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Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts

Thursday, April 2, 2026

Drainage Petition Fails Over Area Requiring Drainage

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

New municipal drains in Ontario are created by “petition” made to the local municipality.  Pursuant to Section 4 of the Drainage Act (the “Act”), petitions may be made by the majority of the number of landowners in an “area requiring drainage”, by any one owner who owns at least 60% of the land within that area, by the municipal engineer or road superintendent where a municipal drain is required for a road, or by the “Director” appointed by the Province in the case of drains required for agricultural purposes.  Where the municipality accepts the petition, it appoints a drainage engineer and that engineer must prepare a report for the proposed drain.  The report includes the design and specifications of the drain as well as a table of assessments in which each participating landowner’s respective share of the costs of the drain is assigned.

Section 5 of the Act requires a municipal council that receives a petition to consider the petition forthwith and to decide whether to proceed or not to proceed with the drainage works.  Where the municipality decides to proceed with the works, the municipality must appoint an engineer to examine the area requiring drainage and to prepare a report for the proposed drainage works.  Pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, before making the examination and report, the engineer must hold an on-site meeting with landowners within the area and shall at the meeting: (a) determine the area requiring drainage; (b) determine whether the petition complies with Section 4 for the area requiring drainage; and, (c) where the engineer is of the opinion that the petition fails to comply with Section 4, establish the requirements for a petition to comply.

The term “area requiring drainage” is not defined in the Act. Once an engineer has been appointed by the municipality, in order to determine the validity of a petition brought by a private landowner(s), the engineer must make his or her own identification of the area requiring drainage (which may differ from the area described in the petition) and of the property(ies) lying within that area.  The Drainage Act requires this confirmation of compliance with Section 4 because the legislation compels area landowners to participate in (and pay for) municipal drains.  Only a landowner or landowners with a sufficient ownership interest in the “area requiring drainage” can compel non-petitioning neighbours to accept a municipal drain.  The proper determination of the sufficient ownership interest places an important limit on this forced participation.

The Drainage Referee, who is a judge or a lawyer appointed by the Ontario Cabinet, is given jurisdiction under the Act to determine the validity of a petition, effectively creating an appeal from the engineer’s determinations about the area requiring drainage.  A recent decision of the Acting Drainage Referee for Ontario dealt with such an appeal.  The Acting Referee noted in his decision:

It is essential to determine an area requiring drainage in order to be able to apply those percentages and thus test for the validity of a petition. Once the area requiring drainage has been determined, the rest is a mathematical calculation. However, if an area requiring drainage is determined solely and simply based on the owner of a single property’s desire for a legal outlet, then what is the purpose of Section 4 of the Act? The legislature knows how to create laws that allow for single-person initiation, as in Sections 78 and 79 of the Act. However, it has not done so in relation to the establishment of new municipal drains. Careful attention is therefore required in the determination of an area requiring drainage to preserve the integrity of section 4 of the Drainage Act.

In the case before the Acting Referee, a single landowner had signed a petition for a new municipal drain to address a “low depressional area” located in part on the petitioner’s property but mainly on the neighbouring property.  The neighbouring owner did not sign the petition.  The engineer prepared a report for the proposed municipal drain and identified the property owned by the petitioner as the area requiring drainage (being the area within which the owner planned to install a systematic tile drainage system).  The questions for the Acting Drainage Referee were whether the engineer was correct to define the area requiring drainage by reference to property ownership boundaries and whether it was correct to exclude the neighbour’s property from the area requiring drainage for purposes of Section 4 of the Act.

The Acting Drainage Referee did not foreclose the possibility that ownership boundaries might be relevant in some circumstances to the determination of the area requiring drainage, but found in this case that ownership boundaries should not have formed the basis for the engineer’s determination.  Further, the engineer was wrong to exclude the neighbour’s portion of the “low depressional area” from the area requiring drainage.  The engineer had suggested that the neighbouring land should be excluded because it had existing riparian access to an outlet (a nearby creek).  However, the Acting Drainage Referee found that the portions of the low area on both sides of the property line had “technical access … for outlet” and neither had “reasonably feasible riparian access to that outlet.”

The result of the Acting Drainage Referee’s findings was that petition was invalid because it was not signed by 60% of the landowners of the area requiring drainage.  The engineer’s report was set aside and the municipality’s provision drainage by-law was quashed.  As the Acting Referee concluded:

The Engineer is entitled to great deference with respect to the question of the area requiring drainage for the purposes of section 4 of the Drainage Act, and his conclusions ought not to be disregarded except when there is clear evidence of error or unless a question of law is involved. But if his conclusion is patently wrong, it cannot stand.

Read the decision at: 2025 ONDR 5 (CanLII)

Monday, February 10, 2025

Supreme Court talks de facto expropriation again

 AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

The concept of “de facto” expropriation was the focus of another decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2024.  In certain cases, government action outside of expropriation legislation may effectively result in a taking of property, which may entitle a property owner to compensation for the taking.  This is known as a “constructive” or “de facto” taking.  There is a presumption that there will be no expropriation without compensation.  If government action (often in the form of regulation) removes all reasonable uses of a property, then the property has been effectively expropriated and compensation may be payable.

Importantly, though, “compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition.”  This “Pointe Gourde principle”, taken from a 1945 case of the same name heard before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK, flows from the rule that compensation is to be based on the value of property to the owner, not the value to the taker.  An owner who suffers expropriation, de facto or otherwise, is entitled generally to be compensated for the market value of the property based on its highest and best use before the taking.  If the expropriating authority’s reason for taking the property actually enhances the market value of the property, the property owner does not get to rely on the enhanced value in the calculation of compensation payable.

The Pointe Gourde case involved the expropriation of land in Trinidad for use as a quarry from which stone would be taken to construct a nearby naval base.  The compensation owing to the owners was to reflect the “value of the quarry as a going concern”.  The quarry owners argued that the value of their quarry should include consideration of the higher profits they would make because their stone was to be used for the naval base.  The Judicial Council, which was the highest court for cases from Trinidad (as it was at one time the highest court for Canadian cases), decided against the quarry owners.  The increase in the market value of the property was due entirely to the expropriating authority’s plan to build the naval base.  The expropriating authority benefitted from a nearby and accessible source of a large quantity of stone, but without the plan for the naval base construction this did not increase the value of the quarry to the owners.  Value to the owner, not value to the taker.

The Supreme Court of Canada addressed similar issues in the recent Canadian case, which originated in Newfoundland.  In 1917, a landowner was issued a Crown grant for the purposes of harvesting trees to produce barrels and for firewood.  The grandchildren of the original grantee still own a 7.36-acre portion of the original Crown grant.  This remaining land is in a natural state, covered in trees and shrubs, and is located within a watershed area that drains into a river used by the City of St. John’s for its local water supply.  For decades, the land has been made subject to a series of by-laws and regulations prohibiting development in the watershed area.

Since the 1990s, the grandchildren landowners have attempted to obtain permission to develop their property.  In 2011, they asked the City about the possibility of residential development and also other activities such as tree harvesting, farming, saw milling, and the installation of solar panels and wind turbines.  The City advised that those uses were not permitted and that the land must be kept “unused” in its “natural state”.  The landowners went ahead in spite of this and applied for permission to develop a 10-lot residential subdivision.  Their application was rejected, in part on the basis of the watershed zoning that prohibited most if not all forms of development on the landowners’ property.

The landowners sued the City of St. John’s in court and obtained a declaration (upheld by the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador and not contested before the Supreme Court of Canada) that their property had been “constructively expropriated”.  The Court of Appeal ruled that the City had acquired a “beneficial interest” in the land that consisted of “the right to a continuous flow of uncontaminated groundwater downstream to the City’s water facilities”.  While the grandchildren landowners had acquired the land their grandfather had received through the Crown grant, all they had now was a right to keep the land “unused in its natural state”.  The Court of Appeal concluded that this was a taking of “virtually all of the aggregated incidents of ownership” and that the landowners had no remaining reasonable use of the property.

The case that came to the Supreme Court arose from a legal question posed to the lower court in Newfoundland by the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, the authority tasked with determining the amount of compensation owing to the landowners.  The landowners were arguing that compensation should be based on land value as if the watershed regulations were not in place and a medium-density residential development were possible.  The City contended that value should be based on a highest and best use of agriculture and forestry that would be acceptable to the City and would not cause adverse impact to the watershed (something possible within the watershed zoning).  The lower court in Newfoundland relied on the Pointe Gourde principle and sided with the City.  The Court of Appeal in Newfoundland reversed this decision. 

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the decision of the lower court on the basis of the factual finding that the watershed zoning “was an independent enactment and not made with a view to expropriation”.  If the City had enacted the zoning specifically for the purpose of reducing the value of the landowners’ land so that it could then take the land for a public use, the value of the land could be determined as if the land were not subject to the zoning and was eligible for subdivision development.  However, as it was found that the zoning was enacted independent of any plan to “take” (constructively) the land, the landowners were only entitled to compensation based on the value of the land with the watershed zoning regulations in place.

Read the decision at: 2024 SCC 17 (CanLII).

Friday, January 10, 2025

Supreme Court of Canada digs up the dirt on the Sale of Goods Act

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

The Supreme Court of Canada issued a decision at the end of May, 2024 in a case about topsoil.  Of course, the case was not only about topsoil.  Topsoil just happened to be the subject matter of the contract at the heart of the dispute between the parties.  The Supreme Court chose to hear the case because it involved important questions about contracts for the sale of goods and the statutory conditions that are implied through legislation to form part of those contracts.

With the exception of Quebec, all Canadian provinces and territories have a statute governing the sale of goods that is modelled on a 19th-century law from the United Kingdom – the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.  That UK legislation codified common law (judge-made, non-statutory) that had developed in the English courts throughout the 19th century.  Passed down to Canadian law were three implied obligations that certain sellers of goods can owe to buyers related to the characteristics or properties of the goods sold even though the contract between seller and buyer might not mention the obligations: 1) fitness for purpose (that where the buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are to be used, the goods will be reasonably fit for the purpose); 2) merchantability (that the goods sold by description will be of “merchantable” or reasonable quality and fit for sale in the usual course of trade); and, 3) correspondence with description (that goods sold by description will match the seller’s description of the goods). 

According to the Supreme Court in its recent decision, those implied obligations were likely imposed by judges to relieve buyers from the harsh effect of the law of “caveat emptor” (buyer beware) that left all of the risk related to the characteristics or properties of the goods on the buyer where the contract was silent on those matters.  In Ontario, the Sale of Goods Act contains the three implied obligations of fitness for purpose, merchantability and correspondence with description and makes them implied “conditions” rather than “warranties”.  Contractual terms are “conditions” where they are fundamental to the contract: breach of a condition would give the buyer the right to reject the goods from the seller.  Contractual terms that are not fundamental to the contract are “warranties”: breach of a warranty would give the buyer a claim for damages but would not entitle the buyer to reject the goods.  Where a condition is breached, the buyer would actually have the option to reject the goods or keep the goods and sue for damages (as if a warranty had been breached).

In the case that went to the Supreme Court, the issue was whether or not the parties to a contract for the supply of topsoil had “contracted out” of the implied condition in the Sale of Goods Act that the goods sold by description correspond with the description.  Parties don’t have to leave the implied conditions in place – they can use express language in their agreement to say that the implied conditions will not apply.

The buyer in the case was engaged by a municipality to remediate flooding in an area, which involved the removal and replacement of topsoil.  The buyer needed topsoil with a specific composition in order to provide the drainage required to solve the flooding problem.  The topsoil was sourced from the seller on the basis of the seller’s description, which included laboratory reports based on topsoil samples taken six weeks prior to the eventual delivery of the soil.  Although the seller warned that updated test results should be obtained, the buyer had missed project deadlines and wanted immediate delivery of the soil to avoid paying damages to the municipality.  The seller and the buyer agreed to go ahead with the transaction and delivery of the soil, but with exclusions of implied conditions.  The buyer would have the right to test and approve the topsoil before it was shipped to the site, but if the buyer waived that right the seller would not be responsible for the quality of the topsoil once it left the seller’s facility.

It turned out that the topsoil delivered had substantially more clay content than indicated by the earlier test results.  The soil didn’t drain the way it was supposed to and ponding developed on the project site, forcing the buyer to remove the topsoil and replace it with new topsoil that would drain properly.  The buyer sued the seller for damages claiming that the seller failed to deliver topsoil that had the composition of the soil shown in the test results that had been provided.

The majority of the members of the Supreme Court (there was one dissenting opinion) sided with the seller, finding that the parties had contracted out of the implied “correspondence with description” condition in the Sale of Goods Act.  Although the exclusion language used by the seller and buyer in their contract referred to “quality”, which is arguably something different than the matching of “identity” between the description of the soil (the test results) and the soil as delivered, the Supreme Court found that the buyer had chosen deliberately to assume the risk of not having further testing carried out on the topsoil before delivery.  The use of the word “quality” in the exclusion clause didn’t allow the buyer to avoid the objective intention of the exclusion clause – that the seller was not to be held liable for any claim relating to the topsoil.

Read the decision at: 2024 SCC 20 (CanLII).

 

Tuesday, February 21, 2023

The Mystery of the Missing Will(s)

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE: 

Estate administration can be contentious and complex.  Family dynamics and emotions often ignite and drive disputes and litigation between executors, estate beneficiaries and others even where the true last wishes of a deceased relative would appear to be clearly stated.  There are many formal requirements for making a valid will in Ontario.  A failure to fulfill even one of those requirements can provide an opening for a will challenge and costly litigation.

In a case decided by the Court of Appeal, a dispute over the future of an estate farm property boiled down to legal formalities and a scenario that could make for a mystery novel (or at least a short story).  The deceased farm owner allegedly signed two versions of the same will, only one of which was witnessed, and neither of which was available in original form at trial.  By the time of the appeal, the original copy of one of the wills had been found, but it was not enough to convince the Court of Appeal that either will should be accepted.  Instead, the rules of intestacy (where a deceased has no valid will) were to apply.

The farm owner was a bachelor with no children; he died in 2015.  He had executed a will in the 1990s naming his parents as sole beneficiaries of his estate, but they had both pre-deceased him.  Absent a subsequent valid will, the farm owner’s estate would pass to his brother (50%) and the two daughters of his deceased sister (50% jointly) in accordance with the provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act: “Where a person dies intestate in respect of property and there is no surviving spouse, issue or parent, the property shall be distributed among the surviving brothers and sisters of the intestate equally, and if any brother or sister predeceases the intestate, the share of the deceased brother or sister shall be distributed among his or her children equally.”

For two decades prior to his death, the farm owner had been assisted in his farming operation by a long-time friend.  In 2009, he named the friend as his attorney for property and personal care.  In 2013, the legal assistant of the farm owner’s long-time lawyer prepared a draft will naming the friend as the sole trustee of the farm owner’s estate and the beneficiary entitled to inherit the farm property.  The friend asked the Court to determine that the 2013 will was valid so that she would receive the farm.  The farm owner’s brother opposed the request on the basis that there was no valid 2013 will.

At trial, two copies of the 2013 will were marked as exhibits.  One copy – Version 1 – had the farm owner’s signature but no witness signatures.  The other copy – Version 2 – had the farm owner’s signature as well as the signatures of two witnesses.  Both copies were marked “Draft” as the will had only been sent to the farm owner by his lawyer for review and comment; the farm owner had never attended at his lawyer’s office to revise and/or execute the will.  However, the friend claimed that Version 2 had been signed by the farm owner and witnessed prior to his death in 2015.  The brother claimed that Version 2 was signed by the alleged witnesses only after the farm owner’s death once the friend had discovered that Version 1 would not be valid without the signatures of witnesses. 

The friend testified that, after the farm owner’s death, she had searched for a will.  She said that she had found Version 1 in a filing cabinet in the farm owner’s house and took it to the lawyer’s office where she learned that the lawyer had no fully executed copy of the will.  During the visit, the lawyer’s assistant made a copy of Version 1 and returned the original to the friend.  The lawyer’s assistant also advised the friend at that time that Version 1 was not valid because it was not signed by witnesses.  The friend further testified that, after her visit to the lawyer’s office, she found the original Version 2 will on top of a kitchen cupboard in the farm owner’s house (not in the filing cabinet where she found Version 1).  Version 2 was signed by two witnesses and would be valid.  In fact, the Trial Judge found that Version 2 was valid and ruled in the friend’s favour.

No original of Version 1 or Version 2 of the 2013 will was produced at trial.  However, between the time judgment was rendered following trial and the hearing of the appeal, the friend located the original of Version 2 of the will and asked the Court of Appeal to allow it to be admitted as “fresh evidence”.  The Court rejected the request, finding that the new evidence would not change its conclusion that the friend had failed to prove the validity of the 2013 will.  The Court of Appeal found that the Trial Judge made a key error in failing to appreciate the relevance of the evidence of an expert in handwriting called by the farm owner’s brother.  The expert testified that the farm owner’s signatures on the two copies of the 2013 will – Version 1 and Version 2 – were identical.  Without being able to produce the original of Version 1 and, in doing so, prove that each of Version 1 and Version 2 was signed (separately) by the farm owner, the friend failed to overcome the appearance that Version 2 was not signed by the witnesses until after the farm owner’s death.

Read the Court of Appeal's decision at: 2021 ONCA 442 (CanLII).