heard the case of a farmer looking to exercise a right to take hay that was first created in 1960. The Court explained:
This application involves the interpretation of a reservation of a hay/crop
GC's nephew and successor in title has now come to the Court seeking an order confirming and declaring his right to enter the 2.7 acre parcel "for the purpose of removing hay or other crops or improving the land".
The Court determined that the right reserved to GC when he sold the 2.7 acre parcel was a "profit a prendre" - a right to take the produce or profit from the land. The Court ruled that GC had reserved to himself and to his assigns (his successors in title) the right to remove hay form a portion of the 2.7 acres and that this reservation was not "repugnant" to the grant of title to the 2.7 acres (i.e. the sale of the land in 1960).
The responding parties (the current owners of the 2.7 acres) argued that the profit a prendre was extinguished years ago "because the purpose for which the condition was created has now expired". The Court disagreed with this position. It found that the owners of the GC lands have continued to take hay from the 2.7 acres since 1960 (whether for their own use or by lease to another farmer) and that:
If the profit appurtenant has been extinguished by the permanent alteration of the GC tenement, since it is no longer a cattle farm, then removal of the hay is still held as a right in gross, unaffected by such circumstances. It is a right exercisable by GC, the owner of it independently of his ownership of any land. The reservation is not rendered void or the profit extinguished due to alteration to the GC lot.
However, the Court agreed with the respondents that the right to take hay on the whole 2.7 acres unreasonably limited their potential use of the property. The Court made an order allowing the respondents to use the land within a certain tree line, which the Court determined "would not be an actionable infringement of the reservation rights". The Court did grant the application and declared that the GC land owners hold a profit a prendre.
Read the decision at: Chisholm v. Snyder.
This application involves the interpretation of a reservation of a hay/crop
right in favour of GC, his heirs and assigns” in a 1960 deed from
GC to the respondents’ predecessor in title ID. An area of some 2.7 acres of GC’s 150-acre farm lot in Antigonish County, was conveyed, along with a 100-year old farm house and barn (or its foundation), collectively “the S lot.” After describing the dimensions of the 2.7-acre lot, which runs through GC’s farm lot, the deed then provides the following:
RESERVING however to the said GC, his heirs and assigns the right and privilege to enter upon the said land from time to time for the purpose of removing hay or other crops or improving the land, ...
GC's nephew and successor in title has now come to the Court seeking an order confirming and declaring his right to enter the 2.7 acre parcel "for the purpose of removing hay or other crops or improving the land".
The Court determined that the right reserved to GC when he sold the 2.7 acre parcel was a "profit a prendre" - a right to take the produce or profit from the land. The Court ruled that GC had reserved to himself and to his assigns (his successors in title) the right to remove hay form a portion of the 2.7 acres and that this reservation was not "repugnant" to the grant of title to the 2.7 acres (i.e. the sale of the land in 1960).
The responding parties (the current owners of the 2.7 acres) argued that the profit a prendre was extinguished years ago "because the purpose for which the condition was created has now expired". The Court disagreed with this position. It found that the owners of the GC lands have continued to take hay from the 2.7 acres since 1960 (whether for their own use or by lease to another farmer) and that:
If the profit appurtenant has been extinguished by the permanent alteration of the GC tenement, since it is no longer a cattle farm, then removal of the hay is still held as a right in gross, unaffected by such circumstances. It is a right exercisable by GC, the owner of it independently of his ownership of any land. The reservation is not rendered void or the profit extinguished due to alteration to the GC lot.
However, the Court agreed with the respondents that the right to take hay on the whole 2.7 acres unreasonably limited their potential use of the property. The Court made an order allowing the respondents to use the land within a certain tree line, which the Court determined "would not be an actionable infringement of the reservation rights". The Court did grant the application and declared that the GC land owners hold a profit a prendre.
Read the decision at: Chisholm v. Snyder.
Labels:
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crop,
declaration,
deed,
easement,
farmer,
grant,
hay,
landowner,
Nova Scotia,
profit a prendre,
reservation
Wednesday, November 13, 2013
NS Farm Practice Board decision on overspray upheld
Justice Scanlan of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia heard an appeal of a decision of the Farm Practices Board (FPB) involving the following facts:
The issue that had been before the FPB was whether or not the farmer in this case complied with normal farm practices, in which case the practice would be protected from certain civil actions for damages or injunctive relief. However, the farm protection legislation does not address "the potential impact of chemical use or misuse, including the impact on neighbouring properties."
In the end, Justice Scanlan determined that the FPB decision was reasonable, but pointed out its limitations - it did not deal with all of the allegations made by the complainants, including allegations about overspray. Those other allegations would still have to be dealt with, if at all, in the civil action that the complainants had also commenced against the farmer in this case. That action had been stayed pending the outcome of the FPB proceeding.
Read the decision at: Nauss v. Nova Scotia (Farm Practice Board).
The matter arose as a result of two instances where [JW] sprayed a field directly across the road from the [N] property with what I understand to have been a herbicide. The Appellants argue this was done at a time when the wind speed and direction caused an overspray to spread onto their property, allegedly damaging raspberry canes and allegedly causing personal injury to both Mrs. [N] and to her horses. In addition, the Appellants complain about the impact of ditch excavation, as carried out by Mr. [W], and as to the placement of bales of hay or straw in the ditch, the escape of organic materials onto their property together with the impact or the potential impact that might have had on their well water. I emphasize repeatedly the word “allegedly.” The Appellants also allege, as I noted, that the herbicide impacted the health of their horses, specifically mares in foal. They say the mares were impacted and perhaps may have aborted as a result of the overspray. They allege, as I understand it, although I'm not reviewing in any great detail the allegations in the statement of claim, that it was not just the existing pregnancies that were impacted but the fertility of the mares on a go forward basis.
The issue that had been before the FPB was whether or not the farmer in this case complied with normal farm practices, in which case the practice would be protected from certain civil actions for damages or injunctive relief. However, the farm protection legislation does not address "the potential impact of chemical use or misuse, including the impact on neighbouring properties."
In the end, Justice Scanlan determined that the FPB decision was reasonable, but pointed out its limitations - it did not deal with all of the allegations made by the complainants, including allegations about overspray. Those other allegations would still have to be dealt with, if at all, in the civil action that the complainants had also commenced against the farmer in this case. That action had been stayed pending the outcome of the FPB proceeding.
Read the decision at: Nauss v. Nova Scotia (Farm Practice Board).
Labels:
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farmer,
jurisdiction,
liability,
neighbours,
normal farm practices,
Nova Scotia,
nuisance,
overspray,
spray drift
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Nova Scotia Board allows compensation claim for expropriation of contractual rights to proceed
The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is allowing PEV International Research & Development Incorporated (PEV) to proceed with a somewhat unusual claim under the Expropriation Act. PEV claimed compensation arising from the expropriation of land owned by James Irving Warner by the Municipality of the District of Guysborough (for the purpose of its inclusion in an industrial development for the regasification of liquid natural gas).
Warner and PEV had already entered into a business agreement involving the development of an LNG regasification plant and related facilities on the same land. Warner applied for compensation under the Expropriation Act. PEV then applied for compensation for the value of its interest in the land (arising from the contract). PEV withdrew claims for business loss and disturbance. Guysborough challenged PEV's ability to bring the claim for "market value" of the land, questioning whether PEV was an "owner" pursuant to the Expropriation Act.
In ruling that the claim could proceed, the Board said that it was satisfied that, but for the expropriation, the agreement between PEV and Warner would not have terminated (as it did when the expropriation occurred). The Board was not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence before it to support a finding that PEV has no claim. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment failed. However, the Board made it clear that, in allowing the claim to proceed, it refrained from any consideration of the value of the PEV interest (i.e. an interest that might be valueless).
Read the decision at: PEV International Research & Development Incorporated (Re).
Warner and PEV had already entered into a business agreement involving the development of an LNG regasification plant and related facilities on the same land. Warner applied for compensation under the Expropriation Act. PEV then applied for compensation for the value of its interest in the land (arising from the contract). PEV withdrew claims for business loss and disturbance. Guysborough challenged PEV's ability to bring the claim for "market value" of the land, questioning whether PEV was an "owner" pursuant to the Expropriation Act.
In ruling that the claim could proceed, the Board said that it was satisfied that, but for the expropriation, the agreement between PEV and Warner would not have terminated (as it did when the expropriation occurred). The Board was not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence before it to support a finding that PEV has no claim. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment failed. However, the Board made it clear that, in allowing the claim to proceed, it refrained from any consideration of the value of the PEV interest (i.e. an interest that might be valueless).
Read the decision at: PEV International Research & Development Incorporated (Re).
Labels:
expropriation,
Expropriation Act,
landowner,
market value,
Nova Scotia,
NSURB,
owner,
summary judgment
Friday, January 21, 2011
When does the taking of rights constitute expropriation?
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia recently decided a case involving a petition by one landowner in Halifax for a private right of way over the land of a neighbour. The petition was made to the municipality under the Private Way Act (PWA). The neighbours asked the Court to find that there was no jurisdiction in the municipality to consider the petition and grant the right of way, as to do so would constitute an expropriation (requiring that steps be taken under the applicable expropriations legislation).
While the Court understood that the PWA may have significant consequences for affected landowners, it noted that there are procedural protections and a means of compensation built into the PWA. Moreover, in spite of those potentially significant consequences, the Court did not conclude that the process under the PWA constitutes “expropriation” as contemplated by the Expropriation Act. Therefore, the Court declared that as a matter of law in Nova Scotia, Part 2 of the PWA is operative legislation, and any Municipal Council petitioned for the “obtaining and laying out of a private way or road” may properly consider the petition as per the provisions of the PWA.
Read the decision at: Cron v. Halifax (Regional Municipality).
While the Court understood that the PWA may have significant consequences for affected landowners, it noted that there are procedural protections and a means of compensation built into the PWA. Moreover, in spite of those potentially significant consequences, the Court did not conclude that the process under the PWA constitutes “expropriation” as contemplated by the Expropriation Act. Therefore, the Court declared that as a matter of law in Nova Scotia, Part 2 of the PWA is operative legislation, and any Municipal Council petitioned for the “obtaining and laying out of a private way or road” may properly consider the petition as per the provisions of the PWA.
Read the decision at: Cron v. Halifax (Regional Municipality).
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Farm labourer's "get a motel" constructive dismissal claim dismissed
Mark Isnor had been an employee of the Ueffing Farms Limited from June 22, 1997 to November 2, 2009, as a farm labourer and performed many varied tasks on the company’s hog farm in Canning, Nova Scotia. Before a labour tribunal hearing, Isnor testified that in early September of 2009, there were two new employees who were hugging and kissing in the barn. He testified he did not say anything to the owners of the business although he did not believe it was appropriate behaviour for employees in the workplace. He testified this activity of hugging and kissing by the two young people went on 2 to 3 times a day, however, on cross-examination he restated and said the activity was frequent, but may not have been that often.
Isnor further testified that he did speak to the couple to say they should get a motel if they were going to do that activity. He testified this behaviour did not bother his work and he did not consider it a major concern other than he thought it was inappropriate behaviour in the workplace and told Donald Ueffing, an owner of the employer company, that it should stop.
Isnor quit his employment and then made a complaint to the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Tribunal in the form of a constructive dismissal claim (i.e. that his work environment had been allowed to become so poisoned that he had no choice but to leave his employment, as if he had been wrongfully dismissed). The Tribunal dismissed the claim:
Isnor further testified that he did speak to the couple to say they should get a motel if they were going to do that activity. He testified this behaviour did not bother his work and he did not consider it a major concern other than he thought it was inappropriate behaviour in the workplace and told Donald Ueffing, an owner of the employer company, that it should stop.
Isnor quit his employment and then made a complaint to the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Tribunal in the form of a constructive dismissal claim (i.e. that his work environment had been allowed to become so poisoned that he had no choice but to leave his employment, as if he had been wrongfully dismissed). The Tribunal dismissed the claim:
The Tribunal finds on the balance of probabilities from hearing the evidence and the testimony, and review of the exhibits, the Complainant quit his employment on November 2, 2009, and there has been no substantive evidence presented by the Complainant to show the workplace environment was so poisoned or destructive that was not remedied by the Respondent, such that he could not do his work. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds without some corroboration of the Complainant’s testimony, which did not occur at this hearing, there is no substantive evidence to support a claim for constructive dismissal from the evidence presented.Read the decision at: Isnor v. Ueffing Farms Limited.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Nova Scotia Court upholds cap on dairy quota prices
Some Nova Scotia dairy producers applied to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia challenging the authority of the Dairy Farmers of Nova Scotia (DFNS) to decrease the price of quota in the province. DFNS regulations provide mechanisms to adjust a producer’s non saleable and saleable milk quota. They also create a capped price for the exchange of saleable milk quota. The capped price is being phased in over the period commencing in August 2009 through July 2012 and eventually will set a maximum value that is below the value currently being obtained in trading on the quota exchange.
The applicants’ principle challenge was to the purported authority to decrease the quota price. While they maintain support for a supply management system, they favor a quota exchange price that is market driven and not capped. They also seek to ensure that they do not otherwise lose valuable saleable quota already acquired.
At the heart of the dispute was a conflict between some dairy producers who seek to preserve the value of their investment in the dairy industry through unrestricted quota pricing, and those who fear that an unregulated quota price will render the financial structure of the industry unsustainable in the long term. It is suggested, among other things, that an unrestricted quota price exchange will make it prohibitively expensive for new entrants to the industry.
The Court examined two issues: 1) whether the quota regulation was, prima facie, a proper exercise of the DFNS authority; and, 2) whether the effect of the regulations was to expropriate property without compensation (which can be done, but only where the legislation expressly permits expropriation without compensation) - de facto expropriation. With respect to these issues, the Court ruled:
- the power to adjust quota has been properly delegated to the DFNS under the Dairy Industry Act (DIA);
- Regulation 21, fixing a price cap, is authorized by section 14(1)(e) of the DIA, and in particular clause (iii) which authorizes “...setting the terms and conditions on which the transfer [of quota among producers] may take place”;
- Milk quota is not "property" for the purposes of the de facto expropriation argument;
- Alternatively, if quota is "property", it has not been expropriated because the uses of quota have not been destroyed by the price cap;
- Further in the alternative, if quota is property and has been expropriated, the legislation expressly provides for the price cap without any compensation (i.e. expropriation without compensation).
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Owner liable for damages caused by pet goat
A Small Claims Court in Nova Scotia has awarded a woman $1,500 in damages after her neighbour's goat rammed her car. At first, the goat had chased the woman's young daughter who had exited the vehicle. When the daughter managed to get back into the car, the goat rammed the side of the car and then climbed on top of it. The goat was being "goatsat" while the owner was away.
The Small Claims adjudicator ruled that the goat was to be considered a wild animal rather than a domesticated one for the purposes of the case:
The Small Claims adjudicator ruled that the goat was to be considered a wild animal rather than a domesticated one for the purposes of the case:
The law divides animals into one of two categories. The first category is wild by nature known as ferea naturae . The second category would be those considered domesticated by nature and this category is known as mansuetae naturae. I grant you it is sometimes difficult to categorize animals as wild by nature versus domesticated by nature. For example, is a cow a domesticated animal or a wild animal? Is a Rottweiller or a Pitbull a wild animal or a domesticated animal? These are questions that face the Small Claims Court on more than one occasion. I think it is safe to say the goat would fit in to the first category of an animal that is wild by nature. No doubt they can be trained to a certain extent but when you have an animal like a goat would you allow it to live in your home. I suggest there is only so far you can go to training an animal like a goat. The same could be said for a tiger. While they may be well trained they are wild animals. As such the law imposes a very high duty on the owner to prevent any kind of injury from such animals even if the owner believes in his own mind that the animal is harmless. The owner of such an animal will be strictly liable for any injury caused by that animal, which is the case here.Read the decision at: Pittman v. Morin.
Labels:
damages,
domesticated animal,
goat,
neighbours,
Nova Scotia,
Small Claims Court,
wild animal
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Utility and Review Board upholds municipal watercourse set back decision in Nova Scotia
The Nova Scotia Mink Breeders Association (the “Association”) and various farmers: Kevin Hamilton, Heather King, William Brewer, Douglas Hurlbert, Carmen Comeau, Betty Reeves, and Walter Doucette, (“collectively referred to as “individual farmers”) appealed from a decision of Council for the Municipality of the District of Yarmouth (“Yarmouth” or “Municipality”) which amended Part 23, s. 5(c) of the Land Use By-law (“LUB”) to increase the required minimum setback from 328 to 500 feet from any off-site waterwell or any watercourse or waterbody (“amended LUB”). Yarmouth’s Municipal Planning Strategy (“MPS”) includes policies to protect water quality, encourage agriculture, and determine the minimum setbacks from water bodies for fox, fur, hog and fowl operations. The appeals of the Appellants are made pursuant to s. 250(1)(a) of the Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 18 as amended (the “MGA”). The sole issue in the appeal was: Does Council’s decision to amend the LUB reasonably carry out the intent of Yarmouth’s MPS?
The individual farmers filed an appeal with the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board on November 16, 2009 alleging the by-law amendment was contrary to the intent of all by-laws requiring the encouragement of agriculture. Furthermore, they alleged the setbacks discourage agriculture and reduced the value of their farms. On November 17, 2009, the Association filed an appeal with the Board alleging the by-law amendment does not reasonably carry out the intent of the MPS. Specifically, it stated that the amendment does not carry out the intent of policy H-7 which is to encourage any endeavor to promote the growth of agriculture. Furthermore, it claimed the setback is arbitrary in nature and not based on solid scientific evidence. On November 17, 2009, the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture filed an appeal with the Board, on the same grounds as the Association, which it later withdrew.
The Board dismissed the appeals, finding:
The individual farmers filed an appeal with the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board on November 16, 2009 alleging the by-law amendment was contrary to the intent of all by-laws requiring the encouragement of agriculture. Furthermore, they alleged the setbacks discourage agriculture and reduced the value of their farms. On November 17, 2009, the Association filed an appeal with the Board alleging the by-law amendment does not reasonably carry out the intent of the MPS. Specifically, it stated that the amendment does not carry out the intent of policy H-7 which is to encourage any endeavor to promote the growth of agriculture. Furthermore, it claimed the setback is arbitrary in nature and not based on solid scientific evidence. On November 17, 2009, the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture filed an appeal with the Board, on the same grounds as the Association, which it later withdrew.
The Board dismissed the appeals, finding:
The fact that at sometime in the future the Province may develop regulations that better manage the fur industry in Nova Scotia does not prohibit the Municipality from taking what action it can within its By-Laws to implement its MPS for its citizens. Whether it’s the most effective means of addressing the problem is not for the Board to determine. From the evidence before the Board, Council sought to strike a balance between encouraging farming and the preservation of its lakes and watercourses taking into consideration the blue green algae, its toxins and related health issues. Having considered both issues and making a decision of 500 feet, the Board finds that in the circumstances of this case, Council has reasonably carried out the intent of the MPS.Read the decision at: Re: Nova Scotia Mink Breeders Association.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Nova Scotia - Nuttby Mountain wind turbines arrive
CBC News - Nova Scotia - Nuttby Mountain wind turbines arrive
Nova Scotia Power's plan to generate power from five new wind farms by the end of 2010 took a step forward this week at the 45-megawatt farm under construction on Nuttby Mountain, near Truro. Read the CBC News article at the link above.
Nova Scotia Power's plan to generate power from five new wind farms by the end of 2010 took a step forward this week at the 45-megawatt farm under construction on Nuttby Mountain, near Truro. Read the CBC News article at the link above.
Labels:
Nova Scotia,
turbine,
wind energy,
wind farm
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board turns down appeals of wind farm approvals
The NS Utility and Review Board has dismissed appeals by Eco Awareness Society and Helen and Donald Brown from a decision of the County of Antigonish allowing the re-zoning of 14 areas on 9 properties to allow for the construction of 14 wind turbines by Shear Wind Inc. The appeals were dismissed because the Board determined that the appellants were not "aggrieved persons" as was required to have standing to appeal the decisions under the applicable legislation. A person must have "standing" to participate in a particular matter before a decision-making body such as a court or a tribunal. "Standing" may depend on a person's direct or indirect connection to the matters in issue, and in some cases includes a connection based on the public interest.
In this case, the Board concluded:
In this case, the Board concluded:
For the reasons outlined above, the Board finds that the Appellants have not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the rezoning (or any future development falling within the scope of the proposed rezoning) will adversely affect the value or reasonable enjoyment of Mr. and Mrs. Brown's properties (or the properties of a majority of members of the Eco Awareness Society), or cause or threaten any form of harm prejudicial to their interests (or the interests of a majority of members of the Eco Awareness Society). Further, the Society has not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that it is an incorporated organization, the objects of which include promoting or protecting the quality of life of persons residing in the neighbourhood affected by the council's decision, or features, structures or sites of the community affected by the council's decision, having significant cultural, architectural or recreational value.Read the decision at: Re Eco Awareness Society.
Labels:
appeal,
Nova Scotia,
standing,
turbine,
wind farm
Monday, May 10, 2010
NS Court of Appeal upholds punitive damages claim against insurer in dairy barn case
At trial, a jury awarded Adrian and Kelly Ackermann of Nova Scotia $265,000 (the maximum payable under their insurance policy) in connection with damage caused to their dairy barn by Hurricane Juan in 2003. The Ackermann's insurer, Kings Mutual, had denied coverage, although it was agreed that the hurricane was a "wind storm" within the meaning of the policy and was covered. Kings Mutual denied that any damage had been caused to the barn.
In addition to the main damages award, the jury at trial also awarded $55,000 in punitive damages against Kings Mutual, having found that the denial of coverage was made in bad faith and that the insurer's conduct offended the jury's sense of decency (click on the link to the decision below to read the extensive report of the facts of the case). Punitive damages are only awarded in rare and exceptional circumstances where a party’s actions are deserving of punishment, deterrence or denunciation. Normally, damages are compensatory - designed to put the injured party back in the place they were before suffering the injury. Punitive damages are about punishment for exceptionally wrongful conduct.
Kings Mutual did not appeal the main award of damages, but did appeal the award of punitive damages to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal ruled with respect to the jury's decision on the issue:
In addition to the main damages award, the jury at trial also awarded $55,000 in punitive damages against Kings Mutual, having found that the denial of coverage was made in bad faith and that the insurer's conduct offended the jury's sense of decency (click on the link to the decision below to read the extensive report of the facts of the case). Punitive damages are only awarded in rare and exceptional circumstances where a party’s actions are deserving of punishment, deterrence or denunciation. Normally, damages are compensatory - designed to put the injured party back in the place they were before suffering the injury. Punitive damages are about punishment for exceptionally wrongful conduct.
Kings Mutual did not appeal the main award of damages, but did appeal the award of punitive damages to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal ruled with respect to the jury's decision on the issue:
The jury’s answers to the questions put to it clearly indicate its findings of bad faith in relation to Kings’ denial of coverage under the policy and that King’s conduct offended its sense of decency. This indicates the jury was satisfied Kings’ conduct of its investigation was outrageous. My review of the record satisfies me that this was a conclusion a reasonable jury could reach and that an award of punitive damages was a rational response on the jury’s part to its findings. It was not an inevitable or unavoidable response, but it was a rational response to what the jury saw and heard. Without an award of punitive damages, Kings would not have been required to pay more than its policy required it to pay and there would be nothing to deter it from acting similarly in the future; by not following up on all of the evidence relevant to a claim, withholding critical information from the adjuster engaged to investigate a claim and allowing the adjuster to present the results of his or her investigation in a partisan, biased and unobjective manner. The actions of Kings were exceptional, justifying an exceptional remedy.Read the decision at: Kings Mutual Insurance Company v. Ackermann.
Labels:
appeal,
denial of coverage,
insurance,
Nova Scotia,
punitive damages
Friday, February 26, 2010
The continuing perils of fuel oil leaks
I don't know if there has been increase in the incidence of fuel oil leaks and spills, but I have noticed a fair number of reported court cases and news stories about the problem in the past year or so. Most often a spill occurs when a fuel oil supplier is delivering oil to a homeowner. I can recall a recent story out of Newfoundland where a fuel supply company pumped oil into an intake pipe at the side of a house only to discover that he was at the wrong house and the intake pipe led directly to the basement (the former oil tank had been removed).
On February 19, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court issued a decision in a case involving a leaking storage tank in a hotel/office building complex - Park Place Centre Limited v. Ultramar Ltd. and G&S Haulage Limited. Ultramar supplied the fuel oil. G&S was hired by Ultramar to deliver the oil. On one delivery date, oil was pumped into the storage tank and leaked out into the building through a breach in the tank. The cost of clean up was more than $300,000.
In the end, liabilty for the main part of the plaintiff's damages claim was apportioned 70%/30% between the two defendants and the plaintiff itself. The Court found that G&S was negligent in
filling the tank without taking proper precautions to ensure that it would not leak. The Court found Ultramar vicariously liable for the damage caused by G&S, since Ultramar owed a duty to the plaintiff to ensure that G&S took reasonable care in delivering the fuel oil. The Court also found that Ultramar had breached an implied term of its contract with the plaintiff, namely that it would deliver fuel oil safely in a manner that would not allow it to escape from the tank.
The plaintiff, Park Place, however, was not without its own responsibility for the spill. The Court found the plaintiff contributorily negligent to the tune of 30% because it had done almost nothing in the years since the tank was installed to ensure that the tank was in proper order and did not ensure that the tank room itself was liquid tight. The Court ruled that an "ordinary, reasonable and prudent operator of a hotel and office complex" would have recognized the importance of ensuring that oil would not escape from the tank room.
Read the decision at:
http://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nssc/doc/2010/2010nssc39/2010nssc39.html
On February 19, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court issued a decision in a case involving a leaking storage tank in a hotel/office building complex - Park Place Centre Limited v. Ultramar Ltd. and G&S Haulage Limited. Ultramar supplied the fuel oil. G&S was hired by Ultramar to deliver the oil. On one delivery date, oil was pumped into the storage tank and leaked out into the building through a breach in the tank. The cost of clean up was more than $300,000.
In the end, liabilty for the main part of the plaintiff's damages claim was apportioned 70%/30% between the two defendants and the plaintiff itself. The Court found that G&S was negligent in
filling the tank without taking proper precautions to ensure that it would not leak. The Court found Ultramar vicariously liable for the damage caused by G&S, since Ultramar owed a duty to the plaintiff to ensure that G&S took reasonable care in delivering the fuel oil. The Court also found that Ultramar had breached an implied term of its contract with the plaintiff, namely that it would deliver fuel oil safely in a manner that would not allow it to escape from the tank.
The plaintiff, Park Place, however, was not without its own responsibility for the spill. The Court found the plaintiff contributorily negligent to the tune of 30% because it had done almost nothing in the years since the tank was installed to ensure that the tank was in proper order and did not ensure that the tank room itself was liquid tight. The Court ruled that an "ordinary, reasonable and prudent operator of a hotel and office complex" would have recognized the importance of ensuring that oil would not escape from the tank room.
Read the decision at:
http://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nssc/doc/2010/2010nssc39/2010nssc39.html
Labels:
contamination,
contributory negligence,
damages,
negligence,
Nova Scotia,
oil
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