Municipality cuts down abandoned orchard trees deemed noxious weeds

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

According to Ontario’s Weed Control Act, “every person in possession of land shall destroy all noxious weeds on it.”  The owner of land is deemed by the Act to be in possession of the land.  Provincial and municipal road authorities are deemed to be in possession of road allowances.  Noxious weeds are those that are prescribed in the Regulation made under the Act (including giant hogweed, poison-ivy, leafy spurge, sow-thistle, ragweed, etc.) and other plants that may be deemed to be a noxious weed (called a “local weed”) in a by-law passed by a municipality.  The council of upper-tier municipalities (counties, regions, cities) and some other municipalities are required by the Act to appoint one or more area weed inspectors to enforce the Act.  Only municipalities that have appointed a weed inspector may pass a by-law deeming other plants to be noxious weeds.

Weed inspectors are empowered to enter any land and buildings (dwelling houses excepted) between sunrise and sunset for the purpose of searching for noxious weeds and weed seeds and may also inspect implements, machinery, vehicles, crops and other plants.  Where access to a property is denied, the weed inspector can obtain a search warrant without prior notice to the owner or occupier of the property.  The inspector may order a person in possession of land to destroy noxious weeds or weed seeds.  If the person in possession does not comply with the order, the weed inspector may “cause the noxious weeds or weed seeds to be destroyed in the prescribed manner”, with the cost of the work charged back to the owner of the lands by the municipality.  The prescribed manner of destroying noxious weeds includes pulling or removing the plants from the soil, cutting the roots or stalks of the plants, ploughing or cultivating the soil, or treating the plants with a herbicide. 

In August of this year, Justice Sheard of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released her decision in a lawsuit brought by landowners against their local municipality after the Municipality cut down an apple and pear orchard on the landowners’ property.  The orchard was cut down in 2014 and the landowners were billed $12,800 for the work.  Their court action was commenced in 2015 and a trial took place before Justice Sheard over several days in 2022 and 2023.  The lawsuit included claims for: $1,500,000 in general damages for negligence, misfeasance in public office, negligent assumption of jurisdiction, trespass, and nuisance; $1,000,000 in punitive and exemplary damages; a declaration that the Municipality’s weed by-law was void for bad faith, vagueness, overreach, etc.; a declaration that the landowners’ natural justice rights were violated; and an order for reimbursement of the $12,800 cost of the tree removal work.

The landowners had purchased their property in May, 2011.  The property was 20 acres in size and included two abandoned orchards of about 2.5 acres each (only one of which was at issue in the litigation).  Very shortly before the landowners’ purchase, a new neighbour purchased an adjacent farm property where he planted apple trees with a view to developing an orchard.  That neighbour had concerns that the landowners’ abandoned orchard was full of disease and insect pests that would threaten the existence of his young apple trees.  The neighbour raised this concern with the Municipality and had learned through OMAFRA that other municipalities had passed by-laws designating abandoned orchards as noxious weeds.  He requested that his own municipality do the same.

In 2013, the Municipality’s Council passed a by-law designating diseased fruit trees as “local weeds” to be treated as noxious weeds pursuant to the Weed Control Act.   A “diseased fruit tree” was defined in the by-law as “a fruit tree as herein defined, whether dead or alive, which fruit tree as part of a planting of greater than 0.25 ha (0.618 ac) and which planting is within the 375 m (1,230.31 ft) of a fruit growing operation or plant nursery operation, and which planting has been neglected from normal standards of good farming practices, such that it exhibits fruit tree disease or populations of insects which represent a reasonable threat by movement to such commercial fruit growing operation.”  A “fruit tree” included both apple trees and pear trees.

In April, 2014, the Municipality determined that the landowners’ one abandoned orchard contained diseased fruit trees and issued an order to the landowners to “bring down and burn” the apple trees within 30 days of service of the order.  Nearly four months later, the trees had not been destroyed.  In August, 2014, the Municipality moved in and had the diseased trees cut down.

Justice Sheard dismissed the landowners’ court action in its entirety.  She found that the weed control by-law passed by the Municipality was not void – it was clearly within the scope of the Municipality’s statutory authority given to it under the Act.  The Municipality followed the proper procedure in passing the by-law and the bylaw was submitted to and approved by the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs as required by the Act.  Justice Sheard disagreed with the landowners that the by-law targeted them in particular, commenting:

Had the plaintiffs acted in accordance with “normal standards of good farming practices” in the management of the Orchard, the Bylaw would have been of no concern to them. Indeed, had the plaintiffs acted on their stated objective to develop a commercial apple growing operation, they might well have been advocates for the Bylaw, intended to protect all fruit growing or plant nursery operations.

Having found that the by-law itself was valid, Justice Sheard concluded that the landowners’ court action must fail because their recourse was not to the Court but to the chief weed inspector appointed pursuant to the Weed Control Act.  Where a municipal weed inspector makes an order against a person in possession of land, that person may appeal the order to the chief inspector who may either confirm or revoke the order or make a new order.  The chief inspector’s order may be appealed to the Divisional Court.  In this case, the landowners did not appeal the order and were bound by it.  As the order was found to be valid, there was no basis on which the landowners could sue the Municipality for damages allegedly resulting from the operation of the order.

Read the decision at:  2023 ONSC 4540 (CanLII).

Normal Farm Practices Protection Board goes to the dogs

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

In 1987, the Ontario Government introduced Bill 83, An Act respecting the Protection of Farm Practices, which led to the enactment of Ontario’s first “right to farm” legislation, the Farm Practices Protection Act, 1988.  The Minister of Agriculture at the time, the Honourable Jack Riddell, explained to the Legislature:

Ontario farmers have been concerned for some years that normal farming practices may increasingly result in complaints and court actions under the common law of nuisance. Under the act, a Farm Practices Protection Board will be established. Individuals who complain about odours, noise and dust from farm practices may ask the board to investigate. The board will hold hearings on odour, noise or dust complaints referred to it. The board will have the power to dismiss complaints about a normal farming practice or to issue an order to rectify the problem if it is not normal. […]

The act will deal with current and future nuisance incidents arising from existing conditions. The long-term solution is a strong agricultural planning policy to avoid incompatible and competing uses in agricultural areas.

A decade later, perceived shortcomings in the original legislation were addressed in a new Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998 (“FFPPA”), which expanded nuisance liability protection to a number of modern farming activities, added to the list of disturbances covered by the protection, and addressed conflicts between agriculture and restrictive municipal by-laws.  This legislation remains in effect today.

The FFPPA protects “normal farm practices”, which are defined as practices either “conducted in a manner consistent with proper and acceptable customs and standards as established and followed by similar agricultural operations under similar circumstances” or which “[make] use of innovative technology in a manner consistent with proper advanced farm management practices”.  Importantly when it comes to livestock operations, a practice that is inconsistent with the regulations made under the Nutrient Management Act, 2002 will not be considered a normal farm practice.

The first layer of protection for agriculture created by the FFPPA is the nuisance liability protection introduced in the original Farm Practices Protection Act, 1988.  At Common Law (“judge-made” law as opposed to statutory law passed by the Legislature), a person can be liable for use of his or her land in a way that substantially and unreasonably interferes with a neighbour’s enjoyment of his or her own property.  The FFPPA creates an exception by stating that a farmer will not be liable in nuisance for “a disturbance resulting from an agricultural operation carried on as a normal farm practice”.  The agricultural operation must be carried on “in the expectation of gain or reward” to be protected.  The disturbances covered by the FFPPA are odour, dust, flies, light, smoke, noise, and vibration.

The second layer of protection for agriculture in the FFPPA is the resolution of conflicts between normal farm practices and municipal by-laws in favour of normal farm practices.  According to the legislation, no municipal by-law can apply “to restrict a normal farm practice that is carried on as part of an agricultural operation.” 

The FFPPA creates the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board, which is a tribunal with the power “to inquire into and resolve a dispute respecting an agricultural operation and to determine what constitutes a normal farm practice” and “to make the necessary inquiries and orders to ensure compliance with its decisions.”  A person directly affected by a disturbance from an agricultural operation can apply to the Board for a determination “as to whether the disturbance results from a normal farm practice.”  Farmers directly affected by a municipal by-law or “persons who want to engage in a normal farm practice as part of an agricultural operation on land in the municipality and have demonstrable plans for it” can apply to the Board for a determination “as to whether a practice is a normal farm practice for purposes of the non-application of a municipal by-law.”

At issue in one of the most recent cases decided by the Board was a complaint about a surprising source of disturbance – a barking dog acquired by a small farm operation to guard poultry from predators, namely coyotes.  The Applicant lived next door to the farm and alleged that he could hear the dog barking every night and sometimes during the day, and that the barking kept him and his family up during the night and terrified his young son.  The Applicant asked the Board to determine whether the alleged disturbance resulted from a normal farm practice.

The Board dismissed the application without having to determine whether having the guard dog on the farm was a normal farm practice entitled to the liability protection under the FFPPA.  Based on the evidence it heard, and taking into account all of the circumstances, the Board found that the Applicant failed to meet the threshold test – establishing that he was directly affected by the alleged disturbance.  To pass that test, the Applicant would have to have shown that the dog barking caused interference that was “substantial and would not be tolerated by the ordinary occupier in their location, an objective test.”

Read the decision at: Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

Normal Farm Practices Board shuts down greenhouse biodigester

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:  

In Ontario, a person affected by a disturbance from an agricultural operation, such as odour or noise, may apply to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board for a determination as to whether the disturbance results from a “normal farm practice”.  If, following a hearing, the Board determines that the disturbance results from a practice that is not a normal farm practice, the Board must order the farmer involved to cease the practice.

On November 8, 2018, the Board issued its Reasons for Decision in a case involving allegations of disturbances due to odour, flies, dust, light, noise and vibration arising from the operation of a biodigester at a large greenhouse operation.  The Board determined that the operation of the biodigester was not a normal farm practice and ordered that the digester system be shut down immediately.  The Application was brought by a number of residents living in the vicinity of the operation in 2015.  A hearing of the Application was held by the Board over the course of 20 days in December, 2015, and January, April, June, and July, 2016.  In addition to hearing from no fewer than 25 witnesses, the Board received approximately 200 documentary exhibits into evidence.

The Board heard that the biodigester in question had been installed in or about 2008 by the greenhouse operator (now in receivership) at the rear of its greenhouses to provide an alternative source of energy.  Biogas produced by the digester ran a large electrical generator, and the electricity produced was used to heat water to heat the greenhouses.  The system included two enclosed digesters, a large generator, a flare for burning off excess gas, cement bunkers where feedstock for the digesters was stored, and both open and buried tanks for liquid digestate.  Feedstock for the digester has included material such as pet food, coffee grounds, vegetable and flower waste from grocery stores, solids from meat processing, and occasionally manure.

The rural area where the greenhouse operation was located is composed of small farms with narrow frontages, along with a number of residential lots that have been severed from larger farm properties.  Prior to the installation of the biodigester, the neighbourhood was considered to be "a relatively quiet, peaceful rural setting" where disturbances from agriculture were limited to the occasional sound of tractors operating and periodic odour from nearby chicken barns.  Following installation of the biodigester, however, significant disturbances were reported, including offensive odour noticeable almost daily, and an extreme increase in the number of flies around neighbours' homes.

In assessing the application, the first question for the Board was whether one or more of the applicants had proven that he or she was directly affected by a disturbance of odour, flies, dust, light, noise or vibration arising from a practice related to the greenhouse operation.  Although under the test applicable to the application, the Board would only need to find that one of the applicants had been directly affected by one of the alleged disturbances, the Board found that several of the applicants demonstrated that there had been:

"a substantial and repeated interference with the use of their properties by reason of the excessive odour and flies since 2009.  The character of the neighbourhood has been changed by the operation of the digester from a quiet, peaceful rural setting with the occasional sounds and smells of farming to one besieged by almost daily intense odour and hordes of flies."

The next question was whether the operation of the biodigester was a "normal farm practice", which is defined in the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1988 as a practice that: (a) “is conducted in a manner consistent with proper and acceptable customs and standards as established and followed by similar agricultural operations under similar circumstances”, or (b) “makes use of innovative technology in a manner consistent with proper advanced farm management practices."  If the Board found that the operation of the biodigester did not meet one or both of those definitions, the legislation would require the Board order the greenhouse operator to cease operation of the biodigester.

With respect to the first definition of "normal farm practice", being one that is conducted in a manner consistent with proper and acceptable customs and standards, the Board found that the greenhouse operator failed to provide sufficient evidence of other similar biodigester systems being used in similar circumstances as the biodigester at issue.  With respect to the second definition of "normal farm practice", being one that makes use of innovative technology, the Board accepted that the use of a biodigester in an agricultural setting, and the use of agricultural waste as feedstock, were innovative.  However, relying on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Pyke v. Tri Gro Enterprises Ltd., the Board ruled that operation of the biodigester was nevertheless not a "normal farm practice" on account of the intensity and severity of the disturbances caused and the change in the character of the neighbourhood surrounding the greenhouse operation.

The Board also found that the operation of the biodigester could not be modified so as to make it a “normal farm practice”, leaving no option but to shut the digester down.

Read the decision at:  2018 CanLII 107105 (ON NFPPB).

Private Prosecution by Neighbour over Boundary Tree - Tree By-law Conviction Upheld on Appeal

Disputes between neighbours about boundary trees are not uncommon; private prosecutions by neighbours against neighbours, especially concerning boundary trees, are uncommon.  In a recent decision, Justice Libman of the Ontario Court of Justice upheld a lower court conviction obtained on a private prosecution with respect to a violation of the Forestry Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-26.  One neighbour contended that the other neighbour cut down a shared Norway maple tree without consent, which is generally a requirement of Section 10(3) of the Forestry Act.  He brought forward a charge against his neighbour in the Provincial Offences Court.

Although there was a permit or Certificate of Exemption issued by the City of Toronto for the removal of the tree (granted on the basis of concerns that the tree posed a hazard), the permit made it clear that the determination of the ownership of the tree was the responsibility of the party applying for permit.  In other words, the permit itself did not relieve the applicant (the neighbour who wished to cut down the tree) of any responsibilities he might have at Common Law or through legislation like the Forestry Act.

And although there are cases in which a neighbour might remove a tree without the other neighbour's consent. such as a case where the tree is causing a nuisance or where the removal is needed urgently and consent cannot be obtained in a timely manner, Justice Libman found that this was not such a case.  Where it was already well known that the neighbours opposed the removal of the tree, the other neighbour, permit or not, could not simply go ahead and have the tree removed.  For these reasons, the appeal from the conviction was dismissed.

The penalty that had been imposed by the trial justice was a fine of $5,000. 

Read the appeal decision at:  Gross v. Scheuermann.

Read the trial decision at: R. (ex rel. Scheuermann) v. Gross.

Read the sentencing decision at: R. (ex rel. Scheuermann) v. Gross.

Neighbour loses claim for damages from biosolid application on field next door

The Plaintiff in this case sued her neighbour over concerns that her well water had been contaminated by the agricultural field application of municipal sewage waste or biosolids.  The neighbour actually leased the land to a farm operation, so he commenced third party claims against both his tenant (the farm operation) and the company that applied the biosolids.  The Plaintiff's claims were based on nuisance and negligence.

Justice Heeney of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Plaintiff's claim on the basis that the application of biosolids did not cause the Plaintiff's well to become contaminated.  Put another way, the Plaintiff failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the application of the biosolids caused contamination of the well.  In his decision, it was not necessary for Justice Heeney to address the question of who might be liable for what.

Evidence in this case was heard over 6 days of trial, and included testimony concerning the application of the biosolids.  The application project had been approved by the Ministry of the Environment ("MOECC") following extensive soil testing and other measures.  The biosolids were to be applied to 90 acres of wheat stubble.  The Plaintiff had a 14-foot dug well just a few feet north of the southerly boundary of her property, in close proximity to the neighbouring field.  On the day that the biosolid application commenced, the Plaintiff said water from her shower was "brown and stinky", and smelled like "vomit material".

The Plaintiff's water was tested following the application of the biosolids.  There was some detection of coliform, but there had been positive readings of coliform in the well water prior to the biosolid application project.  No e.coli was detected.  The absence of e.coli in the water was, in Justice Heeney's opinion, the single most significant fact in the case.  There was opinion evidence that, if biosolids had entered the well, there would have been a very high level of e.coli in the water that would have been detectable when the water was tested.  E.coli is specifically used in water testing as "being the most accurate indicator of fecal contamination - sewage or fecal contamination".  Justice Heeney concluded that the biosolid application did not contaminate the Plaintiff's well.

Read the decision at: Marshall v. Shaw.

Court of Appeal overturns summary judgment, allows historical contamination claim to proceed

D Corp. owned a property that was used as a gas station until 2004.  C Ltd. purchased a nearby property on April 10, 2012 and, on April 28, 2014, commenced an action against D Corp. and the former owners of D Corp.'s property for damages resulting from hydrocarbon contamination.  The contamination was alleged to have migrated from D Corp.'s property to C Ltd.'s property.

After the exchange of pleadings (the Statement of Claim and Statements of Defence by the parties), the Defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss C Ltd.'s claim on the basis that the applicable limitation period had expired.  They asserted that C Ltd.'s claim had been discovered more than 2 years prior to the commencement of its action.  The judge hearing the motion granted the dismissal, finding that C Ltd. had become aware of sufficient material facts by March 9, 2012.  Alternatively, the motion judge held that C Ltd. had a sufficient basis for an action by March 30, 2012 when soil and groundwater sampling results were made available to C Ltd.  In the further alternative, the motion judge found that, even if C Ltd. did not know about drilling results showing contamination until May, 2012 (i.e. within 2 years of the commencement of the action), C Ltd. should have known of its claim but did not exercise due diligence.

Also, the motion judge rejected C Ltd.'s suggestion that there was a continuing tort that suspended the operation of the limitation period.  The judge saw no evidence that there was ongoing damage or nuisance.  Where there is such ongoing damage or nuisance, the limitation period will not act to bar a claim entirely since the tort (the wrong being done by the party causing the contamination) is ongoing.  The limitation period might still act, though, to limit how far back the claimant's damages claim can extend (i.e. the damages might still be limited to those sustained no more than 2 years before the commencement of the action).

The Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the action.  It found that the motion judge was wrong to find that C Ltd. knew or ought to have known of its claim for contamination damages more than 2 years prior to commencing the action.  First, C Ltd.'s knowledge of potential contamination or its suspicion (based on a Phase I ESA) should not have been equated with actual knowledge that its property was contaminated.  Second, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge improperly ignored relevant circumstances surrounding C Ltd.'s purchase of its property (which was part of a multi-property purchase involving 22 properties).  The Court found that once C Ltd. had waived its conditions on the purchase, it was not reasonable to expect C Ltd. to have sought out information about potential contamination (the test results it obtained in May, 2012); by that point, C Ltd. was bound to complete the purchase of the property.

In making its decision, the Court of Appeal did not rule on C Ltd.'s continuing tort argument.

Read the decision at: Crombie Property Holdings Limited v. McColl-Frontenac Inc. (Texaco Canada Limited).

Ontario Court of Appeal rules on contaminated lands case and Section 99(2) EPA liability

The Ontario Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal from a decision that dismissed a contamination claim by one landowner against a neighbour.  Thorco Contracting stored a large volume of petroleum hydrocarbons ("PHCs") on its property in an industrial area of Toronto for several decades.  PHCs contaminated the soil and groundwater on that property, and the contaminated groundwater flowed into a neighbouring property owned by Midwest Properties.  Midwest acquired its property in 2007 and then discovered the contamination.  It sued Thorco and its owner for damages based on nuisance, negligence and the statutory cause of action in Section 99(2) of Ontario's Environmental Protection Act.

The trial judge ruled that Midwest failed to prove that it had suffered damages because, in particular, it had not proven that the PHC contamination lowered the value of its property; it was not enough to prove the cost required to remediate the property.  The trial judge also ruled that the Section 99(2) claim was not available because the Ministry of the Environment ("MOE") had already ordered Thorco to remediate the property; an award of compensation might permit double-recovery.

The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's decision and granted judgment against Thorco and its owner jointly and severally in the amount of $1,328,000 based on all three causes of action.  Midwest was also awarded $50,000 in punitive damages from each defendant.

With respect to the Section 99(2) statutory cause of action, Justice Hourigan of the Court of Appeal wrote:

In my view, the trial judge erred in her interpretation and application of the private right of action contained in s. 99(2) of the EPA. This private right of action was enacted over 35 years ago and is designed to overcome the inherent limitations in the common law in order to provide an effective process for restitution to parties whose property has been contaminated. The trial judge’s interpretation of the section is inconsistent with the plain language and context of this provision; it undermines the legislative objective of establishing a distinct ground of liability for polluters. This is remedial legislation that should be construed purposively. It is important that courts not thwart the will of the Legislature by imposing additional requirements for compensation that are not contained in the statute.

With respect to the claim for damages, Justice Hourigan wrote:

Neither Tridan nor Canadian Tire involved a claim under s. 99(2) of the EPA. There is no reported case where a court has awarded damages for the cost of future remediation under this section. Nonetheless, in my view, awarding damages under s. 99(2) based on restoration cost rather than diminution in property value is more consistent with the objectives of environmental protection and remediation that underlie this provision.

This approach to damages reflects the “polluter pays” principle, which provides that whenever possible, the party that causes pollution should pay for remediation, compensation, and prevention: see Pardy, at p. 187. As the Supreme Court has noted, the polluter pays principle “has become firmly entrenched in environmental law in Canada”: Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, at para. 23. In imposing strict liability on polluters by focusing on only the issues of who owns and controls the pollutant, Part X of the EPA, which includes s. 99(2), is effectively a statutory codification of this principle.

Further, a plain reading of s. 99(2) of the EPA suggests that parties are entitled to recover the full cost of remediation from polluters. Pursuant to s. 99(2)(a), a party is entitled to recover all “loss or damage” resulting from the spill. Section 99(1) provides that “loss or damage” includes personal injury, loss of life, loss of use or enjoyment of property and pecuniary loss, including loss of income. Section 99(2)(b) provides that a party has a “right to compensation for all reasonable cost and expense incurred in respect of carrying out or attempting to carry out an order or direction under this Part, from the owner of the pollutant and the person having control of the pollutant.” In my view, under either part of s. 99(2), polluters must reimburse other parties for costs they incur in remediating contamination.

In summary, restricting damages to the diminution in the value of property is contrary to the wording of the EPA, the trend in the common law to award restorative damages, the polluter pays principle, and the whole purpose of the enactment of Part X of the EPA. It would indeed be a remarkable result if legislation enacted to provide a new statutory cause of action to innocent parties who have suffered contamination of their property did not permit the party to recover the costs of remediating their property, given the EPA’s broad and important goals of protecting and restoring the natural environment.

Read the decision at: Midwest Properties Ltd. v. Thordarson.

BC Landowner's nuisance claim dismissed - insufficient interference by water from municipal lands

A BC landowner sued his municipality over drainage runoff, seeking both damages and an injunction requiring the municipality to take "immediate and effective action to stop the flow of water onto his property."  In 2002, the municipality approved the development of 68 townhomes by a developer adjacent to and north of the landowner's property.  As a condition of the development, a greenway was granted to the municipality running between the properties (including a gas pipeline right of way and an asphalt walkway).

The landowner alleged that prior to the development, there was a watercourse between one and three feet deep running in the location of the greenway.  The developer was permitted to fill in this watercourse resulting in the loss of the drainage route and periodic flooding on the landowner's property to the south (3.67 acres).

The municipality responded that the surface ponding of water on the landowner's property was a natural and pre-existing feature given the location of the property at the toe of a slope, its proximity to the water table, and the impermeable condition of its soils.  Also, the municipality argued that any additional water flowing onto the landowner's property was so minor in volume that it did not constitute a substantial interference with the landowner's use or enjoyment of his property.

On review of the evidence, the BC Supreme Court was unable to accept the landowner's contention that water was never a problem on his property prior to the development.  The Court found that the landowner exaggerated the extent of the water problems suffered since the development.  Also, the water table underlying his property was high and the soil was "fairly impermeable".

The Court concluded that any water coming onto the landowner's property did not meet the test of a claim in nuisance - that it resulted in a substantial and unreasonable interference with his use or enjoyment of the property or that there was sufficient physical damage to the land.  The landowner's property was a "holding property, awaiting development", and the consequences from increased water were minor.  The landowner did not demonstrate that "the pooling water along the northern boundary of his property has either substantially altered the nature of his property or interfered to a non-trivial or significant extent with the actual use being made of the property."  There was also no basis to find that any substantial adverse alteration of the land had been caused.

The landowner's nuisance claim was dismissed.

Read the decision at: Wood v. Langley (Township).

BC Court rules neighbours liable in nuisance for "water problem" discharges

A recent BC Supreme Court decision begins: "It has been said that water is the driving force of all nature and as such it can be very destructive. ... It is a truism that water follows the path of least resistance and flows down a landscape to find the lowest point.  It has a tendency to descend and flow with great readiness.  These properties of water are abundantly clear in this case which involves a now protracted dispute between neighbours."

Neighbours A alleged that Neighbours R made changes to the R property that resulted in water damage to the A property.  Neighbours A sued in nuisance, negligence and trespass and sought general, aggravated and punitive damages, as well an injunction obligating Neighbours R to remedy the problems.

The most significant change to the R property was the installation of a tile drain (as part of a french drain) ending about 3 feet from the boundary between the A and R properties.  This tile redirected water from the R property to the A property.  Neighbours R also raised the grading of their property by a few feet, which put their property higher than the A property.  Previously, the R property had been lower than the A property at the boundary in question.  The increased water flows (including sludge) that resulted from these changes caused the damages to the A property alleged by the A neighbours.

As a threshold issue, the judge in this case examined the applicability of statutory limitation periods.  Justice Kerr ruled that the two-year limitation period did apply.  However, she also recognized that where there is continuing damage, a new cause of action arises each day (to some extent resetting the limitation period each day for any "fresh damages").  In this particular case, the effect of the limitation period was that Neighbours A could not recover for any damages sustained before November 25, 2007.  The french drain had been installed in 2001, but they did not commence their action until November, 2009.

Justice Kerr concluded that Neighbours R were liable to Neighbours A in nuisance.  Neighbours R had caused "a substantial and unreasonable interference" with their neighbours' use and enjoyment of the A property.  And Neighbours R were not saved by any riparian rights.  The evidence showed that the water problems resulted from groundwater rather than surface water and that the flow of water between the properties was not by way of a natural watercourse.  Neighbours R could not say that they were not causing a nuisance for having allowed surface water to flow naturally across their land to the A property.  Even if they were dealing with surface water, Justice Kerr found that the flow was the result of the significant changes made to the R property.

She awarded to Neighbours A the sum of $10,000 in non-pecuniary general damages for loss of use and enjoyment of the A property and the sum of $27,908.66 in pecuniary general damages for the cost of remediating the A property.

Read the decision at: Allison v. Radtke.

NS Supreme Court throws out spray drift case after Farm Practices Board rules farm practice was normal

The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has dismissed a spray drift claim brought by landowners against a neighbouring farmer and his farm business.  The plaintiffs are organic farmers and alleged that, in 2007, the defendant farmer sprayed his lands with a herbicide that drifted onto their property causing various damage: significant health issues, crop damage, and miscarriages by four horses as a result of exposure to "overspray". 

In response to the claim, which was founded in negligence, the defendants relied on the provisions of the Farm Practices Act.  They stated that their farming activities were carried out in accordance with "normal farm practice" so that, under the legislation, they were protected from any civil action in "nuisance, negligence or otherwise, for any odour, noise, dust, vibration, light, smoke or other disturbance resulting from an agricultural operation."  Following a motion by the defendants, the civil action was stayed pending a determination by the Farm Practices Board of whether the activities in question constituted "normal farm practice".

The plaintiffs then made an application to the Board and a hearing took place in June, 2012.  In January, 2013, the Board ruled that the defendants had not acted in a manner inconsistent with "normal farm practice", and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.  That Board decision was appealed unsuccessfully by the plaintiffs.

With all of that completed, the plaintiffs returned to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to have the stay lifted so that they could proceed with their action for damages.  The defendants also asked for the stay to be lifted, but for the purpose of dismissing the claim.  The Court had to deal with the ruling by the Board that the activities in question, in particular the spraying, were "normal farm practice".  However, the Board decision was not automatically determinative of the civil action - the question for the Court was whether spray drift was "other disturbance" within the meaning of the Farm Practices Act.

If spray drift fell outside "other disturbance", then there would be no protection against a civil claim afforded by the Act.  Justice Murphy concluded on this point: "Absent contrary authority, I remain of the view that the activities the plaintiffs allege occurred, herbicidal overspray or drift and contaminated run-off from ditching, are "other disturbances" resulting from an agricultural operation as contemplated by section 10(1)(a) of the Act."  Therefore, the claims made by the plaintiffs were barred by the normal farm practices legislation and dismissed as such.

Read the decision at: Nauss v. Waalderbos.

Court awards $3.6 million for contamination clean-up and $1.115 million for out-of-pocket costs

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has awarded a property owner $3.6 million to clean-up petroleum hydrocarbon contamination from a neighbouring property, along with more than $1.115 million to cover out-of-pocket costs already expended in connection with the contamination.  Following a 12-day trial in Goderich and London, Justice Lynne Leitch found that underground storage tanks (USTs) at a concrete supply company's property were the source of contamination that had migrated onto a neighbouring commercial property.  She ruled that the defendant landowner was responsible to return the neighbouring landowner to the position it was in prior to the wrong committed.

The plaintiff landowner advanced its claims on the basis of the doctrine in Rylands v. Fletcher/Strict Liability, Nuisance, Negligence and Trespass.  The plaintiff's property was vacant until 1997 when a retail store operation was constructed there, and the evidence was that there had been no other use of the property prior to 1997.  The defendant's property was used for the production and sale of ready-mix concrete product, and the defendant also operated a fuel outlet on the property from the 1950s until 2012.  Original USTs were removed in 1989 and replaced by new USTs.   Justice Leitch noted, "It is fair to say that [the Defendant] used gasoline for many years with questionable UST system monitoring and maintenance practices and poor record keeping."

In 2007, the plaintiff landowner planned to build its own gas bar as part of its retail operation, and investigated the proposed site.  It was then that petroleum hydrocarbon contamination was detected.  From that point forward, the plaintiff undertook interim remediation steps and eventually commenced its action against the defendant landowner to recover the costs of the clean-up of its property.

Expert evidence was called by both parties, with the defendant's expert focusing on an opinion that the source of the contamination was, in fact, the plaintiff's property.  However, there was no evidence of soil contamination in the area where the defendant's expert postulated that a spill had occurred.  Considering all of the evidence, Justice Leitch concluded that the contamination came from the defendant's property: "There is no question that until 1989 leaded gasoline was stored on the "Defendant" Property in single-walled steel tanks, which were susceptible to corrosion and did not have a leak detection system."  She found the defendant liable on the basis of strict liability, nuisance, negligence and trespass.

What I find to be most interesting about the decision is the issue of damages.  Justice Leitch agreed with the plaintiff that it should be awarded $3.6 million, which is the estimated cost of remediation, including soil and groundwater remediation.  In addition, she awarded out-of pocket costs already incurred, bringing the total damages award up to about $4.8 million.  However, I was not able to see any reference in the decision to the actual value of the Plaintiff's property.  Although the Plaintiff did include a claim for loss of property value in its lawsuit, it did not pursue that claim at trial.  In reading the decision, I was expecting to see a discussion of the cost of the proposed remediation in relation to the value of the property as part of an analysis of the reasonableness of the damages award.  Perhaps the value of the property (including the retail operation) was so much greater than the cost of remediation that it was simply taken for granted that the cost of remediation was reasonable.

Read the decision at: Canadian Tire Real Estate Ltd. v. Huron Concrete Supply Ltd.

NS Farm Practice Board decision on overspray upheld

Justice Scanlan of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia heard an appeal of a decision of the Farm Practices Board (FPB) involving the following facts:

The matter arose as a result of two instances where [JW] sprayed a field directly across the road from the [N] property with what I understand to have been a herbicide. The Appellants argue this was done at a time when the wind speed and direction caused an overspray to spread onto their property, allegedly damaging raspberry canes and allegedly causing personal injury to both Mrs. [N] and to her horses. In addition, the Appellants complain about the impact of ditch excavation, as carried out by Mr. [W], and as to the placement of bales of hay or straw in the ditch, the escape of organic materials onto their property together with the impact or the potential impact that might have had on their well water. I emphasize repeatedly the word “allegedly.” The Appellants also allege, as I noted, that the herbicide impacted the health of their horses, specifically mares in foal. They say the mares were impacted and perhaps may have aborted as a result of the overspray. They allege, as I understand it, although I'm not reviewing in any great detail the allegations in the statement of claim, that it was not just the existing pregnancies that were impacted but the fertility of the mares on a go forward basis.

The issue that had been before the FPB was whether or not the farmer in this case complied with normal farm practices, in which case the practice would be protected from certain civil actions for damages or injunctive relief.  However, the farm protection legislation does not address "the potential impact of chemical use or misuse, including the impact on neighbouring properties."

In the end, Justice Scanlan determined that the FPB decision was reasonable, but pointed out its limitations - it did not deal with all of the allegations made by the complainants, including allegations about overspray.  Those other allegations would still have to be dealt with, if at all, in the civil action that the complainants had also commenced against the farmer in this case.  That action had been stayed pending the outcome of the FPB proceeding.

Read the decision at: Nauss v. Nova Scotia (Farm Practice Board).

BC Court of Appeal allows landowner appeal in breach of easement agreement case

I last wrote about this case in 2010: Utzig #2 decision.  As I explained in that post, the litigation concerns whether a pipeline owned and operated by the plaintiff Terasen Gas Inc. (“Terasen”) that runs through a portion of Burns Bog in Delta, B.C. was damaged or put at risk by landfill operations on lands owned by the defendant Utzig Holdings (B.C.) Ltd. (“Utzig”). The landfill operations were conducted, with Utzig’s permission, by the other defendants Alpha Manufacturing Inc., Burns Developments Ltd. and Burns Developments (1993) Ltd. (“Alpha” and “Burns”).

The BC Court of Appeal has now released a decision limiting the scope of the breach of covenants finding made by the lower court and dismissing in its entirely the claim in nuisance against the landowner. 

The covenants by the "owner" to the "utility" read as follows: "Not to do or knowingly permit to be done any act or thing which might, in the opinion of [the utility], interfere with or injure the works or any part thereof" (1961 ROW agreements) and "Not to do or knowingly permit to be done any act or thing which might, in the reasonable opinion of [the utility], in any way whatsoever interfere with or injure or endanger the works or any part thereof or impair the operating efficiency thereof or create or increase any hazard to persons." (1981 instrument)

For the landowner Utzig, the issue was whether it had, at all material times or some material times, permitted other parties to endanger the pipeline.  A key date was October 10, 1993, when Utzig entered into an Agreement for Sale of the property, which was never registered on title to the property.   The purchase price of $4 million was to be paid in instalments by October 18, 1995.  Terasen went to Court to seek injunctive relief prior to October, 1995, and the sale was never completed because the purchaser failed to pay the entire purchase privce when due.  For this reason, Utzig remained the registered owner of the property at all material times.

Madam Justice Newbury ruled (on behalf of 2 of the 3 judges on the panel) that the breach of the covenant not to permit only lasted up to the October 10, 1993 date:

In the result, I agree with the trial judge that up to October 10, 1993, Utzig retained sufficient authority over the subject property that it should be regarded as having “permitted” Alpha to do acts that might have interfered with or injured the pipeline. This constituted a breach of covenant. If in fact the works were so affected in this period, damages may be found to be payable in the second stage of this litigation. In respect of the post-AFS period, however, I would allow Utzig’s appeal on the ground that having sold the property under the AFS, it was no longer in a position to “permit”, or withhold permission for, Alpha’s activities. This result, in my view, accords with the reality that once land has been sold, it is for the new owner to be responsible for new breaches of the terms of instruments (such as rights of way or restrictive covenants) that are registered against the land. If it were otherwise, vendors would be obliged to obtain covenants from their purchasers repeating the covenants in such instruments, and one of the primary advantages of the Torrens registration system would be lost.

The last issue decided on the appeal related to Terasen's claim for nuisance - that Utzig was responsible for the landfill activities conducted on its land with its consent and that such activities substantially interfered with Terasen's use of its rights of way.  This claim related to the pre-October 10, 1993 period.  Utzig submitted that the threshold of “unreasonable interference” was not met in this case, given the lack of evidence of any “significant movement” of the pipeline until late 1994 and the fact the pipe was never “injured” physically.  The Court of Appeal ruled that, in the absence of clear evidence of substantial interference, the trial judge's finding of nuisance could not stand.

Read the decision at: Terasen Gas Inc. v. Utzig Holdings.