Enbridge Line 6B Citizens' Blog

Click here to visit a blog by "concerned landowners affected by the Enbridge 'replacement' project": Line6B Citizens' Blog.  Recall that Enbridge's plan for its Line 6B pipeline in Michigan (related to the Kalamazoo River spill) is to abandon about 75 miles of pipe in place and to construct new pipe in a new easement next to it.  The new easement will be obtained by expropriation where agreement is not reached with the landowner.

Turning a blind eye: NEB won't consider NTSB Kalamazoo Rupture findings in deciding on Enbridge Line 9 Reversal Application

The National Energy Board (NEB) has released a decision dismissing a motion by the Ontario Pipeline Landowners Association (OPLA) that requested the re-opening of the evidentiary record of the Enbridge Line 9 Reversal Project hearing process to allow the NEB to consider the report of the NTSB into the Line 6B Rupture in 2010.  Although the NEB was "satsified that the synopsis and full report could contain information that is relevant to the Project", it ruled that:

• it is "mindful that Enbridge and parties, who have fully presented their case, are entitled to a timely decision from the Board";
• the NEB "was fully aware that this NTSB report would be issued.  Still, the Board commenced its proceeding and conducted a public hearing without waiting for this report.";
• although the NEB has yet to release a decision on the Line 9 Reversal, "the Board is satisfied that it has conducted a comprehensive assessment against its own set of regulatory requirements and applicable Canadian standards to determine whether Enbridge has the ability to safely construct and operate the Project.";
• "The Board is of the view that it has all the information it needs to be able to make a final decision on Enbridge's Project."

The NEB's decision begs the question: what harm is there in considering the report of a sister regulator into Enbridge's operational and integrity management systems?  Not only has the NEB declined to postpone its decision on the Line 9 Reversal until it has reviewed the final report of the NTSB, it has declined even to consider the NTSB synopsis that is already available.

Read the decision at: July 20, 2012.

NTSB Reports on Enbridge Kalamazoo Rupture

Among the conclusions reached by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in its review of the Enbridge Pipelines rupture near the Kalamazoo River in Michigan in July, 2010 are:

• The Line 6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure due to corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from multiple stress corrosion cracks, which had initiated in areas of external corrosion beneath the disbonded polyethylene tape coating;
• Enbridge's delayed reporting of the "discovery of the condition" by more than 460 days indicates that Enbridge's interpretation of the current regulation delayed the repair of the pipeline;
• Enbridge's integrity management program was inadequate because it did not consider the following: a sufficient margin of safety, appropriate wall thickness, tool tolerances, use of a continuous reassessment approach to incorporate lessons learned, the effects of corrosion on crack depth sizing, and accelerated crack growth rates due to corrosion fatigue on corroded pipe with a failed coating;
• PII Pipeline Solutions' analysis of the 2005 in-line inspection data for the Line 6B segment that ruptured mischaracterized crack defects, which resulted in Enbridge not evaluating them as crack-field defects;
• The ineffective performance of control centre staff led them to misinterpret the rupture as a column separation, which led them to attempt two subsequent startups of the line;
• Although Enbridge had procedures that required a pipeline shutdown after 10 minutes of uncertain operational status, Enbridge control centre staff had developed a culture that accepted not adhering to the procedures;
• Had Enbridge operated an effective public awareness program, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control centre staff tried to start the line;
• Had Enbridge implemented effective oil containment measures for fast-flowing waters, the amount of oil that reached Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River could have been reduced;
• Enbridge's failure to exercise effective oversight of pipeline integrity and control centre operations, implement an effective public awareness program, and implement an adequate postaccident response were organizational failures that resulted in the accidenct and increased its severity.

The NTSB also commented that, "contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA's ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness."

NTSB Report: Enbridge Control Room Failure and the Kalamzoo River Spill

An excerpt from a recent report of the National Transportation Safety Board paints a picture of the surprising goings-on in the Enbridge Edmonton Control Centre while Line 6B was spewing oil into the Kalamazoo River system:

Operator B2 said he has never seen this problem before and that it was interesting. Operator B2 stated that the situation looked liked a leak, and Operator B1 stated that they could pump as much as they wanted but could never over pressurize the pipeline. Operator B2 stated that eventually the oil has to go somewhere. Operator B2 said that it seemed as if there was something wrong about the situation. Operator B2 said to Operator B1 'whatever, we're going home and will be off for few days.' Operator B1 stated they were not going to try this again, not on their shift

Andrew Nikiforuk discusses the report and its findings about Enbridge's operations in this article called: "Spill Crisis: 'Whatever, we're going home'".

What does Enbridge have to say about the report?  Enbridge suggests in a press release on its website: "Enbridge appreciates the hard work and due diligence of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating to the July 2010 leak.  We have been actively working with the NTSB and immediately reviewing and addressing concerns as they have been raised ... Until the final report is published, we do not intend to pre-empt those findings by commenting on specific details."

Not surprisingly, the findings of the NTSB on the failures in its control centre, which would have been known to Enbridge from the time of the 2010 leak, were not included in any of the information filed by Enbridge in support of its Line 9 Flow Reversal Project application.