Municipality cuts down abandoned orchard trees deemed noxious weeds

AS PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE RURAL VOICE:

According to Ontario’s Weed Control Act, “every person in possession of land shall destroy all noxious weeds on it.”  The owner of land is deemed by the Act to be in possession of the land.  Provincial and municipal road authorities are deemed to be in possession of road allowances.  Noxious weeds are those that are prescribed in the Regulation made under the Act (including giant hogweed, poison-ivy, leafy spurge, sow-thistle, ragweed, etc.) and other plants that may be deemed to be a noxious weed (called a “local weed”) in a by-law passed by a municipality.  The council of upper-tier municipalities (counties, regions, cities) and some other municipalities are required by the Act to appoint one or more area weed inspectors to enforce the Act.  Only municipalities that have appointed a weed inspector may pass a by-law deeming other plants to be noxious weeds.

Weed inspectors are empowered to enter any land and buildings (dwelling houses excepted) between sunrise and sunset for the purpose of searching for noxious weeds and weed seeds and may also inspect implements, machinery, vehicles, crops and other plants.  Where access to a property is denied, the weed inspector can obtain a search warrant without prior notice to the owner or occupier of the property.  The inspector may order a person in possession of land to destroy noxious weeds or weed seeds.  If the person in possession does not comply with the order, the weed inspector may “cause the noxious weeds or weed seeds to be destroyed in the prescribed manner”, with the cost of the work charged back to the owner of the lands by the municipality.  The prescribed manner of destroying noxious weeds includes pulling or removing the plants from the soil, cutting the roots or stalks of the plants, ploughing or cultivating the soil, or treating the plants with a herbicide. 

In August of this year, Justice Sheard of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released her decision in a lawsuit brought by landowners against their local municipality after the Municipality cut down an apple and pear orchard on the landowners’ property.  The orchard was cut down in 2014 and the landowners were billed $12,800 for the work.  Their court action was commenced in 2015 and a trial took place before Justice Sheard over several days in 2022 and 2023.  The lawsuit included claims for: $1,500,000 in general damages for negligence, misfeasance in public office, negligent assumption of jurisdiction, trespass, and nuisance; $1,000,000 in punitive and exemplary damages; a declaration that the Municipality’s weed by-law was void for bad faith, vagueness, overreach, etc.; a declaration that the landowners’ natural justice rights were violated; and an order for reimbursement of the $12,800 cost of the tree removal work.

The landowners had purchased their property in May, 2011.  The property was 20 acres in size and included two abandoned orchards of about 2.5 acres each (only one of which was at issue in the litigation).  Very shortly before the landowners’ purchase, a new neighbour purchased an adjacent farm property where he planted apple trees with a view to developing an orchard.  That neighbour had concerns that the landowners’ abandoned orchard was full of disease and insect pests that would threaten the existence of his young apple trees.  The neighbour raised this concern with the Municipality and had learned through OMAFRA that other municipalities had passed by-laws designating abandoned orchards as noxious weeds.  He requested that his own municipality do the same.

In 2013, the Municipality’s Council passed a by-law designating diseased fruit trees as “local weeds” to be treated as noxious weeds pursuant to the Weed Control Act.   A “diseased fruit tree” was defined in the by-law as “a fruit tree as herein defined, whether dead or alive, which fruit tree as part of a planting of greater than 0.25 ha (0.618 ac) and which planting is within the 375 m (1,230.31 ft) of a fruit growing operation or plant nursery operation, and which planting has been neglected from normal standards of good farming practices, such that it exhibits fruit tree disease or populations of insects which represent a reasonable threat by movement to such commercial fruit growing operation.”  A “fruit tree” included both apple trees and pear trees.

In April, 2014, the Municipality determined that the landowners’ one abandoned orchard contained diseased fruit trees and issued an order to the landowners to “bring down and burn” the apple trees within 30 days of service of the order.  Nearly four months later, the trees had not been destroyed.  In August, 2014, the Municipality moved in and had the diseased trees cut down.

Justice Sheard dismissed the landowners’ court action in its entirety.  She found that the weed control by-law passed by the Municipality was not void – it was clearly within the scope of the Municipality’s statutory authority given to it under the Act.  The Municipality followed the proper procedure in passing the by-law and the bylaw was submitted to and approved by the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs as required by the Act.  Justice Sheard disagreed with the landowners that the by-law targeted them in particular, commenting:

Had the plaintiffs acted in accordance with “normal standards of good farming practices” in the management of the Orchard, the Bylaw would have been of no concern to them. Indeed, had the plaintiffs acted on their stated objective to develop a commercial apple growing operation, they might well have been advocates for the Bylaw, intended to protect all fruit growing or plant nursery operations.

Having found that the by-law itself was valid, Justice Sheard concluded that the landowners’ court action must fail because their recourse was not to the Court but to the chief weed inspector appointed pursuant to the Weed Control Act.  Where a municipal weed inspector makes an order against a person in possession of land, that person may appeal the order to the chief inspector who may either confirm or revoke the order or make a new order.  The chief inspector’s order may be appealed to the Divisional Court.  In this case, the landowners did not appeal the order and were bound by it.  As the order was found to be valid, there was no basis on which the landowners could sue the Municipality for damages allegedly resulting from the operation of the order.

Read the decision at:  2023 ONSC 4540 (CanLII).

Court of Appeal confirms inconsistent use requirement for adverse possession in Ontario

In a recent post, I wrote about a B.C. adverse possession case that made it all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada - Nelson v. Mowatt.  The Ontario Court of Appeal has now released a decision in which it comments on the Mowatt decision and the question of whether an Ontario adverse possession claimant must satisfy the "inconsistent use requirement" (by demonstrating that his or her use of disputed lands was inconsistent with the intended use of the "true owner").  Here is what the Court says:

A note on Mowatt

[29]      After this appeal was heard, the Supreme Court released Mowatt, a decision concerning the law of adverse possession in British Columbia. We refer to Mowatt in para. 20, above. In Mowatt, the Supreme Court also noted, citing Masidon and other cases, that the inconsistent use requirement appears in the jurisprudence of Ontario.  It held that the law of British Columbia governing adverse possession does not require a claimant to demonstrate that his or her use of disputed lands was inconsistent with the intended use of the “true owner”. At para. 27, Brown J., for the court, wrote: “Whether the requirement is properly applicable in other provinces remains an open question subject to examination of their respective legislative histories, the wording of their particular limitation statutes, and the treatment of these matters by the courts of those provinces.”  

[30]      In supplemental submissions following the release of Mowatt, the appellants effectively urge this panel to overrule Masidon and eliminate the inconsistent use requirement in Ontario, without regard to whether there is mutual or unilateral mistake.  However, this panel is not in a position to overrule Masidon.

So, it seems that the question left open by the Supreme Court has (relatively) quickly been answered by the Ontario Court of Appeal: inconsistent use remains a requirement of the law of adverse possession in Ontario (see Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham).

Read the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision at: Sipsas v. 1299781 Ontario Inc.

Road Access Act saves landlocked neighbour from conviction on trespassing charge

Landowner W was charged with trespass, a provincial offence under the Trespass to Property Act, after he used a road he had constructed through a neighbour's property to reach his own landlocked property.  In her decision acquitting W of the charge, Justice of the Peace MacKinnon described the properties involved as follows:

This case involves three parcels of land, two of which front on Highway 609. Highway 609 is a two lane secondary highway in a rural area of Northwestern Ontario and runs in an east-west configuration.

On the south side of Highway 609 there is a parcel of land belonging to [M]. The west side of the [M] property fronts on the Wabigoon River. To the east of the [M] property is property belonging to [B] which is the North part of Lot 5, Concession 5. Its north boundary is Hwy 609, and its south boundary is on the north side of the defendant’s ([W]’s) property.

The defendant’s property is to the south of both the [M] and [B] properties. Its western boundary includes grasslands and the shore of the Wabigoon River. North is the [B] property and east is another property.

It is not disputed that the defendant purchased his lot as a landlocked property. He arranged for an easement over the [M] property from Highway 609, and received authority from the province for an entrance from the highway. He built a road south from Highway 609 through the [M] property but eventually turned southeast onto the [B] property and crossed it to his lot. [emphasis added]

A dispute arose surrounding the portion of this road on the [B] property.

At trial, W admitted that he had purchased his landlocked property as having water access only; it was his intention to purchase access from his neighbours (which he did from neighbour M, but not neighbour B).

The fact that W had constructed a road in part on lands owned by B and the fact that W had used that road were not in dispute.  What was at issue in the trial was whether W had a right or authority conferred by law which allowed W to go on the road through B's property.

Justice of the Peace MacKinnon examined whether W had a right or authority based upon the Road Access Act.  She noted:

The Act sets out strict prohibitions against landowners taking matters into their own hands and blocking or obstructing access roads, and requires an application to a Superior Court judge for an order closing the road. Landowners may only block a road when there is an alternate route for the landlocked owner to access their land. Such alternate routes must be in existence contemporaneously. A charge against a landowner who violates the Act, is a provincial offences matter with fines of up to $5,000 (s.61 POA).

MacKinnon, J.P. then found that W's road through B's property was a "road" for the purposes of the Road Access Act, meaning that W had a legal authority to use the road at the time for which he was accused of having trespassed.  The road was not owned by a municipality or dedicated as a public highway.  The road served as an access to landlocked property.  W had a "limited and temporary statutory right to use the road".  In fact, MacKinnon J.P.'s decision says that until such time as a closing order is obtained by B from the Superior Court as required by the Road Access Act, W would not be a trespasser on the road.

On top of the prosecution for trespass, W also faced (or faces) a civil claim from B related to the road through B's property.  It would be interesting to know how the decision to dismiss the trespass charge will affect the civil proceeding.  Was it correct to find that W could establish a right to trespass on B's property by building his own road, even after he had asked for and was denied permission to do so? The Road Access Act may protect use of existing roads, but does it effectively empower a landlocked landowner to use a new road as long as that landowner can manage to get the road built on the neighbour's lands?  And will the court hearing the civil claim be bound by the ruling made by the Justice of the Peace in the trespass case, even if it is incorrect?

Read the decision at: R. v. Weber.

Neighbour loses claim for damages from biosolid application on field next door

The Plaintiff in this case sued her neighbour over concerns that her well water had been contaminated by the agricultural field application of municipal sewage waste or biosolids.  The neighbour actually leased the land to a farm operation, so he commenced third party claims against both his tenant (the farm operation) and the company that applied the biosolids.  The Plaintiff's claims were based on nuisance and negligence.

Justice Heeney of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Plaintiff's claim on the basis that the application of biosolids did not cause the Plaintiff's well to become contaminated.  Put another way, the Plaintiff failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the application of the biosolids caused contamination of the well.  In his decision, it was not necessary for Justice Heeney to address the question of who might be liable for what.

Evidence in this case was heard over 6 days of trial, and included testimony concerning the application of the biosolids.  The application project had been approved by the Ministry of the Environment ("MOECC") following extensive soil testing and other measures.  The biosolids were to be applied to 90 acres of wheat stubble.  The Plaintiff had a 14-foot dug well just a few feet north of the southerly boundary of her property, in close proximity to the neighbouring field.  On the day that the biosolid application commenced, the Plaintiff said water from her shower was "brown and stinky", and smelled like "vomit material".

The Plaintiff's water was tested following the application of the biosolids.  There was some detection of coliform, but there had been positive readings of coliform in the well water prior to the biosolid application project.  No e.coli was detected.  The absence of e.coli in the water was, in Justice Heeney's opinion, the single most significant fact in the case.  There was opinion evidence that, if biosolids had entered the well, there would have been a very high level of e.coli in the water that would have been detectable when the water was tested.  E.coli is specifically used in water testing as "being the most accurate indicator of fecal contamination - sewage or fecal contamination".  Justice Heeney concluded that the biosolid application did not contaminate the Plaintiff's well.

Read the decision at: Marshall v. Shaw.

Supreme Court of Canada discusses the law of adverse possession in recent case

Property law cases do not often reach the Supreme Court of Canada, but a recent adverse possession case out of British Columbia did make it to Canada's highest court.   While certain aspects of the decision are limited in application to British Columbia, the Supreme Court does review the law of adverse possession generally in its reasons.

The Claimants in the case in question claimed title to a parcel of land in Nelson, BC that is adjacent to a separate parcel they purchased in 1992.  The registered owner of the disputed parcel was the provincial Crown.  The Claimants alleged that they and their predecessors in title had continuously possessed the disputed parcel since the early 20th century and, therefore, that ownership had transferred to them by the passage of time.  The Claimants commenced an action for a declaration that the provincial Crown was not the owner of the parcel (and could not transfer it to the City of Nelson), and also brought a petition for judicial investigation of their title under the BC Land Title Inquiry Act.

The headnote from the Supreme Court's decision describes the law of adverse possession as follows: 

"Adverse possession is a longstanding common law device by which the right of the prior possessor of land, typically the holder of registered title, may be displaced by a trespasser whose possession of the land goes unchallenged for a prescribed period of time. To meet the test of establishing adverse possession, the act of possession must be open and notorious, adverse, exclusive, peaceful, actual and continuous. The adverse possessor who successfully obtains title need not always be the same person whose adverse possession triggered the running of the limitation period."

At first instance, the judge hearing the matter granted a summary dismissal application by the City of Nelson, having found that there was an evidentiary gap with respect to the question of continuous possession.  A claim for adverse possession of someone else's property must rest on possession of land by a claimant for a specified period of time that open and notorious, adverse (vis-a-vis the registered owner), exclusive, peaceful, actual and continuous.  The judge at first instance found that there was an interruption in continuity of adverse possession from 1916-1920, resulting in the dismissal of the claim.  The Court of Appeal for BC reversed the decision to dismiss the claim, finding that there was evidence of continuous adverse possession from 1909-1923.  On that basis, the Court of Appeal remitted the matter back to the BC Supreme Court for final determination of the proceedings.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Court of Appeal decision and restored the dismissal of the adverse possession claim made by the judge at first instance.  The Supreme Court found that the original finding of an evidentiary gap could not be set aside by the Court of Appeal based on the evidence.  While the Court of Appeal's finding that there was continuous adverse possession from 1909-1923 was reasonable, the Supreme Court found that the original judge's finding of the gap from 1916-1920 was not open to second-guessing by the Court of Appeal.  Absent a palpable and overriding error, the factual findings of the original judge hearing the matter could not be disturbed.

In this particular case, the time period in the between 1909 and 1923 was important because the claimants had to prove continuous adverse possession of the land either for a period of 20 years leading up to 1930-31 (the date at which the disputed parcel was escheated to the Crown because the company that was at the time the registered owner was dissolved) or for a period of 60 years leading up to the 1970s (when the law in BC was changed to prevent adverse possession going forward).  The onus was on the Claimants to prove continuous adverse possession during the relevant periods, and any gap in the evidence would be fatal to the claim.  A gap was found and the claim failed.

In its reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada also addressed the issue of inconsistent use.  At Common Law, there has been a requirement that a possessor's use of the disputed land must have been inconsistent with the "true owner's" present or future enjoyment of the land.  To be truly adverse, the possession must "entail a use of the property that is inconsistent with the true owner's intended use of the land."  However, while that inconsistent use requirement has appeared in the jurisprudence in Ontario, it has formed no part of the law in British Columbia.

The Supreme Court also commented on the distinction between "continuous possession" and "continuous occupation".  The Claimants suggested that the judge at first instance had erred in finding the evidentiary gap by confusing possession and occupation.  They argued that proof of continuous occupation of land is not required to prove continuous possession of land.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that "possession" does not require continuous occupation - a person may possess land in a manner sufficient to support a claim to title of the land while choosing to use the land intermittently or sporadically.  However, the Supreme Court found that the apparently interchangeable use of the terms "possession" and "occupation" by the judge at first instance did not change the outcome of the case.  The only evidence of "possession" before the judge was "occupation" (no form of possession less than that was posited to the judge).

Read the decision at: Nelson (City) v. Mowatt.

Court of Appeal overturns summary judgment, allows historical contamination claim to proceed

D Corp. owned a property that was used as a gas station until 2004.  C Ltd. purchased a nearby property on April 10, 2012 and, on April 28, 2014, commenced an action against D Corp. and the former owners of D Corp.'s property for damages resulting from hydrocarbon contamination.  The contamination was alleged to have migrated from D Corp.'s property to C Ltd.'s property.

After the exchange of pleadings (the Statement of Claim and Statements of Defence by the parties), the Defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss C Ltd.'s claim on the basis that the applicable limitation period had expired.  They asserted that C Ltd.'s claim had been discovered more than 2 years prior to the commencement of its action.  The judge hearing the motion granted the dismissal, finding that C Ltd. had become aware of sufficient material facts by March 9, 2012.  Alternatively, the motion judge held that C Ltd. had a sufficient basis for an action by March 30, 2012 when soil and groundwater sampling results were made available to C Ltd.  In the further alternative, the motion judge found that, even if C Ltd. did not know about drilling results showing contamination until May, 2012 (i.e. within 2 years of the commencement of the action), C Ltd. should have known of its claim but did not exercise due diligence.

Also, the motion judge rejected C Ltd.'s suggestion that there was a continuing tort that suspended the operation of the limitation period.  The judge saw no evidence that there was ongoing damage or nuisance.  Where there is such ongoing damage or nuisance, the limitation period will not act to bar a claim entirely since the tort (the wrong being done by the party causing the contamination) is ongoing.  The limitation period might still act, though, to limit how far back the claimant's damages claim can extend (i.e. the damages might still be limited to those sustained no more than 2 years before the commencement of the action).

The Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the action.  It found that the motion judge was wrong to find that C Ltd. knew or ought to have known of its claim for contamination damages more than 2 years prior to commencing the action.  First, C Ltd.'s knowledge of potential contamination or its suspicion (based on a Phase I ESA) should not have been equated with actual knowledge that its property was contaminated.  Second, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge improperly ignored relevant circumstances surrounding C Ltd.'s purchase of its property (which was part of a multi-property purchase involving 22 properties).  The Court found that once C Ltd. had waived its conditions on the purchase, it was not reasonable to expect C Ltd. to have sought out information about potential contamination (the test results it obtained in May, 2012); by that point, C Ltd. was bound to complete the purchase of the property.

In making its decision, the Court of Appeal did not rule on C Ltd.'s continuing tort argument.

Read the decision at: Crombie Property Holdings Limited v. McColl-Frontenac Inc. (Texaco Canada Limited).

Ontario Court of Appeal rules on contaminated lands case and Section 99(2) EPA liability

The Ontario Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal from a decision that dismissed a contamination claim by one landowner against a neighbour.  Thorco Contracting stored a large volume of petroleum hydrocarbons ("PHCs") on its property in an industrial area of Toronto for several decades.  PHCs contaminated the soil and groundwater on that property, and the contaminated groundwater flowed into a neighbouring property owned by Midwest Properties.  Midwest acquired its property in 2007 and then discovered the contamination.  It sued Thorco and its owner for damages based on nuisance, negligence and the statutory cause of action in Section 99(2) of Ontario's Environmental Protection Act.

The trial judge ruled that Midwest failed to prove that it had suffered damages because, in particular, it had not proven that the PHC contamination lowered the value of its property; it was not enough to prove the cost required to remediate the property.  The trial judge also ruled that the Section 99(2) claim was not available because the Ministry of the Environment ("MOE") had already ordered Thorco to remediate the property; an award of compensation might permit double-recovery.

The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's decision and granted judgment against Thorco and its owner jointly and severally in the amount of $1,328,000 based on all three causes of action.  Midwest was also awarded $50,000 in punitive damages from each defendant.

With respect to the Section 99(2) statutory cause of action, Justice Hourigan of the Court of Appeal wrote:

In my view, the trial judge erred in her interpretation and application of the private right of action contained in s. 99(2) of the EPA. This private right of action was enacted over 35 years ago and is designed to overcome the inherent limitations in the common law in order to provide an effective process for restitution to parties whose property has been contaminated. The trial judge’s interpretation of the section is inconsistent with the plain language and context of this provision; it undermines the legislative objective of establishing a distinct ground of liability for polluters. This is remedial legislation that should be construed purposively. It is important that courts not thwart the will of the Legislature by imposing additional requirements for compensation that are not contained in the statute.

With respect to the claim for damages, Justice Hourigan wrote:

Neither Tridan nor Canadian Tire involved a claim under s. 99(2) of the EPA. There is no reported case where a court has awarded damages for the cost of future remediation under this section. Nonetheless, in my view, awarding damages under s. 99(2) based on restoration cost rather than diminution in property value is more consistent with the objectives of environmental protection and remediation that underlie this provision.

This approach to damages reflects the “polluter pays” principle, which provides that whenever possible, the party that causes pollution should pay for remediation, compensation, and prevention: see Pardy, at p. 187. As the Supreme Court has noted, the polluter pays principle “has become firmly entrenched in environmental law in Canada”: Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, at para. 23. In imposing strict liability on polluters by focusing on only the issues of who owns and controls the pollutant, Part X of the EPA, which includes s. 99(2), is effectively a statutory codification of this principle.

Further, a plain reading of s. 99(2) of the EPA suggests that parties are entitled to recover the full cost of remediation from polluters. Pursuant to s. 99(2)(a), a party is entitled to recover all “loss or damage” resulting from the spill. Section 99(1) provides that “loss or damage” includes personal injury, loss of life, loss of use or enjoyment of property and pecuniary loss, including loss of income. Section 99(2)(b) provides that a party has a “right to compensation for all reasonable cost and expense incurred in respect of carrying out or attempting to carry out an order or direction under this Part, from the owner of the pollutant and the person having control of the pollutant.” In my view, under either part of s. 99(2), polluters must reimburse other parties for costs they incur in remediating contamination.

In summary, restricting damages to the diminution in the value of property is contrary to the wording of the EPA, the trend in the common law to award restorative damages, the polluter pays principle, and the whole purpose of the enactment of Part X of the EPA. It would indeed be a remarkable result if legislation enacted to provide a new statutory cause of action to innocent parties who have suffered contamination of their property did not permit the party to recover the costs of remediating their property, given the EPA’s broad and important goals of protecting and restoring the natural environment.

Read the decision at: Midwest Properties Ltd. v. Thordarson.

Empty barn not enough to trigger MDS to prevent neighbours' severance

Landowners had applied to their municipality to sever a 0.84 acre parcel from their existing 30-acre lot.  County planning staff determined that the proposed severance complied with MDS requirements and that the County had no objection to the proposal.  However, a neighbour did object to the severance, suggesting that the new lot would breach MDS provisions because it would come too close to his 1860-era barn.  Although the barn was vacant, the neighbour was considering returning the barn to livestock use.  He asked that the proposed severed parcel be moved to a different location on the applicants' property.

The municipality went ahead and approved the severance, so the neighbour appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board ("OMB").  The only issue on the appeal was the application of MDS to the severance, and the OMB ruled that MDS did not apply.  Although the OMB took issue with some aspects of the municipality's methodology for considering required setbacks, the OMB concluded that the neighbour's barn did not correspond to the definition of a "livestock facility" within the governing Provincial documents.  MDS had no application in this case.

As the OMB noted:

The fundamental problem with this appeal, however, pertains to the barn itself, and whether it even constitutes a "livestock facility", as understood in the Provincial documents. The Board was not persuaded for the following reasons.

The Provincial documents are unequivocal: to qualify as a "livestock facility", it is not enough for a building to be "structurally sound"; it must also be "reasonably capable of housing livestock." The two criteria are not synonymous. Although the neighbour insisted that the structure would not actually fall over, he offered essentially no evidence it could meet any other expectations.

Indeed, the Board was not shown how the existing structure could be much more than a "shade shelter" (which is specifically excluded from consideration as a "livestock facility"). Although there was no "comprehensive building analysis", it did not take a comprehensive analysis to discern that the structure had no insulation, electricity, ventilation, stalls, hay storage, manure storage, or livestock equipment. It also had planks visibly missing from its siding in various places. None of the observations by the CBO were contradicted. The structure is a shell, and not even one that is impervious to the elements.

Whether or not the structure was considered appropriate for livestock by 1860 standards, the Province would not have published its detailed instructions for "determining when a barn is a livestock facility", if such a primitive structure could qualify. The Board is satisfied that if this structure were subjected to even the most elementary agricultural standards today, substantial remodeling would be essential.

That is where the neighbour encounters a second problem. The Guidelines specify that MDS II also applies to "remodeled livestock facilities.”

The CBO apparently concluded that no remodeling under MDS II would be feasible – not because the barn was too close to the proposed severed parcel, but rather because it was too close to Ms. [S]'s existing dwelling across the road. The Board heard no evidence to contradict that position.

Therefore, notwithstanding the eloquence of the [O] brothers and their expert, the Board was not shown how the barn could now trigger the MDS process – or that it ever could.

Read the decision at: O’Brien v Laronde.

NS Court of Appeal overturns profit à prendre (right to take hay) decision

Back in February, 2014, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court upheld a neighbour's right to take hay or other crops off a portion of a 2.7 acre property that had been severed from the neighbour's farm in 1960 (see my post on that decision here).  The case has gone to the Court of Appeal and the lower court's decision has been overturned.

The Court of Appeal introduced the case as follows:

Rarely does a claim of the property right known as profits à prendre, which has existed since ancient times, come before the courts.  It arises here because a landowner conveyed part of his property subject to a reservation of a right in favour of himself, his heirs and assigns to enter on that property to remove hay.  Throughout the next fifty years, the landowner, his successors in title and their assigns continuously exercised that right, entered the conveyed lot and cut hay.

The current owners of that lot defended an application seeking to confirm the right to cut hay on their property.  They argued that the reservation was void or voidable.  In her decision dated January 29, 2014, Justice Margaret J. Stewart granted an order for a declaration in the nature of a profit à prendre (2014 NSSC 36 (CanLII)).  This is an appeal from her order which issued June 11, 2014.

After reviewing in detail the law relating to profits à prendre, the Court of Appeal concluded that the original grant of a right to take hay was a "profit in gross", which is a "right without limit and separate from any land owned by the profit holder".  Therefore, it was not necessary that the right to take hay benefit the neighbouring property specifically - it just had to benefit the original grantor and his successors.  

However, as noted the Court, that finding (which was not made by the lower court judge) was not of assistance to the neighbour: "Since a profit is an interest in land, to be valid in law it must be conveyed by deed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.  But none of the 1972 and 1998 deeds in the chain of title of the C lands from GC to the respondent conveyed the right to enter upon and remove hay from the D lot.  The 1998 deed merely excluded that lot from the description of the C lands."  In other words, there was nothing in the chain of title to link the original profit à prendre to the current owner of the neighbouring land.

It was also possible for the right to take hay to continue to exist as a part of the estate of the original landowner.  However, there was no evidence of any disposition or transfer of the profit à prendre (an asset of sorts) by will or otherwise from the original grantor, GC, to the neighbour.  The neighbour's claim failed.

Read the decision at: Snyder v. Chisholm.

"Shared water does not necessarily make good neighbours" Part 2 - The Appeal

In September, 2013, I wrote about a case involving the post-purchase discovery of an underground waterline on a farm.  The purchaser of a 97-acre hobby farm did not know that the vendor, who retained a three-acre parcel next to the farm where he had built his retirement home, continued to receive water from a spring on the 97-acre farm through an underground line that also supplied other neighbours.  Rather than disclosing the existence of the line and his expectation that he would continue to receive the water supply, the vendor provided a statutory declaration on the date of closing stating that he was "not aware of any person or persons ... having any claim or interest in the said lands or any part thereof adverse to or inconsistent with [his] title and that [he was] positive that none such exists."

After the waterline was discovered, the matter ended up in court and the trial judge declared that there was no prescriptive easement for the line and that the vendor was not entitled to an injunction to prevent the new purchaser from taking steps to interfere with the quality or quantity of the water supply.  The judge also found that the waterline constituted a "latent defect" and that the vendor was liable for negligent misrepresentation.  He awarded the purchaser $25,500 in damages along with nearly $115,000 in costs.

The vendor appealed the decision of the trial judge on negligent misrepresentation and damages to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's finding that the vendor had a duty of care not to make false statements to the purchaser, which arose "specifically from respondent's foreseeable and reasonable reliance on the appellant's representations contained in the statutory declaration."  And, since the vendor himself was a person with an alleged continuing interest in the land being purchased by the purchaser, he "knew, or, at the very least, ought to have known, that his representation to the contrary, in a statutory declaration executed under oath, was false."

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the purchaser in the amount of $22,000.

Read the appeal decision at: Hanisch v. McKean.

Court declines to find that shared driveway right-of-way was abandoned

The drawing above shows three adjacent residential properties in Toronto (in blue, pink and yellow) along with a right-of-way that is shared by the three properties (in green).  The street adjacent to the three properties runs down the left side of the drawing; the right-of-way is a driveway that runs back behind the properties in an L-shape.

 

The owners of the blue lot wanted to use the driveway pursuant to the deeded right-of-way.  The owner of the yellow lot challenged this use on the basis that the blue lot owners had abandoned the right of way.  She claimed that she was entitled to park her car beside her house so as to block the laneway.  In fact, both the yellow lot owner and the pink lot owner (or their predecessors in title) had fenced off the right-of-way adjacent to their backyards.

 

The owners of the blue lot applied to the Superior Court of Justice for an order enforcing their rights to use the right-of-way.  In reviewing the application, the Court noted that the rights-of-way of the three lot owners were duly registered on title.  However, the registered owner of the right-of-way lands (the laneway) had passed away and none of his heirs were made parties to the application by the owners of the blue lot.  For that reason, Justice Myers stated, "I am reluctant to declare any rights in the laneway that may affect the owners' interests."

 

Justice Myers did comment that he would not find as a fact that the applicants (owners of the blue lot) or their predecessors in title abandoned their right-of-way over the laneway, but he did not think that he had the proper parties before him (including the owners of the laneway) to make a formal determination that the owners of the blue lot had not abandoned the right-of-way.  Justice Myers was prepared, however, to enforce the applicants' deeded right-of-way as against the other two residential lot owners (pink and yellow) in personam so that neither of those two owners would be permitted to block the laneway.  He specified that, "nothing herein is intended to bind the true owner(s) of the laneway and my order is expressly without prejudice to any and all rights of the true owner(s) to assert abandonment or any other causes of action or defence that he, she, it, or they may have against the [residential owners]."

Read the decision at: Currie v. Chatterton.

BC Horse Farm case sent back to Farm Industry Review Board - original decision was unreasonable

In 2009, PH constructed a new barn on her farm property in Kelowna, BC to accommodate an equestrian business.  Her neighbours to the south brought a claim before the Farm Industry Review Board claiming that they were suffering from the effects of noise, lights, flies and odour from the farm.  In March, 2013, the Board found that a section of the horse farm and equestrian centre was not a normal farm practice - turning out horses within 15 metres of the southerly property line was deemed not a normal farm practice based on the City of Kelowna's zoning by-law and the Ministry of Agriculture's Farm Practice Review Guide.

 

The Board dismissed the noise and light complaints and determined that the farm's manure management practices were normal farm practice.  However, the Board accepted the complaint concerning the location of "livestock area B", which was not set back from the southerly property line.  The Board ordered that the area be shifted at least 15 metres from the boundary.

 

PH appealed and, on judicial review, the BC Supreme Court found that the Board's decision was unreasonable; the matter was remitted to the Board for a re-hearing.

 

The Court found that the Board, on the whole, failed to consider evidence pertaining to similar farm businesses in similar circumstances.  The Board's decision was not justified or transparent and reasonable because of that.  The Court wrote:

Although it is important to conduct an evaluative function that addresses the "good neighbour" principle, etc., the BC legislature chose clear and specific features of normal farm practices, including "accepted", "established", and "followed" practices.  This language is a clear and specific direction from the legislature that instructs the [Board] that it can supplement but not substitute certain evidence - e.g. provincial guidelines or the "good neighbour" principle - in place of evidence that demonstrates "proper and accepted customs and standards as established and followed by similar farm businesses under similar circumstances".  Indeed, the [normal farm practices legislation] circumscribes the evidence the [Board] must consider in making its final determination of normal farm practice.

and,

The legislature was clear when it defined the normal farm practice as a practice consistent with "proper and accepted customs and standards as established and followed by similar farm businesses under similar circumstances"; the [Board] was required to determine whether practices and by laws comport with those established practices.

Read the decision at: Holt v. Farm Industry Review Board.

Dead lawn points to neighbour's herbicides, but standard of proof not met

The Plaintiff in a Saskatchewan small claims suit alleged that the Defendant applied a substance in the back alley next to his property that caused damage to the Plaintiff's lawn.  The judge hearing the case was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that a substance from the back alley did migrate to the Plaintiff's lawn, either through run-off or leaching, and killed it.  This finding was supported by viva voce testimony, an investigation report, and photographs.  However, the judge was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Defendant had anything to do with putting the substance into the back alley or that the substance came from the Defendant's property.

Of course, the judge accepted that the Plaintiff's suspicions about the Defendant's involvement were not unwarranted.  The Defendant was employed by a crop production services company and the Plaintiff's wife had seen the Defendant dump liquid in the back alley.  The Defendant told the Plaintiff that he has used glyphosate and Ally, and may have "mixed one a little strong".  The Defendant's yard is directly across the back alley from the Plaintiff's yard, and the alley slopes from the Defendant's yard to the Plaintiff's yard.  And there was no plant kill in any other yard in the area.

In spite of this circumstantial evidence, the judge did not find for the Plaintiff.  There was no evidence of what substance had actually killed the Plaintiff's lawn, and no samples had been taken from the back alley to test for chemicals in that area.  The Plaintiff suggested that the cost of testing for numerous substances until the correct one was found would be prohibitive, but it appears to have left the Plaintiff without the evidence necessary to prove the claim.

The Court dismissed the Plaintiff's claim, but (perhaps tellingly) made no order as to costs. 

Read the decision at: Charbonneau v Statchuk.

Saskatchewan man loses appeal from conviction for stealing cattle

Farmer D was convicted of stealing cattle contrary to Section 338(2) of the Criminal Code and of fraudulently making a false or counterfeit mark on cattle contrary to Section 338(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.  D acknowledged at trial that he had sold the cattle in question, but said that he had believed they were part of his own herd.  His evidence was not accepted, resulting in his convictions.  Farmer D's appeal of the convictions has been dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.

The evidence at trial was that, in late 2009, Farmer S noticed that 10 yearling Simmental heifers were missing from his herd.  He called neighbours about the missing heifers, including the wife of Farmer D.  A few days later, another neighbour told Farmer S that he had seen about 10 Simmental cattle in the ditch along a road near the farms of Farmer D and Farmer S.  At trial, the hired man of Farmer D also testified that he had seen the cattle in and near the ditch and that he had told Farmer D about them.

A few days later, Farmer S observed a cattle truck in the yard of Farmer D with someone chasing cattle to the yard.  Farmer S was suspicious and began calling livestock facilities in search of his cattle.  Ultimately, it was determined that Farmer D had sold Farmer S' missing cattle, after having tagged their ears with his own tags.  The yellow "dangle" tags and the radio frequency tags applied by Farmer S had been removed.  The trial judge did not believe that Farmer D had failed to realize he was dealing with Farmer S' cattle.  For instance, the trial judge said that it was not within the realm of possibility that all of the tags applied by Farmer S had fallen out; he concluded that Farmer D had removed the Farmer S tags and replaced them with his own tags before selling the cattle.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments advanced by Farmer D; first that the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence and reached unreasonable verdicts and, second, that the judge erred by ignoring or overlooking the testimony of Farmer D's wife and daughter.  On the first argument, the Court of Appeal reviewed the factual findings of the trial judge and found that he had not misapprehended the evidence, which "pointed strongly in the direction of [Farmer D's] guilt".  On the second argument, the Court of Appeal found that the evidence of Farmer D's wife was not material given that Farmer D acknowledged that he had sold cattle belonging to Farmer S.  The evidence of Farmer D's daughter was not helpful either; it only indicated as a general proposition that cattle sometimes lose tags (and not that it was possible for all 10 missing heifers to lose their tags).

Read the decision at: 2014 SKCA 44 (CanLII).