The Court of Appeal for Ontario has upheld the dismissal of a damage claim by dairy farmers who alleged tingle voltage or stray voltage as the cause of reduced milk production. The trial judge accepted the expert evidence of the claimants that tingle voltage could cause the type of harm alleged, but found that it was not the cause in this case. The Court of Appeal noted:
"The trial judge considered the whole of the evidence and importantly found that if tingle voltage had been the cause of the reduced milk production from 1997 forward, there would have been overt signs on the herd. He concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate such signs and accordingly the appellants had not established that the herd was being affected by tingle voltage. In his view, milk production had been relatively good in 1995 and 1996 and declined thereafter and there was no change in the hydro system that could account for the changes after 1997."
While the trial judge had found that Hydro One had breached the standard of care in failing to give adequate warning to farmers about the possible harms caused by tingle voltage, the lack of causation between the tingle voltage and the loss of milk production was fatal to the claim. The trial judge found that the only cause of milk production loss proven on a balance of probabilities was inadequate labour, and the Court of Appeal declined to interfere with this finding.
Read the decision at: Cowan v. Hydro One Networks Inc.
Storm
Showing posts with label expert evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label expert evidence. Show all posts
Friday, January 10, 2014
Tingle voltage appeal dismissed by Ontario Court of Appeal
Tuesday, September 3, 2013
Court of Appeal upholds conviction for dangerous tractor driving
The appellant in this case before the Ontario Court of Appeal was convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (in this case, a tractor) under the Criminal Code. The evidence at trial included the following:
Read the decision at: R. v. Clare.
• the appellant was driving a tractor at 30-35 kilometers per hour along a rutted gravel and dirt road, causing the tractor to bounce along the road;
• the appellant was driving in a deliberate manner, and appeared determined to return to his property, heedless of those who were in his path or were attempting to stop him;
• without slowing, the appellant drove the tractor through a narrow opening between two trailers, one of which was moving, barely missing both;
• the appellant drove toward a police constable, ignored his motions and shouts to stop, and drove within a few of meters of his vehicle before making an evasive manoeuvre to avoid it;
• he continued along the road at top speed toward another police constable, who feared for his own safety, to the extent that he nearly drew his own service revolver, before the appellant abruptly veered away at the last minute to avoid striking him;
• he drove up onto the narrow berm, adjacent to and above a third police constable in his cruiser, putting the officer in fear for his own safety, before the tractor did in fact roll off the berm; and
• the evidence of several witnesses, including the officers, who testified that the appellant’s driving caused them to fear for their own safety.
The Court of Appeal granted the appellant leave to appeal the decision from a summary conviction appeal judge because the appellant had been self-represented for that appeal (and may have misunderstood the procedure). The appellant argued to the Court of Appeal that the trial judge was wrong to find that the appellant had the required mental element or intent (mens rea) for the offence charged. He argued that the determination of the mens rea element required a determination of whether the manner of driving was a "marked departure" from the standard of care. The appellant submitted that a lay person, lacking specialized knowledge of the operation of a tractor, is not able to appreciate the risks of operating a tractor in the circumstances or the measures a reasonable person would take to avoid them. This, he said, would call for expert evidence.
The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found that the risks of the appellant's driving and the means of avoiding those risks were "plain and obvious" and did not call for expert evidence: "While there may be cases in which expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care in the operation of a tractor and whether the accused's driving was a marked departure from that standard, this case is not one of them." The appeal was dismissed.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)